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Most of the reforms discussed within the framework of the Lisbon strategy will benefit public 
finances in the long term. However, in the short-term, there could a trade-off between some 
structural reforms and budgetary discipline. This possible tension between reforms and fiscal 
discipline was identified by academic economists as a possible drawback of the Stability and 
Growth Pact since its inception.  
 
As a result of the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU fiscal framework now 
contains elements that allow better taking into account the budgetary impact of structural reform. 
These provisions permit to modulate the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact in case 
of major structural reforms both in the preventive arm (the definition of medium-term budgetary 
objectives and the adjustment towards them) and in the corrective arm of the Pact (the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure). In the coming months and years, ensuring an implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact that takes appropriately into account structural reforms will be a major challenge. 
The Council Regulations codifying the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact define conditions 
under which structural reforms could be considered in the EU fiscal framework. However, there 
are aspects open to judgement by the Commission and the Council. Adequate knowledge about the 
interactions between structural reforms and public budgets will be crucial for an economically 
sound use of this judgement. 
 
Unfortunately, to date there has been relatively little research on the relationship between 
structural reforms and government accounts. The workshop “Budgetary implications of structural 
reforms” organized on 2 December 2005 by DG ECFIN of the European Commission aimed at 
filling this gap. This issue of the DG ECFIN Economic Paper series collects the papers presented 
at the workshop.  
 
Some of the papers (Andersen, Giorno, Hoeller and Van den Noord) focus on the budgetary 
impact of structural reforms over the long term and analyse the long-term implications for public 
finances of policies aimed at reforming social security or the functioning of markets via 
equilibrium modelling techniques. These papers highlight how the impact of structural reforms on 
the future path of government budget balances and debt is driven by the interaction between the 
specific design of the reform, the functioning of the tax system and the social security system, and 
the overall macroeconomic environment. 
 
Other papers (Deroose and Turrini, Roeger) focus on the impact of structural reforms on budgets 
over the short and medium run. Reforms may hurt budget balances because implying a direct cost 
in terms of higher expenditures or lost revenues. The most relevant example is that of pension 
reforms shifting funded pillars outside the government sector. However, indirect costs could arise 
if political resistance to reforms is countered to some degree by a compensation of interest groups 
via tax cuts or targeted increased expenditure. These papers aimed at measuring the impact of 
different types of reforms on public budgets via modelling or econometric techniques. 
 
Finally, there are papers (Duval, Heinemann) attempting to answer the question whether the 
pursuit of budgetary discipline could be a deterrent for structural reforms. The aim is to test the 
widely quoted argument that a tight fiscal stance reduces the “political capital” available to 
governments, thereby reducing the feasibility of policies that encounter opposition from interest 
groups. The analysis in this case is not on the impact of reforms on budgets but, the other way 
round, on the impact of the fiscal stance on the probability of reforms.  
  
ii 
The analytical approaches differ across the papers, as well as the datasets employed. This poses an 
issue in deriving across-the-board conclusions. Nevertheless, a tentative summary of the main 
common findings can be made as follows. First, many reforms imply considerable potential long-
term gains for public finances. However, the size of the impact depends crucially on the design of 
the reform and the overall economic environment. Second, although the existence of short-term 
costs of long-term beneficial reforms cannot be easily dismissed, the magnitude of the short-term 
budgetary impact varies considerably depending not only on which sector of the economy is 
reformed (e.g., labour market reforms versus pension reforms) but also on the specific design of 
the reform (e.g., parametric pension reforms versus systemic reforms introducing mandatory 
funded schemes recorded outside government). Third, the impact of the budgetary situation and 
the fiscal stance on the likelihood of structural reforms is not clear-cut. The evidence seems 
consistent with a possible trade-off between fiscal consolidation and labour market reforms, but 
such trade off is not visible for other type of reforms (product market reforms, financial market 
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The paper evaluates ﬁscal sustainability by use of an explicit intertem-
poral (OLG) model. Sustainability problems are measured in terms of the
needed tax changes which either on a period-by-period basis balance the
budget or on a permanent basis ensure that the intertemporal budget
constraint is fulﬁlled. The pros and cons of these approaches to assessing
ﬁscal sustainability are discussed. In an application for Denmark the two
metrics for the sustainability problem are calculated and the implications
for the design and evaluation of policy reforms are discussed.
∗Comments and suggestion by the discussant D. Costello and participants at the workshop
"The Budgetary Implications of Structural Reforms" are gratefully acknowledged.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The medium to long run developments of public ﬁnances is in focus in many
countries due to changing demographics. Increasing dependency ratios imply
that systematic ﬁscal deﬁcits may develop, and this raises questions concerning
both the sustainability of public ﬁnances and thus current policies as well as the
timing and scaling of reforms.
For short run evaluations of the ﬁscal position it is important to have a fore-
cast of medium to long run developments, since the former need not be a good
indicator for the latter. For EMU countries the GSP stipulates norms for the
ﬁscal position. Originally these were formulated in terms of the current budget
and debt position (the 3% deﬁcit-to-gdp and 60% debt-to-gdp norms) with an
objective of ensuring that the structural deﬁcit is in balance or surplus. In a
recent reinterpretation (ECOFIN council (2005)) it is stressed that the evalua-
tion of the budget position should take the medium to long run developments
into account. In particular the inﬂuence of demographic changes should be con-
sidered. Moreover, it is stressed that the evaluation of the short run position
should be seen in perspective of eventual structural reforms leading to more
sustainable public ﬁnances.
Often ﬁscal policies are evaluated by considering the structural budget bal-
ance and questioning whether this is consistent with stabilization of a given
debt level. Although readily applicable this approach has some shortcomings.
First, in a forward looking perspective the primary balance may change sig-
niﬁcantly even for a given structural unemployment rate e.g. due to changing
demographics. Second, the approach is not easy to apply in evaluating the ef-
fects of reforms. Finally, the issue of ﬁscal sustainability is more complex than
just stabilization of debt levels.
While it is sensible to consider the medium to long run developments in
public ﬁnances in order to evaluate the ﬁscal stance and the need for reforms, it
also raises a number of questions. A key question is concerned with reliability
and credibility. What is needed is a realistic projection of the development in
public ﬁnances rather than desired paths. The latter are easy to formulate but
do not provide very useful guidelines for an evaluation of the sustainability of
current policies. This is in particular important since a main task is to provide
indicators on the need and scale of structural reforms as an input to policy
discussions.
Structural issues are involved in the discussion of possible policy reforms and
to this end an explicitly formulated intertemporal general equilibrium model is a
useful tool. The framework thus allows for indicators of the ﬁscal sustainability
problem but also for assessment of reforms which may either be phased in over
several years or have eﬀects which unfold over a sequence of years. Clearly the
speciﬁc results depend on the precise modelling assumption which needs to be
carefully considered in each separate case. A forward looking approach is needed
to take into account expected future developments aﬀecting public ﬁnances.
In this paper we present a forward looking approach using an OLG model
for assessing the sustainability of public ﬁnances and thus of current policies.
2We present metrics by which to assess the sustainability of public ﬁnances. A
straightforward indicator can be constructed by projecting the future path of
public budgets and how it is aﬀected by various reforms. This is useful in par-
ticular if the underlying budget proﬁle has a trend, e.g. a systematic tendency
towards deﬁcits. However, it is not without problems to project a path with "un-
changed policies" in an fully speciﬁed intertemporal general equilibrium model,
and it is also often hard to interpret a given budget position in terms of the
needed scale for reforms. Accordingly, it is useful to translate the sustainability
problem into a readily interpretable indicator which can be directly controlled
by politicians. This provides a better impression of the order of magnitudes of
the needed policy reaction. Via sensitivity analysis it is possible to assess the
uncertainty involved.
A simple indicator of the need for reforms can thus be calculated by ﬁnding
the change in e.g. a tax instrument (deﬁned on a broad tax base) needed to
balance the budget period by period. Note that this metric has no normative
implications as to whether the appropriate policy response is a tax increase.
Evaluating how this indicator is aﬀected by a given reform proposal provides a
measure of the contribution of the reform to ensure sustainable public ﬁnances.
Moreover, sensitivity analysis can be performed straightforwardly. The period-
by-period indicator suﬀers from two shortcomings. First, it leaves a number
of indicators — one for each year - and not a single and easily interpretable
indicator. Second, by implicitly requiring budget balance on a period-by-period
basis, it disregards the possibility that variations in the budget position may not
necessarily pose a problem (smoothing), and in some cases be part of a reform
package (e.g. if it is phased in over a transition period).
These problems are overcome by calculating an indicator of ﬁscal sustain-
ability given by e.g. the permanent change in a tax instrument needed to ensure
that the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector is fulﬁlled - the
sustainable tax rate. By evaluating how this indicator is aﬀected by various
reform proposals, a measure can be derived on the overall contribution to an
improvement in public ﬁnances without concern for the particular timing of the
budgetary consequences. A further advantage of this indicator is that it allows
a smoothening of the eﬀects over time, i.e. it allows for budget variation over
time, but ensures sustainability of public ﬁnances (the intertemporal budget
constraint is satisﬁed). The shortcoming is that it may suppress the underlying
time proﬁle, and this provides important insights into the process of designing
reform proposals.
As we will argue below these two indicators are closely related, and the
application will show that it is useful to apply both metrics since this provides
more detailed information on the mechanisms aﬀecting ﬁscal sustainability, and
also the appropriate way of designing reforms.
To assess the robustness and risk proﬁle of the evaluation of the sustainability
of public ﬁnances it is important to perform sensitivity analysis. This can easily
be done by either of the two indicators.
The paper presents both of these indicators and shows applications by use of
an OLG-model for the Danish economy (the so-called DREAM-model, which is
3a CGE-OLG model). We present an assessment of the sustainability of current
policies and show that there is a substantial sustainability problem despite the
fact that Denmark currently has a budget surplus. Since there is an underlying
trend deteriorating public ﬁnances, this case brings forth the weaknesses and
strengths of both indicators. We also present assessment of the implications of
three types of reforms (retirement, tax and labour market reform) and discuss
aspects to be taken into account in designing reforms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a short overview of
diﬀerent approaches to assess the sustainability of ﬁscal policies. The approach
taken in this paper is presented in section 3, and section 4 provides information
on the analysis performed for Denmark. The results on ﬁscal sustainability are
presented in section 5. Section 6 discusses reform strategies and presents an
evaluation of reform proposals, and section 7 provides a few concluding remarks.
2 Approaches in assessing ﬁscal sustainability
The concept of ﬁscal sustainability can be deﬁn e di nd i ﬀerent ways, but the
most widespread interpretation is "the government’s ability to indeﬁnitely main-
tain the same set of policies while remaining solvent" (Burnside (2004, ch. 2
p1).Various approaches and methods have been proposed in the literature to as-
sess the sustainability of ﬁscal policy. They all depart from the identify linking
changes in public debt to the primary balance and debt servicing (all measured
relative to gdp),
dt+1 =( 1+rt)dt − bt (1)
where r is the interest rate (growth corrected rate of return), d denotes debt
and b the budget balance (revenues less expenditures) relative to GDP.
Steady state conditions
For given interest rates, growth rates etc. this identity provides a relationship
between the debt level (d∗) and the primary balance (b∗) which can be sustained
in the long run (steady state). From this, one can from a targeted debt level
infer a required level for the primary balance, or vice versa from a given primary
balance infer the implied debt level (provided stability). This approach leads to
the so-called primary gap indicator (see e.g. Blanchard(1990)) which gives the
diﬀerence between the current primary balance and the level needed to sustain
a given debt level. The ﬁscal norms of the GSP pact can also be interpreted
from this perspective since a debt level of 60% of GDP can be maintained by a
primary deﬁcit of 3% of GDP provided that the growth corrected real rate of
return is 5%.
Debt dynamics:
It is well-known that the stability properties of the debt level depends on
the real rate of interest being less than the growth rate. Endogenizing interest
determination allows for the possibility that the stability condition depends on
the debt level. This implies that there may be threshold levels for public debt
below which the system remains stable. Identifying the threshold and comparing
4current debt levels to the threshold yield an indicator for the sustainability of
ﬁscal policy (see e.g. Tobin and Buiter (1976), Zee (1988) and Bagnai (2004))1.
Both of the approaches mentioned here share the property that they are
relatively simple and therefore also easy to apply. However, they rely on rather
mechanical assumptions concerning e.g. primary balances, and the forward
looking elements in the approach are mainly captured by the dynamics implied
by the debt accumulation equation allowing no role for future changes in con-
ditions impinging on public revenues and expenditures. Furthermore, it is very
diﬃcult to asses the consequences of structural reforms especially if the reforms
due to either implementation lags or eﬀect lags only show their eﬀects gradually
over time.
Empirical methods
An approach to empirical test of ﬁscal sustainability was proposed by Hamil-
ton and Flavin (1986) and has since been extended by various authors into a
VAR framework (see e.g. Carriero, Favero and Giavazzi (2005), Polito and
Wickens(2005)). The basic idea is to test for stationarity of primary balances
and debt levels. If unit roots in the primary balance or debt levels can be
rejected it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the intertemporal bud-
get constraint for the government will be fulﬁlled2. Leaving aside econometric
problems concerning the problems of unit root tests (sensitivity to alternatives
close to a unit root) the main shortcoming of this approach is that it is back-
ward looking and thereby completely disregards the forward looking aspects
currently raising concerns of sustainability in many countries. These methods
may be useful in characterizing historical periods but cannot be used to as-
sess future consequences of say demographic changes and the consequences of
proposed reforms.
Intertemporal approaches
Recently a number of analysis have taken explicit outset in the intertemporal
budget constraint. Most well-known is generational accounting (see e.g. Auer-
bach et.al. (1999), Kotlikoﬀ (1995). The basic idea is to use the intertemporal
budget constraint in combination with estimations of the contribution rates of
currently living generations to calculate the tax burden resting on future genera-
tions. By comparing the latter to the burden on newborns the inter-generational
proﬁle can be evaluated.
Obviously this calculation is based on various assumptions, but it is straight-
forward to make sensitivity tests to variations in the underlying assumptions.
An alternative closure is to consider the permanent decrease in government
spending or the permanent increase in taxes to restore generational balance
(see e.g. Cardarelli et.al. (2000)).
1The IMF method of critical debt levels also falls into this category. The aim is to determine
threshold levels for the debt level] (public or foreign) which would trigger a "crisis", see e.g.
IMF(2003).
2An alternative method is to test for how primary surpluses respond to public debt, since
as u ﬃcient condition for sustainability is that an increase in debt leads to higher budget
surpluses, cf Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2005). See Turini(2005) for an evaluation of
the short-term budgetary eﬀects of structural reforms.
5This is related to the so-called OECD approach which also relies on the
intertemporal budget constraint but which for a ﬁnite horizon solves for the
needed adjustment given an assumed level of debt at the end of the period
(Blanchard(1990)). The latter property of the method introduces a large ele-
ment of arbitrariness in the analysis since the results are very sensitive to the
imposed time horizon and the stipulated debt level3.
From the abovementioned forward looking approaches it possible to calcu-
late the level at which e.g. taxes need to be to ensure that the intertemporal
budget constraint is fulﬁlled4. The latter is often motivated by reference to tax
smoothing arguments.
One shortcoming of these approaches is that they neglect general equilibrium
eﬀects of say changes in taxes. This is a serious shortcoming in evaluating both
the order of magnitude of the needed changes to ensure ﬁscal sustainability and
the implications of various types of reforms. The second generation approach5
to which the present paper belongs is thus based on an explicit intertemporal
general equilibrium model (here: an OLG model for Denmark, cf below). The
main attraction is that this approach is formulated in such a way that it can be
used directly in the process of formulating and assessing policy proposals.
3 A forward looking method using an OLG model
The purpose is to develop indicators making it possible to assess the sustain-
ability of current policies, and in the case of sustainability problems the order of
magnitude of the required reforms. The following outlines the basic mechanisms.
A simple model in the appendix illustrates the calculation of the indicators and
their relation, while later sections present applications for Denmark.
Denote the primary budget deﬁcit - revenues less expenditures - (relative to
GDP) by
b(xt,yt,zt) (2)
where x denotes a vector of endogenous variables, y a vector of policies, and z a
vector of exogenous variables (including foreign variables, demographics, shocks
etc.). The endogenous variables are determined by some model left unspeciﬁed
here for simplicity, but the endogenous response of various variables and how
they impinge on the public budget is of course central to the whole approach,
cf below.
Policies are given by
3However, for a suﬃciently far-sighted horizon the sensitivity wrt. the debt level may be
very limited.
4Frederiksen (2001) proposes a method to calculate the sustainable budget balance given
the intertemporal budget constraint and assuming a exponential form for the deterioration
in net tax receipts. A disadvantage of this approach is that the sustainable budget balance
under a sustainable policy is not time invariant.
5Heide et.al. (2005) make an assessment of ﬁscal sustainability for Norway using a CGE-
model and solving for the PAYG value of the pay-roll tax. See also Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoﬀ
(2004) and McMorrow and Roeger(2004).
6yt = ft(xt,zt,θt) (3)
which depend on the current state, the policy form (captured by the function
f) and the policy parameters θ.T h i sr e p r e s e n t a t i o na l l o w sat r e a t m e n to fb o t h
structural and parametric reforms.
Hence the public budget is for given policy functions deﬁned by the implicit
function
βt (xt,zt,θt) ≡ b(xt,ft(xt,zt,θt),zt)
The public debt level relative to GDP evolves according to
dt+1 =( 1+rt)dt + bt (4)
where r is the growth corrected eﬀective real rate of interest on public debt.
The intertemporal budget constraint for the public sector reads6
PV(bt) − d0 ≥ 0 (5)
where PV denotes the present value operator and d0 the initial debt level.
Obviously the budget constraint - both the static and the intertemporal - are
fulﬁlled for a inﬁnity of policies, and it is therefore necessary to put more struc-
ture on the analysis to arrive at usable results. The issue is to clarify policies
which are sustainable in the sense that they do not violate the intertemporal
budget constraint.
Passive policies
A frequently asked question is what the consequences would be of main-
taining unchanged policies. Speciﬁcally, how would the public sector budget
balance(b) and public debt (d) evolve in the absence of any policy initiatives?
While it may be illustrative to show a divergent path for public debt, this
approach has two major shortcomings. It is very diﬃcult to determine critical
levels for the public budget balance and debt level beyond which the situation
is no longer tenable7. Theoretical work teaches us that the actual path followed
by the economy depends critically on the expected future policy interventions
used to correct a crisis situation. This is well-known from e.g. the literature
on the contractionary eﬀects of expansionary ﬁscal policy 8and the so-called
"balance-of-payments-crises" literature9. Empirical work also leaves it unclear
what the critical levels are. Moreover, the purpose of discussing sustainability
is not to clarify for how long policies can be maintained without provoking a
major crisis, but to aid in policy planning so as to avoid the possibility of such
crises.
6Assuming the usual no-Ponzi restriction.
7cf the approach taken by e.g. IMF discussed in section 2.
8See e.g. Bertola and Drazen (1989) and Sutherland(1993).
9The "balance of payments crises" literature shows that the crises caued by unsustainable
policies will depend on the nature of the policy intervention, which in turn critically would
aﬀect the timing of the crises.
7The purpose of an evaluation of ﬁscal sustainability is to assess the need for
policy reforms. Such an evaluation naturally takes its outset in current or un-
changed policies, that is, the purpose is not to predict future developments, but
to create an informed basis on which to discuss the need and nature of reforms.
Leaving aside the practical problems of deﬁning what is meant by unchanged
policies, cf below, there is the fundamental problem that a fully speciﬁed in-
tertemporal general equilibrium model necessarily builds on the premise that
the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector would have to be ful-
ﬁlled. That is, an instrument for adjustment needs to be speciﬁed to close the
model. This property should not be mixed up with Ricardian equivalence since
it follows from a consistent modelling of all interrelationships - the attractive
property and disciplining device of formulating an explicit intertemporal general
equilibrium model. To illustrate this point note that in a standard OLG model
Ricardian equivalence does not hold, however, this does not imply that there is
no intertemporal budget constraint for the public sector.
A pragmatic way of solving this problem is to close the budget by assuming
a lump sum transfer in the far future, cf below. This would allow debt to
accumulate and make it possible to assess the consequences of "passive" policies.
While a pragmatic solution, this approach is not without its problems. The
expectations of agents would diﬀer between a case where the budget constraint
is fulﬁlled by an outside transfer and a case with a future lump sum tax increase.
However, this problem may have less importance for the path in the initial
periods
Pay-as-you go
A simple constraint to impose on the analysis is to require a balanced budget
on a period-by-period basis. Requiring that the total balance is zero for all future
periods, i.e.
b(xt,y t,z t) − rtdt =0 for all t (6)
This ensures an unchanged debt position, i.e.
dt = dt+1 for all t
Clearly this condition can still be fulﬁlled for an inﬁnite of combinations of the
policy instruments, and it is not immediately clear from (6) what order of
magnitudes should be attained by policy changes aiming at ensuring that the
condition holds. Clarity can be gained by choosing one instrument (say θ1)a n d
solve for the value of the instrument ensuring that (6) holds leaving the policy
functions and all other policy parameters constant and thus time-invariant.
This approach yields a time dependent value of the policy parameter θ
payg
1 (t)
which ensures that (6) is fulﬁlled. The relation and path of θ
payg
1 (t) relative
to the current value of θ1(0) yields a perspective on the need and order of
magnitude of future policy changes as well as the underlying time proﬁle. If
there is a systematic diﬀerence between θ1(0) and θ
payg
1 (t), current policies are
not sustainable if θ
payg
1 (t) is systematically above (below) θ1(0) and θ1 is a tax
(expenditure) instrument.
8Note that the particular choice of instrument θ1 has no implications for the
optimal policy choice. It is obvious that it in general cannot be optimal to let
one policy parameter to carry the burden of adjustment. The interpretation
is thus that by focusing on one policy instrument one provides perspective on
the direction and order of magnitude of the needed policy changes, and one
policy instrument is singled out only for simplicity. For this to be useful the
instrument θ1 chosen needs to be a general policy instrument which is easily
controllable. For instance a tax rate with a broad tax base. In practice a
combination of policy instruments will be used, and the requirement is that
the package achieves a total eﬀect corresponding to the eﬀect captured by the
diﬀerence between θ
payg
1 (t) and θ1(0).
This approach is relatively simple to apply but it has two main disadvan-
tages. First, it implies that the initial debt level is kept constant throughout
time. This leaves aside whether this is optimal. Second, requiring a period-by-
period balancing of the public budget is unnecessarily restrictive and implies
that the capital market is not allowed to be used to smooth the adjustment.
Sustainable policies
An alternative procedure is to solve for the permanent level to which θ1would
have to be adjusted for the intertemporal budget constraint (5) to be satisﬁed
- allowing all policy functions and all other policy parameters to be unchanged
and thus time invariant10. Denote this value by e θ1. The interpretation is thus
that by making an adjustment of the policy parameter θ1to e θ1,t h et o t a lp o l i c y
package is sustainable in the sense that it is consistent with the intertemporal
budget constraint. By implication future policy changes are only needed to
deal with unanticipated changes. The case of sustainable policies can also be
interpreted as smooth policies in the sense of time invariant policies. It is often
a policy objective to avoid policy changes and having policies invariant over
time and thus generations. There can also be eﬃciency arguments for choosing
smooth tax policies (Barro(1979)).
By comparing the current value of the policy instrument θ1 to the sustainable
value e θ1 one can assert both the sustainability of current policies and the needed
order of adjustment to ensure sustainability. Speciﬁcally we have that current
policies violate (14) and therefore are unsustainable, that is, the present value
of revenues falls short of the present value of expenditures including initial debt
if








The interpretation is that if the instrument θ1 chosen is a revenue instrument
( ∂b
∂θ1 > 0) then there is a sustainability problem if the sustainable value exceeds
10Presuming that a solution exists, cf also appendix.
9the initial value, e θ1 >θ 1(0), and vice versa for an expenditure instrument
( ∂b
∂θ1 < 0).
If there is a sustainability problem a metric of the problem is given by ¯ ¯ ¯θ1(0) − e θ1
¯ ¯ ¯.
An advantage of this approach is that it yields an answer to the question of
ﬁscal sustainability in one metric taking into account the whole future proﬁle
of public ﬁnances and using capital markets to smooth eﬀects across periods.
Notice that this simplicity is attained at the cost of being unable to unravel the
proﬁle of the underlying problem from the indicator.
The sustainable value of the policy parameter can be interpreted as the
present value of the path calculated under the PAYG solution, i.e.
e θ1 = PV(θ
payg
1 (t))
which holds exactly if initial debt is zero, as shown in the appendix.
The sustainability indicator obtained by the approach outlined above can be
interpreted as a market test of the sustainability of public ﬁnances. This is so
since the indicator is based on the intertemporal budget constraint given market
interest rates, and therefore provides an answer as to whether current policies
(policy functions f and parameters θ) are consistent with the intertemporal
budget constraint. If the answer is conﬁrmative the conclusion is that it is
feasible to maintain current policies. However, this does not answer the question
whether it is desirable not least optimal to maintain current policies11.I t
is obvious that optimal policies cannot be derived solely by considering the
budget constraint. If it is found that current policies are unsustainable it can
be concluded that an adjustment eventually would have to take place - current
policies cannot be maintained, but the analysis does not say anything about
how and when the change will take place.






which gives that the path the primary budget balance would have to follow in
order for policies to be sustainable. Note that this path for the primary budget
is both dependent on the particular instruments used in calculating sustainable
taxes and time dependent. This points to the fact that it is not easy to use
a budget metric as a guideline for formulating medium term objectives for
ﬁscal policies. However, as shown in the application below it may be useful to
consider the path for the budget balance when discussing the appropriate policy
response, cf below.
In conclusion, by calculating both the PAYG-tax and the sustainable tax
one arrives with the taxonomy that the former implies a constant level for the
public debt (and public balance) and a time varying tax rate, while the latter
has a constant tax rate and a time dependent level for public debt and the
11Floden(2003) shows in a model with inﬁnitely lived household how the optimal policy
prescribes tax smoothing and a pre-funding due to demographic shifts.
10public balance. In this way the two approaches span two orthogonal dimensions
of possible reform directions.
4A n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r D e n m a r k
The following provides an application of the approach outlined above for Den-
mark.
4.1 The DREAM model12
The analysis is conducted using a large scale dynamic CGE model, named
DREAM, which has been developed with the purpose of evaluating medium-
to-long term eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in Denmark. This model is thus quite appro-
priate for assessing issues of ﬁscal sustainability and to evaluate the sensitivity
to changes in key variables.
The model is based on an overlapping generation structure, and the focus is
on demographic developments and the Danish public sector. DREAM represents
a small open economy with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, perfect mobility of
capital and residence based capital taxation, implying that the nominal interest
rate is given by the international capital market. Danish and foreign products
are considered imperfect substitutes in both production and consumption, and
foreign trade is modeled using the Armington approach. Prices and wages are
therefore inﬂuenced by internal Danish economic developments.
T h ec o r eo fD R E A Mi st h eh o u s e h o l ds t r u c t u r e .T h em o d e lu s e st h ed e t a i l e d
projection of the Danish population presented in section 3.1. The adult popula-
tion is divided into 85 generations, each consisting of cohorts in a 1-year interval,
starting with people who are 17 years of age. For each generation a representa-
tive household is constructed. Children are distributed between the households
according to the age-speciﬁc fertility rates of the demographic forecast.
Each representative household optimizes its labour supply, consumption,
and savings decision in each period given perfect foresight. Savings take place in
owner-occupied dwellings, ﬁnancial assets (stocks and bonds) and labour market
(second pillar) and private (third pillar) pension schemes. The labour market
is characterized by unionized behavior giving rise to structural unemployment.
There are two private production sectors: a construction sector and a sector
producing other goods and services. Firms optimize intertemporally and use
labour, capital and materials in the production process. Investments are subject
to convex costs of installation, giving rise to gradual capital adjustments. Like
the labour market, product markets are characterized by imperfect competition.
An exogenous Harrod-neutral, labour-augmenting productivity growth rate of
2 percent annually and an exogenous foreign inﬂation rate of 2 percent are
assumed.
12The Danish Rational Economic Agents Model. For details see Knudsen, Pedersen, Pe-
tersen, Stephensen and Trier (1998,1999) and Pedersen, Stephensen and Trier (1999). More
information can be found at www.dreammodel.dk.
11The public sector produces goods that are mainly used for public consump-
tion. In addition it levies taxes and pays transfers and subsidies to households
and ﬁrms. These are modeled in great detail to capture actual systems and
rules as closely as possible. The most important taxes in terms of revenue are
local- and central-government income taxes, VAT, excise duties, corporate taxes,
property taxes and a tax on yield of pension funds. Tax rates are assumed to
remain constant in the forecast period. On the expenditure side 23 diﬀerent
transfers are distinguished and paid out to individuals of each respective age,
gender and origin group following the actual distribution in 2001. In the same
way expenditures for individual public consumption (mainly educational, health
and social expenditures) are distributed to individuals. These individual (per
age, gender and origin group) expenses are forecasted to increase with the rate
of inﬂation and the exogenous productivity growth. The remaining collective
public consumption is assumed to grow at the same rate as domestic GDP.
4.2 Unchanged policy
The starting point is to evaluate the sustainability of current policies, and this
requires a precise clariﬁcation of what is understood by unchanged policies. This
is complicated since it involves both current tax, transfer and welfare schemes.
The key assumptions made here are the following( further details are given in
Velfærdskommissionen (2004, 2005))
* Transfer incomes are regulated annually by wage increases in the
private sector13.
* The frequency of the population receiving various income transfers
is constant across gender, age and country of origin.
* The frequency of the population using various forms of welfare
services (individual collective consumption) is constant across gender,
age and country of origin. The average cost per person is regulated
annually by the sum of productivity increases and inﬂation
equal to wage increases.
* Collective public consumption is a constant fraction of GDP.
* Public investments are determined such that the capital-labour
ratio in public production is constant.
* All tax rates (including excise taxes) are assumed constant.
Taxes levied on a per quantum basis are regulated by inﬂation14.
* Working hours and the fraction working part time are constant
Broadly interpreted the assumptions made here correspond to assuming un-
13According to Danish indexation rules"satsreguleringsloven" all transfers are indexed on
private sector wages. However, 0.3 percentage points of the wage increase are transferred to a
public fund "satspuljen" if wage increases exceed 2%. The funds accumulated in "satspuljen"
are to be used for initiatives in the form of transfers or services beneﬁtting recipients of transfer
income. Note that since transfers are taxable income the distribution of part of the funds via
"satspuljen" rather than by full indexation of transfers tends to deteriorate public ﬁnances.
14Currently there is a so-called tax-stop freezing all tax rates, also some at a nominal level
(taxation of houses). In the projections the tax-freeze is assumed to be lifted in 2011.
12changed welfare arrangements and mode of ﬁnancing via various forms of tax-
ation. The basic question is thus whether these policies can be sustained, i.e.
are they consistent with ﬁscal sustainability.
4.3 The demographic projection
Demographic projections depend on future fertility, mortality and migration.
The uncertainty associated with the projection of each of these determinants is
signiﬁcant, and the evolution of the total population becomes highly uncertain
in longer run projections. However, what really matters in relation to ﬁscal sus-
tainability is the robustness of the demographic dependency ratio with respect
to changes in the underlying population ﬂows. The analysis is based on the
demographic forecast of the Welfare Commission (2004).
Using the methods suggested by Lee and Carter (1992), Haldrup (2004)
estimates age and gender speciﬁc mortality rates for Denmark using data from
1900-2002. These estimates imply that the average annual future growth rates
in life expectancy are in the range from 0.08 to 0.09 years for both men and
women. However, these estimates are cautious and imply that the growth rate in
life expectancy remains approximately half of that projected for Western Europe
over the next 50 years (United Nations, 2004). In any case, this suggests that
uncertainty with respect to life expectancy may be signiﬁcant.




























Note: Persons age group below 15 and above 64 as a fraction of age group between
age 15 and 64.
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2004)
The projection shows a fall in the size of the population (from 5.4 million
13today to 5.0 million in 2070), and the number of working-age persons (15-64)
is reduced by 10 per cent from 2002 to 2040 and by 16 per cent from 2002 to
2080. Over the same two periods, the number of elderly citizens (65+) increases
by 52 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively. Consequently, the demographic
dependency ratio increases by 27 per cent from 2002 to 2040 and by 28 per
cent from 2002 to 2080, cf ﬁgure 1. This indicates that the increase in the
dependency ratio during the next 35 years is not a phenomenon that is isolated
to the echo eﬀects of the large post-war generations. Rather, it is a permanent
shift to a higher level15.
5 Fiscal sustainability
We start by presenting the path for public expenditures and revenues under un-
changed policies, cf ﬁgure 2. It is seen that expenditures gradually but steadily
increase to a level systematically above revenues16.



















15Compared to previous yet very recent demographic forecasts, the shift in the dependency
ratio is qualitatively diﬀerent. In the 2001 forecast, the dependency ratio has a global peak
around 2040, but the ratio is then reduced to a level which is in between the current level and
the peak in 2040. This suggests that the demographic ageing problem has both a temporary
and a permanent component. The current demographic projection implies that the ageing
problem is almost entirely a permanent phenomenon, see e.g. Andersen et. al. (2005).
16Note that deposits into private pension funds are deductable in taxable income, the return
is taxed (at a low rate), but withdrawals are also taxable income. Since there has been a
substantial build-up of pension funds since the late 1980s this implies that there is a substantial
deferred tax payment in current pension funds. Therefore, the average tax share increases,
despite unchanged tax rates.
14The primary balance is initially in surplus but will gradually deteriorate, and
systematic deﬁcits will develop. The budget position changes by 4 percentage
points of GDP between now and 2040. Since the change in the demographic
dependency ratio is permanent, there is a persistent deﬁcit.




















Primary balance Total balance
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
The path shown in ﬁgure 3 raises the question of whether it is consistent
with ﬁscal sustainability. Are current surpluses and reductions in public debt
suﬃcient to cope with the projected deﬁcits?
In the following the base tax rate is used as the instrument for evaluating
the needed adjustments to ensure ﬁscal sustainability. This tax rate is chosen
because it is a tax rate with a very broad base (90% of all taxable persons pay
this tax, and the tax base is approximately 50% of GDP - the current rate is
5.5%) and easily interpretable. Note that in calculating the level of the base
tax in accordance with the PAYG-criterion or for the sustainable tax rate, the
consequences of tax changes are taken into account. For the base tax rate the
marginal costs of public funds in the DREAM model are 1.67.
5.1 Pay-as-you go solution
A natural starting point is to assume a pay-as-you-go ﬁnancing where policy is
continuously adapted to ensure a balance between revenue and expenses, cf (6).
This ensures that the debt to GDP ratio remains constant (consolidated public
debt at 5 % of GDP in 2003).
Under PAYG ﬁnancing, the consequences of the demographic changes are
ﬁnanced on a period-by-period basis. This implies that capital markets are not
15used to smooth the ﬁnancial burden, cf above.
The upward trend in the dependency ratio causes an upward trend in the
tax rate on labour income which in the medium to long run becomes more
than twice the current level, cf. ﬁgure 4. Underlying the trend there are some
variations. Initially there is scope for some tax reduction but eventually the















5.2 The sustainable tax rate
Consider alternatively the once and for all change in the tax rate that ensures
ﬁscal sustainability, cf above. More speciﬁcally this gives the permanent change
in the tax rate which ensures that the intertemporal budget constraint for the
public sector is fulﬁlled.
The sustainable tax rate is 7.9 percentage points above the current rate.
This shows two things. First, current welfare arrangements are not ﬁscally sus-
tainable despite current surpluses. Second, the needed reforms are substantial
since they should have budgetary consequences equivalent to an increase in the
base tax rate by 7.9 percentage points.
Since there is an underlying trend in the dependency ratio, it is an impli-
cation of the sustainable tax rate that it implies a substantial consolidation of
public ﬁnances. That is, it implies a pre-fun d i n gs t r a t e g y( f o raf u r t h e rd i s -
cussion see Andersen, Pedersen and Houggard Jensen (2005))17 The primary
17McKissack and Comley (2005) consider pre-funding strategies adopted in some OECD
16budget balance would thus remain positive for a long period of time (to 2076),
cf ﬁgure 5, implying an accumulation of public wealth reaching more than 100%
of GDP, which can be used to ﬁnance the upward expenditure drift in the future
(cf also ﬁgure 7 below).




















Sustainable tax No reform
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
To underline that other modes of ﬁnancing are available note that the per-
manent reduction in public expenditures ensuring ﬁscal sustainability is about
3.2% of GDP. The permanent increase in private employment is about 270.000
persons equivalent to an increase in employment by 10%. Note that this is a
hypothetical number since it is not based on any explicit policy initiatives. Both
of these measures also imply a consolidation and are therefore also prefunding
or savings strategies.
5.3 Comparison of PAYG-solution and sustainable taxes
PAYG-ﬁnancing stabilizes the debt ratio but implies a time-varying tax rate
with an upward trend, whereas the sustainable tax is constant, cf giure 6. Hence,
there is a substantive consolidation of public ﬁnances under the sustainable tax.
This reﬂectss the smoothing properties of the prefunding strategy. However, in
the present context the smoothing is primarily of an underlying upward trend in
the PAYG-tax rather than temporary variations around a more constant level.
countries.
17As a consequences the sustainable tax implies a substantial pre-funding with a
substantial wealth accumulation in the public sector.










2003 2013 2023 2033 2043 2053 2063 2073
%
PAYG tax Sustainable tax
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
The paths for public debt implied by the various strategies are seen from
ﬁgure 7. The PAYG-tax keeps debt at the initial level,and the sustainable tax
leads to an initial accumulation of substantial wealth in the public sector. This
wealth is used to ﬁnance net-expenditures in the far future.



















No reform PAYG Sustainable tax
18Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
Although the prefunding strategy smoothens taxes over time, it also implies
a generational proﬁle for the tax burden. This is so since the tax payments
for a long period of time (before 2080) would be larger under the prefunding
strategy compared to the PAYG-strategy. Considering the taxes paid by a given
generation it follows that all generations born before 2030 will have to face a
larger tax payment compared to PAYG-ﬁnancing, and vice versa for generations
born after 2030, cf ﬁgure 818.
The choice of strategy has the largest implications for generations born be-
tween 1970 and 2000. For these generations the present value of the diﬀerence
corresponds to 0.2 million Dkr per person over lifetime. The gain to generations
born after 2060 under the prefunding strategy has a present value of about 0.1
million Dkr per person evaluated over life time.
Figure 8: Difference in net-payments across 

























Note: Present value of the diﬀerence in tax payments depending on the year of
birth, million Dkr per person
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
The distribution of gains and losses in net-contributions to the public sec-
tor can approximately be used to assess the relative change in utility for each
generation. This is so since the eﬀects on wages and prices of the two ﬁnancing
strategies are fairly similar compared to the diﬀerences in tax payments. Ba-
sically, the prefunding strategy implies that current generations are worse oﬀ
18This calculation is based on an earlier analysis, Velfærdskommissionen (2004). There is,
however, no qualitaty diﬀerence between the two.
19compared to future generations19.
5.4 Sensitivity and risk
The calculations presented above apply to the base scenario, but various as-
sumptions can of course be discussed. Moreover, it is important to identify the
risk factors which may aﬀect public ﬁnances the most. It is therefore impor-
tant to perform a sensitivity analysis. The results of such sensitivity analyses
are given in table 1 in terms of the changes in the sustainable tax rate. Similar
analyses can easily be done for the PAYG-tax but are left out here to economize
on space.
Table 1. Sensitivity — changes in the base tax rate under various
alternative assumptions
Change in base tax
Base scenario 7.9
Demographics
UN growth in life expectancy 16.7
Increased fertility (from 1.7 to 1.8) 8.6
+5000 immigrants annually - more developed countries 7.9
+5000 immigrants annually - less developed countries 11.2
Welfare services and leisure
0.10% reduction in work time per year 1.0
extra 0.15% real growth in welfare service per year 15.6
Labour market
Higher labour force participation descendants
from less developed countries 6.2
Interest rate and growth
0.5 percentage points higher interest rate 4.8
0.5 percentage points higher growth in TFP 14.0
Health care
"Year to death" and age dependency 7.3
"Year to death" and age dependency +
increasing standards 14.5
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d).
In the following we shall comment on two particular important aspects of
the sensitivity analyses.
19See Jensen et.al.(2002) for a comparison of equivalent variation measures and generational
accounts in the DREAM model. The analysis suggests a similarity in relative changes but
diﬀerences between the two measures occur primarily due to diﬀerences in discount factors
and the eﬀects of bequest.
204.1 Demographics
It is seen that the sustainable tax rate is very sensitive to longevity. With
no increases in expected life span, the sustainable tax is only marginally above
the current rate (1.6 percentage points) while in the base case the diﬀerence is
7.5 percentage points. Under UN projections implying about the double growth
in life expectancy the tax increase needed is about 16.7 percentage point. This
shows how sensitive public ﬁnances are to changes in the balances between the
number of years a person is net-contributor to the ﬁnancing and the number
of years as net-beneﬁciary. Note that the projections are made under an as-
sumption of unchanged eligibility ages for early retirement and pensions. This
shows that a major part of the ﬁnancing problem arises from the need to deal
with the fact that future generations would have higher longevity than current
generations.
Table 1 also shows that changes in fertility would only have a minor eﬀect on
the sustainable tax rate, whereas it would obviously have some eﬀect on taxes
under PAYG-ﬁnancing. Increased fertility worsens the sustainability problem
because future generations are expected to live longer.
Permanent changes in immigration only have marginal long-term eﬀects on
the demographic composition of the population. Critical for the eﬀects on the
ﬁnancing problem is the labour market attachment of immigrants and their
descendants20. This is so since universal welfare arrangements in Denmark pro-
vide entitlements to (almost) all individuals and compensate for lack of income,
whereas ﬁnancing goes via taxes levied on income generated in the market.
Assessed from current experiences with the labour market performance of im-
migrants, it follows that increased immigration from highly developed countries
would hardly aﬀect the sustainable tax rate.
A permanent increase in immigration from less developed countries would
worsen the sustainability problem due to the low employment frequency of this
group. If their employment possibilities could be improved, it would clearly
contribute to lowering the sustainability problem.
Finally, increased emigration could worsen the sustainability problem, in
particular since the emigration propensity is larger for highly educated. Cur-
rently, return migration is at a high level, but to the extent this changes, the
sustainability problem worsens. In short this is so since an investment is made
in education, which is not paid back later in the form of tax payments arising
from employment.
In sum, public ﬁnances are vulnerable if immigration is by groups with low
employment rates and emigration is by the better educated. Continued glob-
alization must be expected to lead to increases in migration ﬂows, although
immigration can be aﬀected politically.
Growth
It is often hypothesized that growth will automatically create more leeway
in public ﬁnances. Accordingly, proposals for structural reforms strengthen-
20Labour force participation is 85% for males and 76% for females. For immigrants from
more developed countries the corresponding ﬁgures are 69% and 57% and from less developed
countries 59% and 41%.
21i n gg r o w t ha r eo f t e na l s os e e na sm e a s u r e s to improve public ﬁnances, cf e.g.
ECOFIN Council (2005). This type of reasoning is based on the fact that budget
positions are very sensitive to the underlying business cycle situation. Despite
this, the relationship between growth and public ﬁnance in the medium to long
run may diﬀer.
As seen from table 1, increasing the growth rate for productivity growth
by 0.5 percentage points the sustainable tax increase is 12.8 percentage points
rather than 8.7 percentage points in the base case, i.e. the sustainability problem
is worse when the growth rate is higher.
This result may at ﬁrst seem counterintuitive but it arises from some very
basic mechanisms, cf also appendix. To see this start with the following basic
eﬀects of growth for public ﬁnances. If productivity increases in the private
sector and wages and income increase, it will have a direct eﬀect on public rev-
enues. However, expenditures will also be aﬀected. There are basically two
types of public expenditures, namely wage expenditures and income transfers.
The former will over the medium to long-run have to follow wage developments
in the private sector21. The latter will also, under the political distributional
constraint that all groups should share the gains in material well-being (or equiv-
alently the distribution of income is not to change), follow wage developments
in the private sector. Hence to a ﬁrst approximation public expenditures will
grow in parallel to the growth rate for given welfare arrangements.
Actually, there are mechanisms implying that increasing growth may deteri-
orate public ﬁnances. First, since some tax bases are deﬁn e do np a s ti n c o m e( s a y
the taxation of withdrawals from pension funds) it follows that revenue is not
following the growth rate22. Second, increasing growth may lead to increases in
the demand for leisure (non taxed) but also increasing demand to standards in
services provided by the public sector (expenditure increase) implying a further
deterioration of public ﬁnances.
For the sustainable tax rate there is a further eﬀect at stake. Even under
assumptions ensuring that the PAYG-tax is independent of the growth rate. The
reason is the trend increase in the dependency rate. The increasing dependency
ratio implies a tendency towards systematic deterioration of public ﬁnances.
The sustainable tax requires that all - current and future generations - pay the
same tax rate, such that the intertemporal budget constraint holds. This implies
that current generations with lower income than future generations are going
to contribute to the ﬁnancing of future expenditures. The larger the growth
r a t e ,t h el a r g e rt h et a xr a t ew o u l dh a v et ob et oe n s u r et h a tc u r r e n tg e n e r a t i o n s
contribute suﬃciently to the ﬁnancing of expenditure drifts caused by a trend
increase in the dependency ratio.
The basic budget implications of changes in productivity growth under both
PAYG-taxes and the sustainable tax rate are worked out in a simple two-period
overlapping generations model presented in the appendix. The mechanisms
through which growth aﬀects either indicator are shown to demonstrate why
21Transfers are indexed to wages,cf the so-called "satsreguleringslov".
22A similar eﬀect is found for Norway in Heide et. al (2005).
22increasing productivity growth under very general assumptions may worsen the
sustainability problem.
6 Assessing the eﬀects of reforms
The two alternative modes of assessing the ﬁscal sustainability problems also
capture a fundamental dimension of reform strategy, namely a gradual adjust-
ment vs a front-loading/pre-funding(savings) strategy. The sustainable tax cor-
responds to a pre-funding strategy since the underlying demographic develop-
ments have a clear upward trend. Therefore, this implies a considerable con-
solidation of public ﬁnance over several decades. There are several arguments
against pursuing a strict pre-funding strategy. First, it implies that current gen-
erations come to contribute to the ﬁnancing of a net-expenditure drift primarily
caused by increased longevity of future generations. This is questionable on
equity grounds. Second, the needed amount of pre-funding necessarily depends
on the base projection. Substantial uncertainty is involved, and it is therefore
diﬃcult apriori to determine the needed pre-funding. Finally, on political econ-
omy grounds it is hardly advisable to pursue a policy path with substantial
budget surpluses and accumulation of public wealth over a prolonged period
which at the same time requires the policy discipline that standards in public
provision (both services and transfers) should be kept unchanged relative to the
base scenario.
For these reasons the following considers reform elements which have the
property that they are timed so as to match the underlying trends, i.e. they can
be considered as parts of a gradual adjustment strategy. The following focuses
thus on ensuring a proﬁle for public ﬁnances such that the primary budget
balance in trend is close to zero. Although some smoothing is allowed, there is
no substantial pre-funding or front-loading.
While the assessment of the sustainability problem in terms of needed tax
changes has served the purpose of clarifying the need for reforms, this does not
have any implications for the instrument choice. The reform proposals consid-
ered below aim at increasing labour supply and employment. The underlying
demographic proﬁle leads to an absolute decline in labour supply, and public
ﬁnances in Denmark are as noted above very sensitive to the fraction of the pop-
ulation in employment. This is so since employment aﬀects both public revenues
(via tax payment) and expenditures (via transfer, since most non-employed have
an entitlement to an income transfer in the Danish welfare system). By increas-
ing the employment share of the population it is possible to ensure a ﬁnancial
basis for existing welfare arrangements without resorting to expenditure cuts or
tax increases.
The following presents two speciﬁc reforms - retirement and labour market
reform - as well as a complete reform package recently proposed by the Welfare
Commission (Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)).
236.1 Retirement
A retirement reform can be seen as a natural response to increasing longevity
since it directly aims at ensuring a balance between the number of "contributing"
and "beneﬁtting" years to the social contract. However, demographic shifts
come gradually, and it is a further political concern that eligibility ages for early
retirement and pensions are not changed signiﬁcantly over short periods of time.
To allow agents to adapt to the changes it is thus a premise that the changes
should be phased in over a longer period of time. Given the long transition
period it is interesting to analyse how such changes, which have marginal short
run eﬀects over time, will aﬀect public ﬁnances and thus contribute to the
solution of the ﬁscal sustainability problem via an increase in labour supply and
employment.
In Denmark there is an early retirement scheme making retirement possible
from the age of 60 (the scheme has incentives to postpone retirement to 62),
and the oﬃcial pension age is 6523. The average retirement age is currently
slightly above 61, and more than 60% have left the labour market before they
reach the age of 65. Given the increasing longevity there has been much focus
on measures to increase the retirement age.
In the following, we present an assessment of a retirement reform with the
following two main elements
* The early retirement scheme is phased out over the period 2009 to
2028 , speciﬁcally the eligible age for entry into the scheme is
increased by 4 months per year starting in 2009, and the scheme
is closed when the early retirement period becomes 1 year.
* The eligible age for public pension is linked to longevity,
speciﬁcally by increasing the age limit by one month per year
starting in 201324
Note that longevity according to the demographic projection underlying the
calculations presented above approximately increasing by one month per year.
Hence, the reform of the public pension is to index the eligible age to longevity25.
In the assessment of this reform two issues are particularly important. The
ﬁrst is how large a fraction of persons currently on early retirement in the
absence of this scheme would be entitled to a diﬀerent transfer like disability
pension. Various assessments of this issue have been made, and it is estimated
that between 10% and 30% of those currently on early retirement would be
entitled to a diﬀerent transfer. In the assessment presented here the fraction is
23Eligibility to the scheme requires that contributions have been paid for at least 25 years
of the last 30 years. The contribution ﬁnances between 1/3 and 1/4 of the accumulated value
of the early retirement beneﬁt. The transfer is 91% of maximal unemployment beneﬁts. By
postponing early retirement from the age of 60 to 62 there is a higher transfer (100% of
maximum unemployment beneﬁts) and a more favourable treatment of some forms of pension
savings. Moreover, there is a tax-free bonus to persons delaying early retirement.
24Observe that the indexing of the eligibility age for the public pension is started later than
the out-phasing of the early retirement scheme since the opposite would imply a transition
period in which the early retirement period would increase.
25At regular intervals the indexation parameter should be adjusted to updates of demo-
graphic projections.
24set at 20%. Second, increasing labour supply by changing retirement schemes
is only of interest if it leads to more employment. It is a fact that there is
somewhat higher unemployment for elderly in the labour markets. Analyses
documented in Velfærdskommissionen (2005b,c) show that this is likely to be
driven by mechanisms on both the demand and supply side arising up to the
relevant horizon of labour market participation. Hence, by changing entitlement
ages, it is to be expected that there somewhat higher unemployment will remain,
but the age groups for which this prevails will be shifted upward along increases
in the retirement age.
The eﬀects of the reforms on labour supply and public ﬁnances (primary
balance) are given in ﬁgure 9 and 10, respectively. The gradual introduction of
the changes implies that the immediate eﬀects are modest. For the indexation
of the eligibility age for public pension the eﬀect is moderate for a long period
since it takes time for the indexing to accumulate to a signiﬁcant increase in
the "pension age". However, eventually both reform elements have substantial
eﬀects. It is thus an important implication that a reform which does not change
the rules in the very short run and therefore fulﬁlls the political criteria of a
gradual change in the entitlements of individuals leads to substantial eﬀects
on the sustainability problem. Measured by the eﬀect on labour supply and
employment the eﬀect in 2040 is about 160.000 (an increase of 8 %), and for
the primary balance there is an improvement in 2040 of 2.1 percentage points
of GDP, and the sustainability problem is reduced by some 80%.








































































Note: Growth in labour force relative to base scenario
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
The fact that the retirement reform only has marginal short run eﬀects but
substantial eﬀects over the medium to long run points to implications for policy
design. This is caused by the political constraint of avoiding sudden and abrupt
changes in entitlements . The credibility of the future changes are thus impor-
tant both from the perspective of individuals but also from a macroperspective.
25It is therefore important that the changes are institutionalized by explicit in-
dexation and an announced "tablitta" for changes in entitlement ages (early
retirement and pension). An alternative procedure which plans to carry out the
adjustment in steps by only undertaking one small step in the near future and
leaving further steps for an unspeciﬁed future will not fulﬁll this requirement.









































Note: The change in the primary balance (relative to GDP) relative to base case
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
6.2 Labour market reform
Consider next a reform aiming at reducing structural unemployment. Speciﬁ-
cally, the reform includes a shortening of the duration of unemployment beneﬁts
(from 4 to 2.5 years), an extended "youth package" implying a stronger focus
on education and making it more diﬃcult to enter the social security scheme
and with more focus on activation. These ingredients will reduce the struc-
tural unemployment rate by 1 percentage point. By linking a change in the
structural unemployment rate to explicit policy measures this also sheds light
on the general question concerning the importance of unemployment for public
ﬁnances.
The eﬀects on employment and the public budget balance can be read from
ﬁgure 11 and 12.











































































Note: Growth rate of labour supply relative to base case
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)











































Note: Change in the primary balance (relative to GDP) relative to the base case
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
6.3 Reform package
The Welfare Commission (Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)) has recently pro-
posed a reform package to solve the sustainability problem. The main thrust
of the package is to increase labour supply and employment so as to provide a
sound ﬁnancial basis for welfare arrangements without resorting to tax increases
or savings. The package has the following main ingredients; i) a retirement re-
27form (cf above), ii) a labour market reform (cf above) iii) an education reform,
iv) an integration reform and v) a tax reform. The main focus of all reform
elements is to improve public ﬁnances by a strengthening of labour supply and
employment, although the various reform elements have been chosen also with
other concerns in mind. As noted this focus takes its outset in the fact that
there will be a downward trend in labour supply..























Reform package No reform
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
The reform package has a substantial eﬀect on labour supply and employ-
ment with an eﬀect in 2040 of 252.000 equivalent to an increase by 10% in the
labour force relative to the "no reform" path. The contribution of the various
reform elements is shown in ﬁgure 14.



























Education Labour market Integration Retirement Tax
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d).
The reform package implies that the deteriorating trend in public ﬁnances
is eliminated and sustainability ensured. While the initial favourable position
is used to further consolidate public ﬁnances, the package essentially implies
that the primary balance is projected to vary very closely around zero reﬂecting
that the net-eﬀect of the overall reform package is timed so as to counteract the
consequences of the demographic changes. The budget balance is projected to
b ev e r yc l o s et oz e r o( m a x i m u md e ﬁcit in any year is 0.5% of GDP) and net-debt
relative to GDP is in no year above 10% of GDP. The reform package is thus
neither a pure PAYG-solution nor a pure consolidation/pre-funding strategy,
although if anything it is closer to the former than the latter26.
26Note that in the long run there is a tendency towards budget surpluses leading to some
consolidation coping with problems in the very long run. This has litlle current policy relevance
since it applies to a very long horizon.




















Without reform With reform
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005d).
The contribution of the various reform elements to the improvement in public
ﬁnances is shown in the table below.
Table 1: Decomposition of the contribution of the various reform
elements to the change in the primary budget position
2005 2020 2030 2040 2060
Base scenario 3.0 -0.1 -1.5 -2.1 -3.4
Education 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5
Labour market 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Integration 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Retirement 0.0 0.9 2.0 2.1 2.8
Tax 0.0 -1.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6
Other reform elements 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.3
After reform 3.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.5
Velfærdskommissionen (2005d)
Assessed in terms of ﬁscal sustainability the reform package solves the prob-
lem27The contribution of the various elements to the ﬁscal sustainability prob-
lem is: i) retirement 82.6% , ii) labour market 14%, iii) education 12.6%, iv)
integration 10.4%, while iv) the tax reform worsens sustainability by -21% .
The reform package includes one element where the timing plays a very cru-
cial role, namely the tax reform.The tax reform is motivated by both concerns
for asymmetries in the existing tax structure as well as the need to make the sys-
tem more robust to globalization. The particular tax reform considered involves
27Exactly 99.6% of the sustainability problem identiﬁed in the base case is eliminated.
30a shifting of taxes from labour income to real estate (i.e. shifting taxes in the
direction of less mobile tax bases). However, increased taxation of real estate
would be immediately capitalized in prices causing a capital loss for housing
owners on top of the liquidity problem the tax increase may create (in partic-
ular for families which have recently entered the market)28. By phasing in tax
reductions on labour income quicker than the tax increase on real estate it is
possible both to eliminate the immediate liquidity problem and to moderate the
price eﬀect29. This reform element thus has the element of ﬁrst deteriorating
public ﬁnances, but eventually public ﬁnances will improve, and the reform can
thus be seen as an "investment" in a better tax structure.
Note that the packages also includes increase public spending on research
(to reach a target for public expenditures on research of 1 % of GDP) and pre-
funding of pensions for groups not covered by mandatory labour market pension
or similar pension scheme. This explains the short span of years for which the
primary balance is in deﬁcit, cf ﬁgure 15.
Since it is an implication of the package that it brings public ﬁnances to a
situation very close to budget balance, it follows that exposure to various forms
of risk is reduced. This applies to variation in the interest rate and the growth
rate. For changes in longevity - where increase beyond the relative moderate
projections made here may be expected - this only applies if the underlying
indexation formula is maintained.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The issue of ﬁscal sustainability has been considered in an explicit intertemporal
setting, and indicators based on either a period-by-period (gradual) approach
or a once-and-for-all (permanent) approach have been considered and applied
for Denmark. The framework here allows an explicit consideration of reforms
aiming at eliminating the systematic trends towards making the situation ﬁs-
cally unsustainable. Likewise it is possible to evaluate how reform proposals
motivated by other concerns would aﬀect ﬁscal sustainability.
It is an open question over how long horizons policies should be planned.
However, it is important to consider the short term position of public ﬁnances
in relation to medium to long run trends. The current situation for Denmark is
a case in point - despite current budget surpluses and a trend decline in public
debt, it is the case that current policies are not ﬁscally sustainable. There is
a clear and systematic trend towards deterioration of public ﬁnances for un-
changed welfare and taxation systems. Since this primarily is driven by de-
mographic changes and a substantial lead time is needed to make changes in
retirement and pensions systems it is necessary to consider public ﬁnance over a
horizon of non-trivial length if sudden changes in policies should be prevented.
28Note that since the taxation (ejendomsværdiskat) depends on the price development it
follows that the liquidity problem is moderated the larger the price eﬀect, and vice versa.
29E v a l u a t e di nap a r t i a lm o d e lt h ee ﬀect is a price reduction of 11%. Taking into account
the whole package and the general equilibrium eﬀects, the eﬀect is halfed.
31Concerns for inter-generational equity and risk both point in the direction
of ensuring that the budget balance over the medium to long run is fairly close
to zero. A policy aiming at substantial pre-funding would in a number of re-
spects be a problematic strategy. By keeping public ﬁnances close to balance
it follows that the risk exposure is smaller, and the room for accommodating
short-run business ﬂuctuations are larger. These points have been illustrated by
consideration of a reform package recently proposed by the Welfare Commission
(2005d).
32Appendix A: The welfare state and the social
contract - PAYG-ﬁnancing and sustainable tax
rates
As i m p l i ﬁed version of the social contract can be represented in a standard
two-period overlapping generations model with generations in the work force
(the young) overlapping with retirees (the old). Nt is the number of persons in
the generation being young in period t (and therefore old in period t +1 ), a1t
denotes per capita services received from the public sector as young in period
t, and a2t per capita services received by the old in period t. Pensions paid to
old in period t denoted pt. The total income of those being active in period t is
denoted y1t, and it is taxed by a proportional tax rate τ.
The primary balance of the public sector in period t is
bt = Ntτty1t − Nta1t − Nt−1(pt + a2t)
= Nt [τty1t − a1t − (1 + ρt)(pt + a2t)]
where 1+ρ is the demographic dependency ratio30 in period t,i . e .1+ρt.I t
follows that ρ is negative when the population is growing, and positive when
it is decreasing. An increase in longevity prolongs the "retirement period" and
increases the demographic dependency ratio and can thus be interpreted as a
reason why ρ is positive.
In net terms the exchange of the young generation with the public sector is
Γ1t = Nta1t − Ntτty1t
and for the old it is
Γ2t = Nt−1(pt + a2t)
Given policy rules for welfare service, pensions and taxes - p(),a 1(),a 2() and
τ() - can be realized if and only if
PV(b)+D0 ≥ 0 (7)
where D0 is the initial public debt.
In the following we consider policy rules where
pt = γyt (8)
a1t = α1yt (9)
a2t = α2yt (10)
For pensions and welfare services it follows that they are proportional to cur-
rent income. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sa s s u m p t i o ni m p l i e saﬁxed relation between
30The fact that not all working people survive and reach the pensioner stage can easily be
included. Denote by Ot the number of pensioners in period t out of generation Nt born in
t − 1,w h e r eOt =( 1− φt−1)Nt−1, and φ is the likelihood of dying young. The demographic
dependency ratio is now Ot
Nt =1 + e ρ ≡ (1−φt−1)(1+ρt) < (1+ρt). Beyond this reinterpretation
of the change in the demographic dependency ratio, the analysis remains unchanged.
33pensions and income for those working, i.e. gains from growth are distributed
equally among active and passive members of society. The second part implies
that expenditures on welfare services are proportional to income developments.
This reﬂects that welfare services are labour intensive and that public wages
follow private wages very closely.31 Notice that all parameters are assumed
to be time-independent, i.e. given rules for pensions and welfare services are
considered.
The following focuses on the requirements to ﬁnancing given the increase in
the demographic dependency ratio. This is operationalized by considering the
changes in the tax rate needed to ﬁnance the expenditures. We consider two
ﬁnancing strategies, namely, pay as you go with continuous adjustment of taxes
to balance the budget and the sustainable tax rate, which over time is consistent
with the government intertemporal budget constraint.
We consider a "small and open economy" for which the (real) rate of interest
r is exogenous. To simplify, the interest rate is assumed constant over time.
Similarly the growth rate g is exogenous and constant over time. It is assumed
that r>g , i.e. corrected for growth the real rate of interest is positive.
Pay as you go ﬁnancing
Under pay as you go ﬁnancing it is a requirement that there is budget balance
on a period-by-period basis, i.e.,32
bt =[ τt − α1 − (1 + ρt)(γ + α2)]y1t =0 (11)
which immediately implies
τPAYG
t = α1 +( 1+ρt)(γ + α2) (12)
It follows straightforwardly that the optimal tax rate is increasing over time if
the demographic dependency ratio is increasing (ρ>0)a n dv i c ev e r s a . T h e
intuition is that it is necessary to tax the current work force more when a
large fraction of the population has to be supported. It is also an immediate
implication that
Γ1t = Nta1t − Ntτty1t > 0
Γ2t = Nt−1(pt + a2t) < 0
i.e. in net-terms the working population is net-contributors, and the retirees are
net-beneﬁciaries from the welfare arrangements.
Note that the tax rate under PAYG-ﬁnancing is independent of the income
level and thus the underlying growth rate. The reason for this neutrality result
31At the same time, demand will pull in the same direction if the income elasticity in demand
for welfare service is high.
32Can more generally be translated as a requirement for unchanged debt (relative to GDP).
For simplicity, the initial debt is assumed to be zero, and balance in the primary budget will
maintain a zero debt.
34is that all welfare arrangements (services and pensions) and the tax system are
proportional to the current income level. Increased growth will thus lead to
a proportional income in revenues and expenditures for the public sector and
therefore in net-terms not change anything. This neutrality result depends on
the way welfare arrangements and taxation have been arranged, which can be
seen by considering two special cases.
i) The tax system includes tax bases dependent on income in past period,
e.g. via taxation of pensions or the return on savings. The budget restriction
or the requirement to budget balance is in this case
bt =[ τt − α1 − (1 + ρt)(γ + α2)]y1t + µy1t−1 =0
where µy1t−1, is the revenue from taxation related to tax bases dependent on
earlier periods’ income (here income in the previous period). The balanced
budget requirement can be rewritten
bt =
£
τt − α1 − (1 + ρt)(γ + α2)+µ(1 + g)−1¤
y1t =0
where g i st h eg r o w t hr a t ei ni n c o m e( y1t =( 1+g)y1t−1). The tax rate under
PAYG-ﬁnancing becomes
τPAYG
t = α1 +( 1+ρt)(γ + α2) − µ(1 + g)−1
i.e. increased growth will increase the tax rate. The intuition is that while
expenditures are increasing proportionally to income, this is not the case for
the tax base since it also depends on previous periods’ income. Therefore the
needed tax rate to ﬁn a n c eg i v e nw e l f a r ea r r a n g e m e n t sg o e su p .
ii) Pensions are proportional to earlier labour income, i.e.
pt = γy1t−1
In this case pensions are seen relative to the income (and [this-?] consumption
possibilities) while working and not relative to those currently working. In this
case the budget restriction becomes
bt =
£
τt − α1 − (1 + ρt)(γ(1 + g)−1 + α2)
¤
y1t =0
and the tax rate under PAYG-ﬁnancing
τPAYG
t = α1 +( 1+ρt)(γ(1 + g)−1 + α2)
i.e. increased growth will reduce the PAYG-tax. The intuition is that expendi-
t u r e so np e n s i o n sa r en o ta ﬀected by growth since they depend on last period’s
income.
Sustainable tax rates
An alternative ﬁnancing strategy is to keep tax rates constant over time to avoid
varying tax rates and possibly minimizing tax distortions (Barro (1979)). The
sustainable tax rate is deﬁned as the tax rate b τ,which it is possible to maintain
35in all periods so as to ﬁnance welfare arrangements of the form (8), (9) and (10)









Initial debt is assumed to be zero. By use of (11 and (13), it is found that the
sustainable tax rate b τ,s a t i s ﬁes


































Consider the special case, where ρ is constant over time. In this case the sus-
tainable tax rate is
b τ = α1 +( γ + α2)(1 + ρ)
It is seen to coincide with the tax rate under PAYG-ﬁnancing, cf (7). This
indicates that diﬀerences between the two modes of ﬁnancing arise when the
demographic dependency ratio is not constant over time. It is an implication
that the sustainable tax in this case is independent of the interest rate and the
growth rate.
Trend changes in demographic dependency ratio
Consider a stylized situation with a trend change in the demographic depen-
dency ratio given as (1 + ρt+i)=( 1+ρ)
i+1. This implies that the sustainable
tax (14) becomes
b τ = α1 +( γ + α2)(1 + ρ)
(1 + r) − (1 + g)




=( γ + α2)
"
(1 + r) − (1 + g)
(1 + r) − (1 + g)(1 + ρ)
+( 1+ρ)(1 + g)
(1 + r) − (1 + g)






=( γ + α2)(1 + ρ)
"
(1 + r)ρ






= −(γ + α2)(1 + ρ)
"
(1 + g)ρ




where it is assumed that (1 + r) > (1 + g)(1 + ρ).
36An increasing trend in the dependency ratio increases the sustainable tax
rate. For the case where the dependency ratio is increasing (ρ>0), it follows
that an increase in the growth rate increases the sustainable tax rate, as does an
increase in the interest rate. The intuition is that the sustainable tax distributes
the ﬁnancing requirements over time. Since increasing growth means increasing
expenditures in the future, and since current generations are contributing to the
ﬁnancing it follows that the tax rate has to go up. Similar reasoning applies for
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ee ﬀect.
With a trend in the demographic dependency ratio, the initial budget balance
is
b0 =[ b τ − α1 − (1 + ρ)(γ + α2)]y1t
=( γ + α2)(1 + ρ)
·
(1 + g)ρ
(1 + r) − (1 + g)(1 + ρ)
¸
y1t
which implies that the sustainable tax rate implies an initial budget surplus if the
demographic dependency ratio is increasing, and vice versa if it is decreasing,
i.e. b0 > 0 for ρ>0,a n db0 < 0 for ρ<0. With an underlying trend in
the dependency ratio, it follows that the sustainable tax rate causes an initial
consolidation to create a ﬁnancial basis from which to ﬁnance future expenditure
increases. With an underlying demographic trend, the sustainable tax rate thus
induces savings to ensure a constant tax rate over time.
With an underlying upward trend in the dependency ratio, it is straightfor-
ward to compare the sustainable tax rate with the PAYG-tax rate, since
τPAYG
t = α1 +( 1+ρ)i+1(γ + α2)
b τ = α1 +( γ + α2)(1 + ρ)
(1 + r) − (1 + g)
(1 + r) − (1 + g)(1 + ρ)
i.e.
τPAYG
t − b τ = α1 +( 1+ρ)i(γ + α2) −
·
α1 +( γ + α2)(1 + ρ)
(1 + r) − (1 + g)
(1 + r) − (1 + g)(1 + ρ)
¸
=( γ + α2)(1 + ρ)
·
(1 + ρ)i −
(1 + r) − (1 + g)
(1 + r) − (1 + g)(1 + ρ)
¸
It follows that for ρ>0:τPAYG
0 −b τ<0, and there exists a e t, where τPAYG
e t −b τ>
0. This shows that the sustainable tax rate smooths the ﬁnancial burden caused
by the trend increase in the demographic dependency ratio.
PAYG-taxes and the sustainable tax rate
It follows immediately by use of () deﬁning the PAYG-tax that the sustain-
able tax from () can be written
















































i.e. the sustainable tax equals the present value of the PAYG-tax calculated
by the growth corrected real rate of interest. Note that this presumes that the
initial debt level is zero.
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1.  We take it for granted that fiscal discipline is important: i) fiscal policy volatility can undermine 
growth; ii) a pro-cyclical policy can destabilise the economy; iii) large deficits and rising debt undermine 
the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy and iv) excessive deficits will be a burden on future generations 
(Fatas, 2005). Fiscal rules are one way to cope with such fiscal policy biases, but they need to be 
underpinned by institutional settings so that they can be enforced at the national, and in the case of the euro 
area, at the Community level.  
2.  The EU fiscal framework was set to underpin the single currency. It was designed to address one 
key concern, namely that once exchange rates within the single currency area ceased to exist, financial 
markets would not longer discipline fiscal policy. Fiscal profligacy in one country could affect area-wide 
interest rates and crowd out economic activity in other countries. As interest rate differentials across the 
euro area countries have become small despite a divergent fiscal performance, there is little evidence of 
spill-over effects, probably because there is little to crowd out due to persistent economic slack in the large 
euro area countries. 
3.  This may be one reason why the arguments in favour of rules-based fiscal co-ordination have 
shifted towards long-term issues, not least because ageing-related concerns oblige governments to recognise 
the implications of current budget decisions for public finances in the future. Also, greater weight has 
progressively been put on the incentives built into budgetary institutions that produce fiscal biases (higher 
deficits, expenditure and taxes). But, while these institutions have improved to some extent, they are still 
lagging best practice in many euro area countries. 
4.  At the same time, calls to make the Pact more flexible have mushroomed. Some were motivated 
by new member countries’ need to boost infrastructure outlays, against the backdrop of relatively low 
public debt levels. Some observers have argued in favour of the “golden rule”, along the lines of the one 
introduced in 1997 in the United Kingdom.  
5.  Another rationale for a rewrite of the rules, and the topic of this conference, is that structural 
reform may yield long-term economic gains but entail up-front costs. The estimated gains of structural 
reforms are usually uncertain, whereas any immediate political and budgetary costs, such as compensation 
schemes to offset redistributive effects, are felt immediately and more tangibly. Moreover, some reforms 
will involve J-curve effects; a cut in taxation will reduce budget receipts immediately while effects on 
incentives to work, save and invest may be slow to materialise. This asymmetry could discourage reforms, 
especially in a monetary union, where they cannot be supported via an easing of monetary policy. Similarly, 
a move towards privately funded pension schemes would lead to deficits in the public scheme but initial 
surpluses in the private schemes as contributors transfer to them. 
6.  According to the fiscal rules a waiver could be granted under the excessive deficit procedure to 
countries on the basis of “exceptional circumstances” (EC 2005a). While the Treaty had already stipulated 
that “other relevant factors” should be part of the “exceptional circumstances”, these were not specified. 
The revamped Pact decided by the European Council in March 2005 specifies them and the conditions 
under which they are taken into account. These include a country’s efforts to pursue the Lisbon agenda, to 
foster R&D or “a high level of financial contributions” to underpin the “unification of Europe” and 
“international solidarity” (development aid). Consideration would also be given to pension reforms. 
Concerning the Lisbon agenda, the new Council Regulation observes: “In order to enhance the 
growth-oriented nature of the Pact, major structural reforms which have direct long-term cost-saving 
effects, including through raising potential growth, and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, should be taken into account when defining the adjustment path to the 
medium-term budgetary objective for countries that have not yet reached this objective and in allowing a 
temporary deviation from this objective for countries that have already reached it” (EC, 2005b). All these 
provisions, however, only apply if “an excess over the reference value is temporary” and if the deficit ratio 
“remains close to the reference value”, as stipulated in the Treaty.  
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7.  There is not yet a proper framework for making decisions about such exemptions in place. In this 
paper, various aspects of the nexus between structural reforms and budgetary developments that should 
underpin such a framework will be highlighted. In the first part of the paper we look at the following issues: 
i) to what extent do budgets cost structural reforms? The United Kingdom, which has a very elaborate fiscal 
framework, is used as an example. ii)  There may be budgetary cost from not reforming government 
programmes, such as disability or early retirement programmes, which should also be taken into account. 
iii) Large inventories of structural reforms exist. While they have been used to estimate the effects of 
reforms on growth, budgetary implications are seldom quantified. This is obviously difficult to establish. 
Two countries, New Zealand and Australia, which have implemented a radical reform agenda are used here 
to shed some light on these issues. The second part of the paper uses econometric tools to establish to what 
extent structural reform affects public expenditure, in the short as well as the long run. The data allow us to 
detect both upfront cost and long-run gains of structural reform, although both seem to be modest in 
comparison with other structural determinants. The third part uses simulations with the OECD’s Interlink 
model to highlight the implications of reforms that affect technical progress, the participation rate and the 
natural rate of unemployment in different settings. 
Linking reforms and the budget  
The UK budget: a role model? 
 
8.  Assessing the budgetary implications of structural reforms in the short, medium and long run is 
shrouded with many difficulties. In many cases, governments do provide a costing of changes in tax and 
spending plans and often also beyond the current budget.
1 Obviously, changes in tax and spending plans are 
pursued for many other purposes than purely fiscal ones. UK Budgets (HMT, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004), 
for instance, provide an assessment of Budget policy decisions over a three-year horizon under the 
following headings: meeting the fiscal rules and funding public services; meeting the productivity 
challenge; increasing employment opportunity for all; building a fairer society; a modern and fair tax 
system; and protecting the environment.   
9.  Budget 2002 (Table A.I), for instance, lists 54 spending and tax measures and estimates their 
budgetary effect. The budgetary impact of 16 measures implemented since Budget 2001 are estimated as 
well. The biggest measure was a payroll tax increase and the second biggest an increase in the generosity of 
the Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit for families with children. All other measures were small, 
ranging from beer duty relief for small brewers to simplifying capital gains tax. While the list of measures 
is long, only those are included where the impact of the decisions and circumstances can be quantified with 
reasonable accuracy. Moreover, spending that is fixed by the spending reviews and embedded in 
Departmental Expenditure Limits is not included in the Budget costing of decisions. In 2002, the net fiscal 
impact of the identified spending and revenue measures was nearly 1% of GDP, but considerably lower in 
most other Budgets. In comparison, the forecasting error for the deficit was equivalent to 1% of GDP for 
the year-ahead projection in recent years and nearly 1½ per cent of GDP for the two-year ahead projection 
(Table 1). There is no strong hint in the Budget costings that reforms have generated large budgetary costs 
in the short term. However, this is so mainly, because the spending underpinning the ongoing reforms to 
health, education and infrastructure are built into (hence respect) the Departmental Spending Limits.  
 
1 .  According to the 2003 Survey on Budget Practices and Procedures (available at http://ocde.dyndns.org/), 55% of the OECD countries 
provide multi-year cost estimates for all new spending items, and another 20% do it for some mandatory spending items. The survey does not 
cover revenue changes.    
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Table 1. The costing of Budget policy decisions in the UK 
Budgetary measures as a per cent of GDP
1
  2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
Budget 2001  -0.2  +0.2  +0.3       
Measures since Budget 2000  -0.3  -0.4  -0.3       
Budget 2002    -0.1  +0.6  +0.7     
Measures since Budget 2001    -0.0  -0.2  -0.2     
Budget 2003      -0.1  -0.0  +0.0   
Measures since Budget 2002      +0.1  +0.0  +0.1   
Budget 2004        -0.1  +0.0  -0.0 
Measures since Budget 2003        -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
1. A plus sign indicates an Exchequer yield. 
Source : HM Treasury, Budget 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. 
10.  What this spending has achieved is open to debate, as the new metrics to measure government 
outputs, following the Atkinson Review, are not yet fully in place. Assessments of feedbacks of tax and 
spending changes on economic activity are even rarer. HMT’s effects of budget measures, for instance, do 
not include effects on overall levels of income and spending. This is not surprising, because there is often 
no consensus on effects. Depending on the underlying model and empirics, a rise in payroll taxes can have 
a negative short, medium or long-term impact on structural unemployment, or none at all. Effects of R&D 
tax credits or grants on R&D spending and ultimately growth are notoriously difficult to quantify. Or the 
effect of savings incentives on substitution between different savings vehicles versus aggregate savings is 
usually impossible to pin down. And sometimes, long lags imply that any discernible effects of reforms 
would only show up after many years. Still, in the United States, attempts are underway to include feedback 
effects in assessing tax and spending proposals (Box 1).  
Box 1. Dynamic scoring 
In the United States, legislative proposals are scrutinised by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the 
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). They provide a baseline and forecasts of the changes in expenditure and 
revenues that would result from proposed legislation over the following ten years.
1 The forecasts provide a cost 
estimate or “score”, for each piece of legislation that is reported by a Congressional committee (Page, 2005). In the 
past, the scoring was static, not taking into account macroeconomic feedback effects. Dynamic scoring, which is still in 
its infancy, takes into account induced changes on output, inflation, interest rates or other macroeconomic feedbacks. 
The scoring is important as it influences how favourably initiatives are viewed in Congress and the Senate. A tax cut, 
for instance, could raise output significantly, with a large cut in tax rates having little implication for net government 
revenues. If this feedback is not included, the tax cut will be viewed less favourably by Congress, which is usually 
constrained to keep the total revenue cost of a tax package within pre-set targets (Altshuler et al., 2005)  
The outcome of dynamic scoring depends on the models used and on assumptions about macroeconomic policy 
reactions. In assessing the 2004 budget, forward-looking, life-cycle growth models and more traditional 
macroeconomic forecasting models were used. For the latter, various monetary policy reactions to the fiscal stimulus 
were simulated, while the growth models differ in various respects. Given different models and assumptions, the 
outcomes differed widely. Concerning the JCT’s analysis, incorporating dynamic effects reduced the net revenue cost 
of one proposal by 6 to 28% over the first five years and 3 to 23% over the second five years. Auerbach (2005) 
concludes from these first attempts, that “… it seems clear that dynamic scoring analysis has value, but also that 
adjustments to estimates are smaller than some might have expected. The process to date offers some support to 
those on both sides of the debate. On the one hand, the ability of CBO and JCT to produce dynamic analyses of 
complex, realistic proposals lends credence to the argument that dynamic analysis and, indeed, dynamic scoring may 
be feasible. On the other hand, the many models used and the many assumptions needed leave many with doubts 
about the quality of these estimates and how they would fit into the budget scoring process as currently structured.”         
1.  On the expenditure side, the CBO provides the baseline and the scoring, on the revenue side the CBO provides 




Quantifying the cost of inaction  
 
11.  One could argue that, before allowing more leeway under the fiscal rules, unproductive spending 
should be pruned first, which would probably leave enough room to spend on priority areas, without 
running up against the deficit limit. Similar issues relate to reforms, or the lack thereof, of budgetary 
frameworks, which are far from being best practice in many EU countries (Joumard et al., 2004). The 
design of reforms themselves may also be problematic: perhaps the scope for more cost-effective 
approaches is not being exploited. There are many examples of government spending programmes that tend 
to undermine growth, come at a high budgetary cost, sometimes grow considerably faster than GDP and are 
difficult to reform. They crowd out more productive government spending programmes. As such 
programmes tend to push countries towards the Maastricht deficit limit, the question arises whether policy 
inaction in such areas should not be taken into account, when granting greater flexibility on spending in 
priority areas. 
12.  The potential sources of fiscal stress built into government programmes are multiple. Fiscal 
pressures may mount because of biased incentives of government programmes, for example in the case of 
early retirement and disability schemes. The implicit tax on continued work, which gauges incentives to 
quit work before the retirement age, is very high in many European countries (Figure 1). There have been 
reforms, but most were minor, though Italy lowered the implicit tax a lot between 1998 and 2003. Early 
retirement lowers labour utilisation and has fiscal costs that can amount to several per cent of GDP. 
Similarly, the number of disability benefit recipients varies considerably across countries and only a few 
countries were successful in reducing the number of beneficiaries (Figure 2). In fact, in many countries, the 
number of beneficiaries keeps on rising rapidly.  











































1. Average of implicit tax on continued work in early retirement route, for 55 and 60 year olds. 
2. EU: 15 European countries excluding Denmark and Greece. 
Source: OECD (2005), Going for Growth, Paris.  
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Figure 2. Income support for disability 







































1. EU: 15 European countries excluding Finland, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg. 
2. 1995 for Austria, Mexico and Poland. 
Source: OECD (2005), Going for Growth, Paris. 
13.  There are also cases, were reform efforts have been considerable, but reform outcomes tend to fall 
short of expectations. Majnoni d’Intignano (2001), for instance, argues that health reforms in France are 
recurrent, actually close to one every year between 1975 and 2000, but have barely dented spending growth, 
or have slowed growth in one year, but with a catch-up towards the underlying spending trend the next. The 
costing of changes in government programmes is not too difficult for programmes that are relatively simple 
and where at least some changes in policy parameters influence private decision making in a 
straightforward way: the implications of pension reforms, for instance, have been well researched by the 
Commission or the OECD. More complex issues, like the effects of health care reforms are much more 
difficult to quantify. There are many actors and incentive effects are difficult to model.  
14.  The cost of inaction can be illustrated by resorting to the now fashionable distinction between the 
Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, continental and Mediterranean social models. Boeri (2002), for instance, compares 
their performance in terms of meeting three objectives: reductions in income inequality and poverty; 
protection against uninsurable labour market risk; and the reward to labour market participation. And 
indeed, geography and economic characteristic tend to coincide. Sapir (2005) uses the same typology, but 
focuses on efficiency and equity aspects: Efficiency is measured by a high employment rate and equity by a 
low poverty rate. 
15.  Figure 3 shows that all Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries are above average in terms of 
employment, whereas most continental countries (except Austria and the Netherlands) and Mediterranean 
countries (except Portugal) rank below average. On the other hand, poverty is relatively high in the 
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries and relatively low in the continental and Nordic countries. Sapir 
(2005) has analysed the reasons for these differences. What is important in the context of this paper is the 
fiscal sustainability of social models. Net public debt as a per cent of GDP is much lower in the “efficient” 
countries and much higher in the continental and Mediterranean countries (Table 2). Moreover, debt does 
not tend to come down much in the high-debt countries (except Belgium), while it has staid low or even 
come down further in most better-performing countries.  
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Figure 3. European social systems: employment rates and probability of escaping poverty 
 
Source: Sapir (2005). 
  
50 
Table 2. Gross and net debt development 
  Change in 
 
Gross debt 
% of GDP 
Net debt 
% of GDP  Gross debt  Net debt 
  2005 2005  1993  2005 
Nordic model         
Sweden 61  -6  -18  -16 
Finland  48  -41  -4  -24 
Denmark 48  2  -11  -23 
Netherlands  66  -28  -32  -7 
Austria 65  39  3  -2 
Anglo-Saxon model         
United Kingdom  46  39  -3  6 
Ireland  30  . .  -65  . . 
Portugal 78  46  0
1 20
1
Continental model         
Germany 72  61  24  33 
France  74  45  22  17 
Belgium 100  90  -45  -38 
Mediterranean model         
Italy 121  98  -5
1 -3
1
Spain  53  31  -14  -10 
Greece  108  . .  -2  . . 
1. 1995-2005 
Source:  OECD, Economic Outlook No. 77 database. 
16.  A similar pattern emerges when looking at growth performance and fiscal policy (Figure 4). In 
the period 1999-2005, trend growth was only 1½ per cent per year on average in the three major euro area 
countries, but 3¼  per cent in the smaller countries. Faster growth coincides with a strong fiscal 
performance, while the contrary tends to be true for the slower-growing countries. Econometric work 
provides evidence that fiscal consolidations are more likely to be undertaken and successful if trend 
economic growth is high (von Hagen, 2002). At the same time, the smaller fast growing-economies were 
able to maintain fairly rapid growth in public spending while keeping their government deficits in check. 
Greece is of course an important exception with soaring spending and a whopping government deficit 
despite strong growth.  
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Source:  OECD, Economic Outlook No. 77 database.  
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Quantifying the impact of regulatory reform 
 
17.  Things become even more tricky when assessing the effects of changes in the regulatory stance on 
growth and government budgets. The OECD has developed a broad range of indicators concerning the 
stringency of labour and product market regulations, which are discussed in more detail in Duval (2005) 
and feed into the econometric exercise in the next section.
2 The OECD has also produced a lot of empirical 
work that traces the effects of the regulatory stance on employment and unemployment rates, R&D 
intensity and ultimately growth. This work has culminated in the OECD’s Growth Project (OECD, 2001) 
and feeds into the ongoing structural surveillance work (OECD, 2005). Substantial methodological progress 
has been achieved in constructing structural policy indicators with an econometric link to economic 
performance.  
18.  Such inventories are potentially very useful, but there are also limitations, when assessing the 
budgetary implications of structural reforms: 
•  These inventories leave out a wide variety regulations, such as health and safety or 
environmental regulations, which could have a budgetary impact.  
•  There is in general no direct link between these inventories and budgetary effects and it 
would seem difficult to establish the link between reforms and side-payments to get 
reforms underway.  
19.  Moreover, while the body of empirical work on growth is enormous, there are still considerable 
disagreements about what reforms can achieve in the short and long term. In particular, the short-term 
adjustment costs associated with reforms are under-researched. In addition, results are data-quality, model 
and estimator dependent. While cross-country growth regressions have been an extremely popular means of 
testing ideas about the sources of growth, many of the variables claimed to be significant have not stood up 
to tests for statistical robustness (Ahn and Hemmings, 2000). Another problem is the lack of accepted 
formal theoretical models that can accommodate the wide range of variables that are often included as 
explanatory variables, despite advances in the theory of economic growth.  A related issue is that causal 
links between aggregate economic variables and growth are bi-directional, hence most estimates are likely 
to suffer from endogeneity problems. We are tempted to quote Blanchard (2005) who, after reviewing the 
literature on whether enough is known about unemployment to give advice to policy makers about how to 
reduce it, concludes: “I believe we do – with the proper degree of humility”.  
“Big bangs” and gradualism: the experiences of New Zealand and Australia 
 
20.  Some OECD economies have undergone a radical transformation, with major fiscal implications. 
New Zealand is a prime example. It initiated quite radical and wide-ranging reforms in the mid-1980s. 
These reforms encompassed both macroeconomic stabilisation and structural change (Evans et al., 1996). 
The reforms followed a decade of anaemic growth, which, at less than ½ per cent, was indeed considerably 
lower than it is currently in the euro area, while inflation was rampant and the government and current 
account deficits exceeded 6 and 8% of GDP, respectively.  
21.  Key reforms included financial market deregulation and the granting of operational independence 
to the Reserve Bank; deep labour market reforms, though they were only enacted from the early 1990s 
onwards; and telecommunication and electricity reforms. These reforms did not include any side-payments, 
but there were many reforms affecting the budget directly. Support to manufacturing industries and 
agriculture was withdrawn, which lowered spending, but also lowered revenues due to hefty tariff cuts on 
industrial products. Direct government assistance to industry and agriculture declined form 16% of primary 
government spending to just 4% in 1993/94. At the same time, tax policy put a sharp focus on the neutrality 
 
2.  The World Bank has also developed inventories of policy measures. Another example is the indicators developed by the Fondazione Rodolfo 
Debenedetti.   
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of the tax system: a comprehensive value added tax replaced a myriad of differing sales taxes, while the 
corporate and income tax base was broadened and tax rates reduced. Tax incentives concerning exports or 
retirement savings were abolished. On the spending side, focus was put on organisational and managerial 
devolution and improved accountability, for instance in health and education. Chief executives became 
responsible for managing departments, being directly accountable to their Ministers for hitting specific 
output targets. Moreover, the large number of trading departments was turned into state-owned enterprises, 
many of which were subsequently sold. 
22.  Stronger growth did not help fiscal consolidation early in the reform era. Partly reflecting heavy 
industrial and agricultural restructuring and job losses from rapid efficiency gains of former trading 
departments, GDP barely increased between 1984 and 1991. Also the exchange rate and real interest rate 
were high. Early in the reforms, consolidation was largely achieved by revenue increases and while some 
spending items were pruned severely, spending on health, education and social services increased as a per 
cent of GDP. But stronger growth followed and a fiscal surplus was achieved in the 1993/94 financial year. 
Fiscal performance has been strong since then, the government recording a deficit in only one year since 
1994 and a net debt position of more than 40% of GDP has swung into a net asset position of 10% of GDP 
currently. This partly reflects a decent, though not outstanding, growth performance and partly the 
principled approach to fiscal management that was put in place in 1994. It is a blueprint for principles that 
underpin responsible fiscal management and transparency, which have been taken up in the UK’s code of 
fiscal conduct and the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency. Macroeconomic policy was set to 
provide stable policies rather than stabilisation policy. 
23.  Reforms in New  Zealand since the mid-1980s were broad ranging and quick, against the 
background of large macroeconomic imbalances. By tackling many areas quickly there was no stable 
coalition formed to oppose reforms: for instance, farmers who had their subsidies withdrawn,
3 strongly 
supported tariff cuts; and farmers and other businesses then put pressure on the government to reduce 
spending to bring down the interest and exchange rate. But moving quickly also led to some backlashes, as 
the reform process stalled between 1988 and 1991, from when onward it resumed again. The experience 
highlights that fiscal consolidation and radical change can go hand in hand, even when the results of 
reforms on economic performance do not come quickly.  
24.  In contrast with New  Zealand, the Australian reform process was gradual, but it was also 
principled and coherent (Banks, 2005). As in New Zealand, policy prior to the reforms was characterised by 
being highly regulated, anti-competitive and redistributive, even though the macroeconomic background, 
while not brilliant, was more benign. Productivity growth of just over 1% between 1973 and 1990 was 
relatively poor and, also affected by terms of trade losses, the international income-per-capita ranking 
slipped badly. Though reforms started in 1973 with a 25% across-the-board tariff cut, this precipitated a 
heavy backlash against reforms. It took until 1988, that tariff reductions were phased in and virtually all 
tariffs were below 5% by 1996. The early 1980s also saw financial market reforms. Increased competition 
led to pressure to reform labour markets and sheltered sectors. The reforms ultimately embraced all product 
markets, factor markets and the public sector, including as in New  Zealand the commercialisation, 
corporatisation and privatisation of many government enterprises.  
25.  Contrary to New Zealand, Australia adopted an incrementalist approach to reforms, thus avoiding 
heavy initial adjustment costs. The programme evolved in a cumulative way to encompass reforms across 
much of the economy. Moreover, and again contrary to New  Zealand, reforms were accompanied by 
retraining schemes and displaced workers could rely on the relatively generous welfare safety net. 
Adjustment costs were also eased by sector-specific restructuring and assistance schemes, which amounted 
to AUD 600 million annually under the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme. Similarly, 
when price support for the milk industry was abolished in 2000, farmers were provided with a substantial 
stream of payments, financed by a levy on milk consumers. Also regional policy schemes eased the 
 
3. The largest farmer association, the Federated Farmers of New Zealand argue that the sudden and unexpected removal of subsidies have made the 
farming sector stronger and that farmers are determined never again to be dependent upon government handouts (Federated Farmers of New 
Zealand, 2002). Productivity gains, for instance, moved from 1% pre-reform to nearly 6% post-reform, while the initial impact of the reform, 
while sizeable, was much milder than officially projected.   
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adjustment blow in some cases. Policy has thus dealt with the front-loaded timing of the potential losses of 
reforms as well as the fact that costs of reform are often concentrated on particular groups. The reform 
process had a fiscal cost, but it was limited and easily outweighed by the overall gains: concomitant with 
the reforms, there was a sharp rise in the trade to GDP ratio and business R&D surged, boosting 
productivity growth to among the highest in the OECD and the income-per-capita ranking improved from 
the 15
th place in the mid-1980s to the 8
th currently. Not surprisingly, fiscal performance improved a lot as 
well: the general government balance swung from a deficit peak in the early 1990s of more than 6% of 
GDP into a surplus by 1998 and has staid in surplus since then, except in one year. Net debt will be 
eliminated in 2006 and a net asset position will build up. 
26.  Clearly, for both countries the evidence is that the impact of major structural reforms was a major 
improvement in fiscal performance. Yet, how to apportion the success between a strengthening in 
budgetary institutions and better growth performance is unclear.   
 
Structural reform in an empirical expenditure rule 
27.  Since the proof of the pudding is always in the eating, in this section we try to identify empirically 
the impact of the structural policy stance on public expenditure, using some basic econometrics. The 
assumption is that countries in which structural policy stances are geared towards greater market flexibility, 
the efficiency of welfare systems will generally be higher and government involvement in the economic 
process – be it through regulation or financial support - more effective. At the same time, potential output 
would be higher and as a result, everything else equal, public expenditure would decline relative to 
(potential) output. However, there may be short-run offsets in the form of upfront budgetary cost, such as 
compensation schemes for people losing their job or rents, which tends to raise public expenditure on a 
temporary basis. 
28.  The structural policy indicator capturing structural reform efforts referred to here is the one used 
by Duval (2005). It is calculated as the sum of normalised OECD indicators in five fields (employment 
benefits, tax wedges, employment protection legislation, retirement incentives and product market 
regulation). They are displayed in Figure 5; a higher value corresponds to a tighter stance (more rigidity) 
and vice versa, and a decline in the indicator suggests that “appropriate” structural reforms have been 
implemented. Countries that stand out by relatively “tight” stances (high value of the indicator) are all 
European countries. Some of these countries have also implemented major structural reforms in the past 
decade (notably Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands), suggesting that poor initial 
conditions are a good “predictor” of future structural reform (as confirmed by Duval, 2005). This is 
encouraging and suggests some tendency towards global convergence, perhaps helped by the Lisbon 
agenda.  
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29.  As in Duval (2005) we consider 21 countries for which we have annual observations for the 
period 1985-2003. Using this dataset, we estimated the following partial-adjustment relationship: 
(1)  it i
k
k
it k it it it it CON STR STR PRI PRI ε δ γ β α λ + + + Δ + + = ∑ − − 1 1  
30.  In this relationship PRIit is the level of cyclically-adjusted primary expenditure as a per cent of 
GDP in country i in year t. STRit is the overall structural policy stance. It is included to capture the long-run 
effect of the structural policy stance on public expenditure. The term ΔSTRit is the change in the structural 
policy stance indicator which serves to capture any upfront budgetary cost of structural reform -  its 
expected sign is negative as predicted by theoretical models such as that reported in Beetsma and Debrun 
(2005). CONit-1 is a vector of control variables, δi are country fixed effects and εit is the normally distributed 
residual. The method used is ordinary least squares.  
31.  Following Martinez-Mongay (2002), four control variables have been considered: 
•  Per  capita gross national income at 2000 purchasing power parities. This captures 
“Wagner’s law”, which predicts that high-income countries will exhibit higher shares of 
public spending in GDP than low-income countries owing to a change in preferences in 
favour of public goods and services such as health care, education and social services. 
The expected sign is positive.  
•  The dependency ratio. Ageing puts pressure on notably health care and pension 
expenditure, hence a priori one expects public outlays to be higher in countries that 
portray a high dependency ratio (measured by the share of people older than 65 in the 
total population). The expected sign is again positive. 
•  Trade openness (sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a per cent of GDP). 
A standard finding in the literature is that more open economies will have bigger 
governments in order to protect their citizens against cyclical volatility in economic 
activity. However, it could also be argued that in a globalising world small open 
economies, due to their greater exposure to international competition, will be under 
pressure to keep public expenditure low so as to secure competitive gains from a low tax 
burden. Accordingly, the net effect on government size is ambiguous.  
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•  Public debt ratio to GDP. There is a large body of literature providing evidence that 
governments whose debt position threatens to become unsustainable will rein in public 
expenditure (rather than increase taxes which will at best only bring short-term relief). 
Hence in countries where public debt is high, government size will be negatively affected 
and vice versa.  
32.  The type of electoral system is another factor that emerges from the literature as relevant for the 
size of government (majoritarian voting rules yield smaller welfare systems), but it will not be considered 
here (or rather this will be picked up by the country fixed effects). Baumol’s “cost disease”, which predicts 
that as an economy grows the relative price of public services and hence the share of public expenditure in 
GDP will increase, will be considered as already being captured by the per capita income effect.  
33.  Before considering the impact of structural policy stances on government size, we look at the 
explanatory power of the controls (Table 3). European countries generally portray higher primary 
expenditure ratios, but also tend to score higher on debt, dependency, openness and lower on GDP 
per capita than for example the United States. This suggests that the control variables are unlikely to be 
able to explain the bulk of the cross-country variation in primary expenditure. Accordingly, country fixed 
effects should play an important role, as confirmed by the estimation results.  
Table 3. Primary expenditure and its standard determinants 
  Primary 
expenditure ratio 
(%) 
Debt ratio (%)  Dependency ratio 
(%) 
Openness (%)  GDP per capita (at 






















Australia  31 33 29 30 17 19 35  42  34388  40831 
Austria  47 47 58 69 22 23 70  84  33799  40647 
Belgium  43 42 131  122  22 25 134 152 31551  38420 
Canada  38 35 79 89 15 17 55  78  33499  38188 
Denmark 49 52 74 63 23 23 69  80  34999  41837 
Finland  47 48 30 58 12 13 52  69  30869  36492 
France  46 48 42 67 21 24 43  50  34517  40164 
Germany 41 43 39 60 22 25 50  59  37342  37164 
Greece  31 35 74 110  22 27 46  50  16521  19717 
Ireland  35 29 99 51 18 17 112 160 24755  42852 
Italy  39 39 95 128  21 26 40  51  26902  31696 
Japan  24 28 73 122  17 24 19  20  33239  37961 
Netherlands  47 42 86 72 18 19 108 121 34166  42149 
New  Zealand  40 36 64 40 16 17 56  61  28474  32274 
Norway  53 55 34 37 15 12 71  72  34502  46292 
Portugal  30 37 65 64 20 23 64  66  19418  25232 
Spain  33 32 53 67 20 24 37  54  24358  30583 
Sweden  56 54 65 72 16 14 61  79  36600  40637 
Switzerland  28 31 36 51 21 22 69  77  41653  43892 
United 
Kingdom 
38 37 43 48 24 24 51  56  32993  40808 
United  States  31 30 68 66 18 19 20  24  44591  52872 
EU15
1 38 39 62 70 19 21 59  72  27473  33304 
Average  39 40 64 71 19 21 60  72  31864  38129 
Standard 
deviation 
9 8 26  28  3 5 29 35 6670  7219 
1. Unweighted average. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 78 database.   
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34.  The regression results for the controls, without and with country-fixed effects, are shown in the 
first two columns of Table 4. The inclusion of country-fixed effects indeed proves to be necessary; without 
them the significance levels are unsatisfactory except for the debt ratio and the lagged dependent variable. 
In the equation with country-fixed effects, the regression coefficients for the dependency ratio, per capita 
income and public indebtedness have the expected sign and are all significant. Trade-openness has a 
negative sign, and is also significant. 
35.  The long-run coefficients, which are the more interesting ones to look at, can be computed as 
γk/(1-λ). Based on this calculation, the long-run semi-elasticity on the dependency ratio turns out to be about 
¼, which suggests that if in any country old-age population growth outpaces total population growth by 
1 percentage point the primary expenditure ratio will increase by ¼ percentage point. Similarly, an increase 
in per capita income by 10% would raise the primary expenditure ratio by 1½ percentage point and if 
foreign trade (imports + exports) outpaces GDP by 10 percentage points for any given period or country, 
the primary expenditure ratio would fall by 1½ percentage point. Finally, an increase in the debt ratio to 
GDP by 10 percentage points would depress the primary expenditure ratio by approximately 1¼ percentage 
point. These findings are broadly in line with those reported by Martinez-Mongay (2002), except for the 
trade-openness indicator for which he finds the opposite sign. This may reflect the difference in estimation 
period (1960-99 in his case versus 1985-2003 in ours), since it may be that over time competitiveness 
considerations have gained importance as globalisation progressed. It is also in line with theoretical 
findings by Buti and van den Noord (2005) that there may be incentives for small open economies to aim 
for smaller governments as this would enhance the working of automatic stabilisers. 
Table 4. Estimation results 
Type of equation  Controls only  Controls, country fixed effects  
and structural policy 
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Dummy Maastricht     -0.004 
(-3.1)*** 
  
Dummy SGP      -0.001 
(-0.6) 
   




Change in structural policy stance          -0.002 
(-1.7)* 
Adjusted R
2 0.99 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
Observations  378  378  378  378  378 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 90, 95 and 99%, respectively. 
36.  Another issue is whether the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact and the run-up towards 
the adoption of the single currency subsequent to the Maastricht Treaty has had a significant additional 
impact on primary expenditure in Europe. To test this, the same regression was run including dummy  
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variables that are 1 in the run-up to the single currency (from1992 to 1998) and after the coming into force 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (in 1999), respectively, and 0 otherwise (third column of Table 4). We find 
a significant Maastricht effect, but no significant SGP effect, suggesting that the former has provided a 
binding constraint whereas the latter has not. This is consistent with earlier findings that the Stability and 
Growth Pact failed to provide a binding fiscal constraint, as reported in Buti and van den Noord (2004) and 
Koen and van den Noord (2005). The Maastricht dummy clearly takes away explanatory power from the 
debt variable, suggesting that it essentially captures the same phenomenon, namely that high debt will 
eventually weigh on primary expenditure. We have not retained the EMU-related dummies in subsequent 
regressions. 
37.  The fourth column in Table 4 reports the regression result including the impact of the structural 
stance indicator. The sign is as expected (positive, i.e. a tighter stance leads to higher primary expenditure). 
The long-run impact is not negligible: a structural reform equivalent to a cut in the stance indicator by 
2  standard deviations (roughly corresponding to the difference between e.g.  France and New  Zealand, 
(Figure  5) reduces the primary expenditure ratio by around 1½  percentage points. Obviously structural 
reform is not primarily aimed at reducing public expenditure, but this result does provide some evidence 
that it might work out that way to a significant extent. One health warning is in place though, namely that a 
country with a good regulatory environment for goods and labour markets may typically also have a good 
fiscal framework in place, in which case we may be over-estimating the pure impact of structural policy 
stances on public expenditure. However, either way, the basic message would still be that good policies are 
associated with less rather than more public expenditure.  
38.  Finally, in order to capture possible upfront budgetary costs of structural reform, the regression 
was re-run with the change in the stance indicator included as an explanatory variable. The sign is indeed 
negative, as expected, but statistically significant only at the 10% level. This suggests that upfront cost may 
occur but are small and not very stable over time or across countries, at least on the expenditure side of the 
government account. Obviously, upfront cost may also take the form of tax cuts, which are not considered 
here, but we doubt these are more significant. 
Linking structural reform and fiscal performance: what can a macro-model tell?  
39.  Even if reforms have measurable direct beneficial effects on primary spending, their overall 
budgetary impact also depends on economic feedback mechanisms that may be underestimated in a 
reduced-form approach as the one above. Moreover, the link between a more favourable supply side and a 
better macroeconomic and thus budgetary performance will vary across countries and the different 
mechanisms that pull up demand. Budgetary outcomes also relate to the effect of different types of reforms 
on endogenous variables that affect the public accounts, such as the monetary policy response – which is 
particularly relevant in the euro area where individual countries have given up monetary policy autonomy. 
Also the initial budgetary cost of reforms needs to be taken into account, associated with, for example, tax 
cuts or compensation of losers from reforms.  To clarify the various mechanisms that link structural reforms 
and budgetary outcomes, several simulations were run with the OECD’s Interlink model. They help to 
illustrate the effect of different types of reforms, including their macroeconomic effect as well as the 
difference between concerted reform efforts versus reforms in a single country.  
Effects of coordinated reform in monetary union 
40.  Co-ordination of structural reform in the euro area between the countries and monetary authority 
could pay benefits, as will be illustrated below. To set a benchmark, we first construct scenarios in which 
such co-ordination with monetary policy is absent. Three scenarios are run: first, total factor productivity is 
raised; second, labour force participation increases; and third, structural unemployment is reduced. These 
changes affect the large euro area countries and thus the overall performance of the euro area, for which the 
level of potential output increases by 1¼ per cent over eight years. The reforms all imply lower inflation 
and are accompanied by lower interest rates in a way that keeps real interest rates unchanged. Exchange 
rates are assumed fixed, except in one simulation. Finally, tax rates are kept constant and also government 
consumption and investment are held fixed in real terms. The results are represented with respect to a  
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baseline scenario which goes to 2012, which is based on the premise that countries converge gradually to 
their potential production level.
4
Effects of a rise in trend productivity   
41.  The first simulation illustrates the effect of a productivity gain on macroeconomic and budgetary 
performance. As many studies have shown there is considerable potential to raise productivity in the euro 
area, be it by product and labour market reforms or stronger innovative activity (OECD, 2003 and 2004). 
The simulation assumes that the level of trend labour productivity goes up by a cumulated increase of 2% 
over eight years. In the simulation, stronger productivity growth leads to a progressive rise in real wages, 
which is compatible with lower inflation (Figure 6). This raises internal demand and boosts net exports, 
which benefit from an improved competitiveness. Total demand rises somewhat faster than potential output 
and the output gap closes more quickly than in the baseline. The budget balance improves in actual and 
structural terms by about 1¼ per cent of GDP at the end of the simulation period. This is mainly due to the 
lower nominal interest rates and to a lesser extent to improved social accounts. The reduction of the deficit 
allows only a small decline in the debt/GDP ratio, because lower inflation lowers nominal GDP growth.
 5  
Effects of a rise in participation  
42.  Figure 6 allows a comparison of these first results with a simulation of an increase in labour force 
participation. Considerable room for increases also exist in this domain, especially by sharpening incentives 
for young and older workers to work and by removing obstacles to participation by females (Burniaux et 
al., 2003). In this simulation it is assumed that changes in incentives push up trend participation by 1 
percentage point gradually over eight years. As in the earlier case, domestic demand and net exports rise. 
The rise in participation leads, however, to some rise in unemployment, which leads to lower real wages 
and inflation, which stimulates competitiveness and employment and finally disposable income. Demand is, 
however, initially not rising as fast as supply, so that the output gap is higher for some years. The budgetary 
situation also improves in this simulation. But it is somewhat smaller than in the earlier simulation, because 
unemployment is somewhat higher. Moreover, the debt/GDP ratio remains close to the baseline. The 
improvement of the budgetary situation is likely however to be somewhat underestimated. Especially a rise 
in the participation of older workers would reduce spending on early retirement, while over the longer term, 
unemployment should return to the baseline level.  
 
4. Medium-term scenarios that prolong the short-term projections are regularly up-dated by the OECD. The are based on the premise that the output 
gap will close over the scenario’s horizon (by 2012), while unemployment converges to the structural unemployment rate. Commodity prices and 
exchange rates are held fixed in real terms, while the oil price declines from $54 at the end of 2007 to $44 per barrel by 2012. Monetary policy 
aims at price stability, while fiscal policy remains unchanged, with the primary budget balance virtually stable between 2007 and 2012 in most 
countries. Details can be found in the OECD Economic Outlook 78 (2005).  
5. The debt profile is determined by the following equations: 
  Debt (t) = primary balance (t) + debt (t-1)* (1+ r(t))/(1+g(t)) with r(t) being the nominal interest rate at t and g(t) nominal growth of GDP. With 
no improvement in the primary budget, lower inflation tends to the growth of nominal GDP, which offsets the effect of lower interest rates. In this 
case public debt twill change little with respect to the baseline. If, however, nominal growth decline more than interest rates, a snow-ball effect 
will raise indebtedness, even if there is no deterioration in the primary budget balance.  
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Note: The nature of the shocks is specified in the main text. Nominal exchange rate and real interest rates are kept 
unchanged relative to baseline. Real government expenditure is also kept at baseline level. 
 
Effects of a decline in structural unemployment   
43.  Also a decline in structural unemployment would raise the employment rate and potential output. 
This is illustrated by a third simulation which reduces the structural unemployment gradually by 
1 percentage point over the first three years. The increase in potential output is thus concentrated in these 
years and the output gap widens initially by more than in the other simulations. This leads to a larger real 
wage and inflation deceleration than in the other two simulations (Figure 6). This stimulates employment,  
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profitability and competitiveness and leads to stronger internal and external demand. The budgetary 
improvement is somewhat stronger than in the preceding cases. This is because of lower unemployment. In 
conjunction with the effect of lower interest rates on the budget, also the debt/GDP ratio declines 
somewhat.    
A stronger role for monetary policy 
44.  The simulations show the positive medium-term effects of the reforms on the government budget, 
with the gains being larger in the simulations that show a stronger improvement in the primary budget 
balance. However, the effects on indebtedness are minor, because of the deceleration in inflation induced 
by the reforms. A more accommodating monetary policy would contribute to improve the budgetary results 
further. The central role of monetary policy in accompanying the reforms is shown by simulations that 
again reduce the structural unemployment rate, but now under alternative monetary policy assumptions. 
The first assumes that real interest rates decline as well as the exchange rate, while the other assumes that 
nominal interest rates and exchange rates stay at the baseline level.  
45.  The simulation shown in Figure 7 suggests that an easier monetary policy would stimulate 
demand considerably. It is assumed that real interest rates are about 100 basis points below the baseline 
level on average over the simulation period, while the euro is assumed to decline by 5% in real effective 
terms.
6 The effects on external and internal demand would push the output gap above the baseline level, 
which would limit the deceleration of inflation. The budgetary improvement would be considerably 
stronger, in terms of deficits and of debt developments. Concerning the latter, the impact of the 
improvement in the primary deficit of lower interest rates is not offset by the disinflationary effect and the 
debt/GDP ratio would decline by 10 percentage points with respect to the deadline at the end of the 
simulation period. 
46.  If, on the other hand, nominal interest rates and exchange rates are kept at their baseline values, 
the higher real interest rates dampen demand considerably and the output gap remains larger than in the 
baseline scenario throughout the simulation period (Figure 7). With activity weaker and unemployment 
higher, the improvement in the primary deficit is much slower to come and offset by higher interest 
payments, while nominal GDP rises by less because of lower inflation. The debt/GDP ratio deteriorates 
considerably as the snow-ball effect is reinforced by lower inflation.  
 
6.  In this simulation the exchange rate adjustments are assumed to respond to both inflation and interest rates developments. On the one hand, 
exchange rate purchasing power parity rule is supposed to apply in the long term, implying stable real effective exchanges rates. On the other 
hand, the lower real interest rates in the euro area induce a weakening a real depreciation of the euro exchange rate at least in a transitory period.     
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Note: The Nairu is assumed to fall progressively by 1  percentage point in the first three years of the stimulation. 
Nominal exchange rate are kept unchanged relative to baseline in the case of the simulations with fixed nominal 
or fixed real interest rates relative to baseline. A flexible exchange rate assumption is retained for the simulation 
with a fall in real interest rate. Real government expenditure is kept unchanged at baseline level. 
Structural reform in a single country in monetary union 
47.  In the previous set of simulations it was assumed that all countries embark on structural reform 
simultaneously. However, this may not occur in reality, which raises the issue whether the incentives for (or 
reward of) structural reform is sufficiently strong for individual countries. There may also be a divide  
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between small and big countries in this regard, due to the difference in openness of their respective 
economies. 
Effects of a decline in structural unemployment  
48.  The importance of monetary policy in facilitating the adjustment of demand to a rise in supply 
and for improving budget balances leads to questions about the reforms pursued  by a single country in the 
euro area. This is shown by a gradual decline in the structural unemployment rate by 1½ percentage points 
over three years in the case a small (Belgium) and large (France) country. They are based on the same 
assumption as above: the nominal interest rate and the exchange rate are fixed at the baseline level. The 
results show a marked contrast between the two countries.    
49.  The small country, because of its much greater openness to trade, benefits much more from the 
competitiveness gains, which allows a more rapid adjustment of demand and limits the deceleration in 
inflation (Figure 8). The effect of the reform is positive for the budget balance, though the effect on 
indebtedness is minor.  
50.  In contrast, the adjustment path for the large country is much more drawn-out (Figure 9). The 
impact of higher real interest rates tends to neutralise the competitiveness gains due to lower inflation. 
Overall, the output gap remains below the baseline level over the whole simulation period. The budget 
balance hardly improves, while indebtedness is rising. However, significantly lower inflation in a large 
country will affect area-wide inflation, which could lead to some monetary easing. If the interest rate were 
to decline in line with overall inflation, the budget balance would improve by more.  
51.  These simulation results are, of course, model dependent. The weak endogenous adjustment 
forces in the case of reforms of a single large euro area economy could be exaggerated. It can not be 
excluded that a better macroeconomic performance, and especially lower unemployment, would lead to 
substantial confidence effects, which are not included in the model. These could lead to greater dynamism 
of consumption and investment. The reaction of the US economy to the productivity shock during the 
1990s suggests that demand can outstrip supply, following a supply shock.
7 On the other hand, one should 
not underestimate either the role played by the US monetary authorities, which recognized and 
accompanied the structural changes. Also the depth and flexibility of the American financial markets were 
crucial in allowing a rapid transmission of the associated wealth gains onto demand.  
 
 
7. This would follow Say’s law, which suggests that supply will create its demand. But the American situation even suggests what Val Koromzay 
dubbed Super-Say’s law, whereby a more optimistic outlook on future income can lead to excess demand, when supply conditions improve.     
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Note: The Nairu is assumed to fall progressively by 1.5 percentage points in the first three years of the simulation. 
Nominal exchange rate and interest rates are kept unchanged relative to baseline. Real government expenditure 
is also kept unchanged at baseline level.  
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Note: The Nairu is assumed to fall progressively by 1.5 percentage points in the first three years of the simulation. 
Nominal exchange rate kept unchanged relative to baseline. Real government expenditure is also kept 
unchanged at baseline level. 
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Effects of a decline in structural unemployment with a more active fiscal policy 
 
52.  Our final set of simulations is designed to examine the role of upfront cost, and more generally to 
look at the possibility that countries use a more activist fiscal policy to accompany their structural reform 
programme. A rise in potential output due to a decline in structural unemployment improves the structural 
budget balance. In the absence of monetary policy, euro area member countries may be tempted to use the 
room for fiscal manoeuvre to accompany reforms to speed up the adjustment of demand to the improved 
supply conditions. Moreover, the reforms could have a budgetary cost, for instance, making a cut in social 
security contributions necessary.  
53.  To illustrate the joint effect of a decline in structural unemployment and of a more active fiscal 
policy to scenarios were run for France. The first assumes that the structural budget balance is kept at the 
baseline level. The second assumes that the decline in unemployment is accompanied by a permanent 
reduction in employers’ social security contributions by ½ per cent of GDP. The results are presented in 
Figure 10. They clearly show the limits of an expansionary fiscal policy accompanying structural reforms. 
The macroeconomic gains are very limited, while the budget deteriorates significantly.   
Some policy implications 
54.  The recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact provides more leeway for EU governments to 
temporarily breach the 3% and close to balance or surplus rule if this can be shown to facilitate the 
implementation of effective, but initially expensive, structural reform. While this principle is underpinned 
by a clear economic rationale, its implementation is less obvious. Indeed, for it to be properly implemented 
a number of conditions will need to be met: 
•  Budgets would need to clearly identify the structural policy measures that are being 
taken and specify their immediate and multi-annual budgetary cost and benefit profile. 
So far, there is very little evidence of this happening, with probably the 
United Kingdom being at the frontier (and even there the picture is not always clear). 
Indeed, given the absence of an explicit structural reform programme and its costing, 
the SGP revision seems rather premature. 
•  Budgets would also need to be explicit about the fiscal cost of inaction, i.e., report the 
budgetary developments in the absence of structural reform. This is a form 
transparency that is necessary for the European authorities to call a balanced judgment 
on countries’ trade-offs between the various options available, like reform health care 
but not pensions, or any other combination of reform programmes. However, it is very 
rare to find such costing in budgets. 
•  Budgets would, finally, need to give some indication of the broader economic effects 
of action or inaction, in order to be able to call a judgment on the ex ante effectiveness 
and efficiency of the proposed measures. However ex ante cost-benefit analysis is rare 
–  not to mention ex post cost-benefit analysis. The experience in countries like 
New Zealand and Australia has shown that the longer-term benefits both in terms of 
the budget and overall economic performance may be significant. Even so, it is not 
easy to disentangle the various forces at play. Fundamentally, structural reform and the 
implementation of smart fiscal frameworks tend to go hand in hand – indeed may be 
two sides of the same coin. 
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Note: The Nairu is assumed to fall progressively by 1.5 percentage points in the first three years of the simulation. 
Nominal exchange rate kept unchanged relative to baseline. Real interest rates at the euro level are maintained 
unchanged relative to baseline. 
 
55.  The econometric exercise in this paper provides additional evidence that the budgetary cost of 
structural reform has been rather limited, whereas the longer-term benefits are significant. Probably nobody 
would contest this general finding, but it is useful to be able to put some numbers on it. They broadly 
concur with similar findings by Deroose and Turrini (2005), although they focus on the fiscal position 
rather than on public expenditure. Obviously these findings are ex post and they may not apply to the  
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future. They are also partial in the sense that they do not take explicit account of macroeconomic feedback 
mechanisms. 
56.  The simulation exercises highlight the positive budgetary effects of coordinated structural reforms 
in the euro area. But they have to be accompanied by an adequate monetary policy response to guarantee a 
rapid adjustment of demand to the improved supply conditions. The budgetary gains would still depend on 
the type of reform and their impact on employment and productivity. Efforts to improve supply conditions 
are surely easier to co-ordinate or coordinated in any case, when it comes to single market initiatives, such 
as the current drive to liberalise services across the European Union. Co-ordination is more difficult to 
achieve for labour market reforms. In this domain, national policy initiatives by a single country could have 
only a limited impact, especially in the short term and in the case of a large country. Indeed, in monetary 
union, the strength of endogenous adjustment mechanism appear to be weaker the larger the country. 
Moreover, if reforms were to be accompanied by an easing of fiscal policy, additional macroeconomic 
gains would also appear very limited.  
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This paper projects the macroeconomic and budgetary effects until 2050 of retaining the 
current PAYG system in the EU and analyses two alternative strategies of avoiding an 
increase in non wage labour costs. Special emphasis is laid on the question whether a 
partial move to a funded system could be a feasible option. At least for the transition, the 
budgetary costs appear to be rather large. In an alternative scenario, the paper highlights 
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Demographic pressure in the EU is putting the long run sustainability of government budgets on 
the fiscal policy agenda. The PAYG pension system which currently is the dominant source of 
intergenerational income transfer will increasingly come under stress. Currently ten workers 
finance two and a half  retirees, in 2050, ten workers will have to finance five retirees with their 
pension contributions. This has serious consequences for the government budget in coming 
decades if no reforms are undertaken. As shown previously, leaving the generosity of the PAYG 
system unaffected would require an increase in pension contribution rates from currently about 
16% to about 27%
8 in 2050, taken as given the demographic trends currently projected for the EU. 
Given the still high levels of unemployment in the EU and the fact that non wage labour costs are 
partly blamed for low employment rates in Europe, letting the current pension system in place 
does not seem to be an attractive policy option. There are two radically alternative fiscal strategies 
of financing additional pension expenditures if one wants to avoid ever increasing pension 
contributions. A first alternative could be seen in a switch to debt financing of additional ageing 
related pension expenditure requirements and freezing the replacement rate at current levels. An 
alternative strategy would be to partially move to a funded system, with a government guarantee of 
accrued pension rights for current pensioners and certain well defined age cohorts within the pool 
of current workers. It will be assumed that the transition costs are financed via an increase in 
government debt. 
 
Obviously, the first option is not a true long run solution but rather a strategy of postponing 
reforms, since it will eventually lead to exploding debt levels. Nevertheless it is interesting to show 
the debt dynamics implied by that strategy. The second option would certainly be preferable from 
a debt sustainability point of view, however, the short to medium term budgetary costs, in terms of 
deficits, are likely to be larger, because of immediate and large transition costs due to a fraction of 
accrued pension rights guaranteed by the government. However, unlike with the first option, the 
transition costs would be temporary. The duration would be limited by the age cohorts who are 
chosen to be eligible for government transfers. Nevertheless, given the voting power of age 
cohorts older than 40 years in Europe, it is likely that any transition to a funded system in Europe 
would be accompanied by a fairly generous compensation of current retirees and older workers.  
 
This paper compares these two stylised strategies to each other and to a baseline PAYG scenario 
where the current generosity of the pension system is retained, financed by increasing pension 
contributions. In particular it asks the following questions. What are the macroeconomic and fiscal 
consequences of retaining the generosity of the present PAYG system? What would be the 
macroeconomic impact of the two strategies for stabilising social security contributions? And what 
would be the level of debt the EU would end up in 2050 under the two alternative strategies?   
 
The quantitative analysis is conducted with a five region version of the ‘QUEST model’, where we 
distinguish between EU15, US, Japan and the rest of the World divided into fast and slow ageing 
regions (FA, SA). We regard the international dimension as useful since ageing and pension 
reforms are generally associated with changes in national savings and have implications for 
international capital flows. This model is an extension of DG ECFINs macro model, allowing for a 
disaggregated household sector, split into worker and pensioner households along the lines 
suggested by Gertler (1999). The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the model, 
 
8 See, The EU Economy Review 2001 Review, Reforms of Pension Systems in the EU – An Analysis of the Policy Options, pp.171-222.  
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followed by a section discussing the calibration of the most crucial structural parameters. Section 3 
presents standard simulations on debt and pension reforms in order to show the basic magnitudes 
of crucial multipliers in the model. Section 4 compares the alternative scenarios to each other and 
the paper ends with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
1. The  Model 
 
An identical good is produced in each region with a constant returns to scale production function. 
The technology in each region is identical up to the level of TFP. We allow for capital mobility 
across regions but restrict international migration to zero. In order to allow for demographic effects 
on savings within a life cycle framework and at the same time keep the model tractable we 
distinguish three age groups in each region and adopt the Gertler (1999) specification of consumer 
preferences and make similar assumptions concerning population dynamics, insurance 
arrangements and preferences. 
 
Individuals go through three distinct stages of life: youth (0 - 14 years), work (15years - retirement 
age), and retirement (retirement age+1 - expected end of life). The number of children in period t 
is given by  . Each period   children are born and average duration in childhood is 1/  
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The working age population in period t is given by  . Each period   children enter the 
working age population cohort. The mean duration of staying in this cohort is 1/  where   is 
the fraction of the population in working age which goes into retirement in the current period. 
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There are   pensioners at date t. they are joined by   new retirees, while a fraction (1- ) 
















t N N N ) 1 ( 1 λ λ − + = +
 
Population dynamics imply that individuals face certain probabilities of switching into different 
stages of their lives. Each child faces a probability   of becoming a worker, each worker has a 
probability   of becoming a retiree and each retiree faces an uncertain time of death. Following 
Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) a perfect annuities market is introduced which provides life 
insurance for retirees. Each worker faces an idiosyncratic income risk each period of loosing wage 
income and receiving pension income for the rest of his life. This type of uncertainty is dealt with 
analytically by restricting preferences, i. e. by employing a special class of nonexpected utility 
functions proposed by Farmer (1990). The so called risk neutral constant elasticity of substitution 
(RINCE) preferences separate a household’s attitude toward income risk from its intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution. In particular they restrict individuals to be risk neutral with respect to 
income risk but allow for an arbitrary intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Notice, income risk 




income risk. Therefore it seems reasonable to mitigate the impact of the stochastic income 
variation of individuals between work and retirement by assuming risk neutrality. Children are 
assumed not to make any economic decisions. Extending population dynamics to include children 
is nevertheless useful since it allows to take care of different birthrates and initial youth 
dependency ratios. 
 
The decision problem of retiree and workers can now be formulated by postulating value functions 
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with  z=(r, w). The value function is non-linear in the two arguments. However, instead of 
complicating the analysis it is exactly this type of non-linearity of the value function which 
generates risk neutrality with respect to stochastic income and which allows the derivation of 
closed form decision rules which are functions of first moments of income only.  
 
Consumption of retirees: 
Each retiree j consumes out of pension income ( ) and financial wealth  . Because of the life 
insurance contract pensioners receive a premium on top of the interest rate which is equal to the 
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From this first order condition together with the intertemporal budget constraint the following 
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and the present value of retirement income is given by 
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Consumption of the population of working age: 
Each member of the labour force j can either be employed or unemployed. Employed workers 
receive net income  , the unemployed receive unemployment benefits  . An  t t t
e




unemployed worker finds a new job with probability   while a currently employed worker 
looses his job and becomes unemployed with probability  . Both employed and unemployed 













t C w A r A − + + = −1 ) 1 (         ( 9 )  
 
where the superscript  } , { u e w =  indicates the employment status of worker j. The FOC of  worker 
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t t  is the marginal rate of substitution of consumption across work and retirement 
and   is a factor that adjusts the rate of time preference for the fact that the worker can be in a 
different state next period. It is given by 
t Ω
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The worker determines the level of consumption in period t such that the ratio of the marginal 
utility of consumption tomorrow vs. today is equal to the difference between the real interest rate 
and the rate of time preference. The expected marginal utility of consumption in the next period is 
a weighted average of consumption in the two possible states. Notice, because of risk neutrality 
only the mean of consumption in the two states matters. A closed form decision rule for workers 
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The term 
w H  is the present discounted income of an employed or unemployed worker. Because 
workers can switch employment status randomly in the next period, 
e H  and 
u H  are best 
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The capitalised future pensions of workers   also enter the consumption rule. To simplify the 
analysis we assume that pensions of workers and unemployed are identical. This does not seem to 
be too strong an assumption since we assume that each member of the labour force has identical 
characteristics they will spend equal proportions of their working life in unemployment. The 
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Notice, the marginal elasticity of substitution between consumption during working life and during 
retirement enters this expression, because workers value consumption in the two states differently. 
Aggregation across workers, unemployed and retirees is straightforward and yields the following 
aggregate consumption rule 
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where s is the share of total assets held by retirees and H is the present discounted value of net 
wages and unemployment benefits. 
 
Notice also, like in the standard finite horizon model the dynamics of aggregate consumption 
differs from the dynamics individual consumption. While the change of individual consumption is 
only a function of the difference between the real rate of interest and the rate of time preference, 
the aggregate rate of time preference becomes a positive function of financial wealth because 
households belonging to different age cohorts have different financial wealth positions. This 
implies that in the steady state the rate of interest will exceed the rate of time preference, because 
high interest rates are needed in order to induce newly created worker households to save.  
 
The life cycle feature also has consequences for the dynamics of assets and interest rates in open 
economy models. With infinitely lived consumers the steady state requires the same rate of time 
preference in all regions. In contrast with the life cycle model of consumption the effective rate of 
time preference becomes a positive function of financial wealth, i. e. an endogenous distribution of 
wealth will be generated in steady state equilibrium which equalises the effective rate of time 
preference across regions. In other words those regions with above average rates of time 
preference will, everything else equal, end up with a lower asset stock.  
 
It is also instructive to compare consumption in this model to the standard infinite consumption 
model. A first difference applies to permanent income. Permanent income consists of discounted 
labour income throughout the expected working life as well as the expected present value of 
pension income. Adjusting the discount factors of H and S with the respective probabilities of 
staying in the two states takes care of the finite durations of work and retirement. Thus there is 
saving for retirement.  
 
There is another important feature of the utility function which can potentially work in the other 
direction. Workers value the marginal utility of a unit of consumption differently between their 
working life and retirement. This valuation depends crucially on the intertemporal elasticity of  
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substitution. For  1 > σ  the marginal utility of consumption in retirement exceeds the marginal 
utility of consumption during work and vice versa. Especially the case σ <1 has the interesting 
consequence that workers prefer consumption during working life. Intuitively this phenomenon 
can be related to the preference for income smoothing  implied by a low intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. Effectively this increases the rate of time preference of workers.  
 
Total financial wealth   consists of three types of assets, government bonds   domestic equity 
, where   is the share price and   are units of real capital owned by the household. 
Households can also store wealth in the form of internationally traded bonds   issued by private 
agents in both countries.  
t A t B
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Imperfect international capital mobility is introduced via a trading friction for internationally 
traded bonds expressed as a function which captures the cost for the domestic household of 
undertaking positions in the international capital market. As borrower, the household is charged a 
premium on the foreign interest rate and as lender he receives a remuneration which is below the 
foreign interest rate. Effectively this implies that uncovered interest parity does not hold between 
the domestic and the foreign economy where the spread between the domestic and foreign interest 
rate depends on whether the home country is a borrower or a lender in the market for international 
bonds. We specify the interest differential as a linear function of the net foreign asset position of 
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The corporate sector in each region operates under perfect competition. Output is produced with a 
constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas production function 
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where   is an exogenous shock to technology. Capital stock changes according to the rate of 
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Total investment expenditures are equal to investment purchases plus the cost of installation. The 
unit installation costs are assumed to be a linear function of the investment to capital ratio with a 
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The corporate sector in country i maximises the net present value of its cash flow 
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subject to the technology, the adjustment cost and the capital accumulation constraint. Define with 
 the multiplier associated with the constraint on capital respectively. Differentiating the 
objective function with respect to   (j=0,1....), gives the following system of 
stochastic Euler equations (subject to the transversality condition) 
k λ






j t j t
j t
j t k






















− + = − − λ λ
φ
λ δ α 1
2
2


























+ = α           ( 2 7 )  
 
Equation (25) is the equation of motion of the marginal shadow value of capital λ
k. Equation (26) 
is the first order condition for total investment and it implies that the cost of a marginal unit of 
capital, including both its purchase and adjustment costs, must equal the shadow value of capital  
λ
k. It has been shown by Hayashi (1980) that marginal and average value of Tobin’s Q coincides 
under the technology and market structure assumed here, i. e.  . The cost of capital includes 




Unlike in the goods market we assume imperfect competition in the labour market in both 
countries. Instead of deriving a labour supply equation from the household optimisation problem 
we assume a standard wage rule which can  be derived from various labour market models. As 
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could be derived from alternatively from search model, a union bargaining or an efficiency wage 
model of the labour market. According to this rule, wage costs are a weighted average of the 
reservation wage ( ) labour productivity plus an additional mark-up term that depends positively 
on labour market tightness.  
u w
 
The government provides three types of transfers to households: it pays unemployment benefits 
, subsidises pension transfers at the amount ( ) and provides lump sum 
transfers ( ). In addition the government purchases goods and services ( ). Expenditures are 
financed by labour income and company taxes plus taxes on consumption. The tax rates on wages 
( ) and corporate income ( ) as well as the consumption tax rate ( ) are assumed to be constant. 
Alternatively, the government can issue debt. Thus the government budget constraint is given by 
u
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Since we allow the government to subsidise the  PAYG pension system, the financing constraint is 
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The left hand side gives current pension expenditures which are determined by the number of 
persons older than 65 eligible for a pension. Eligibility criterion is past labour force participation 
( ) and  is the total number of persons in retirement age. Pensions ( )are determined as a 
percentage of current wages. Pensions are financed from two sources, social security contributions 







Lump sum transfers are adjusted proportionally to the gap between the debt to GDP ratio and its 
target level   according to the following rule  0 b
 
























There is a homogeneous good which is traded internationally, therefore world supply is equated to 
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All bonds and equity supplied by the domestic government and the corporate sector are held by 
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Output price serves as numéraire. The competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of a 
sequence of real interest rates ( ) and allocations ( ) that satisfy the first 
order conditions of households and firms, the budget constraints of households, governments and 
firms and goods and bond market equilibrium conditions. Real wages  are determined by the 
wage contracting rule (28) and firms set employment optimally according to the first order 
condition (27). The labour market equilibrium can coexist with involuntary unemployment. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the economy is subject to initial conditions 
( ) and a sequence of fiscal instruments ( ) as well 
as a debt targeting rule that ensures intertemporal solvency of  governments. 
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Because the initial position of the economy is far from the steady state, the solution of a model, 
which is linearised around the steady state may give imprecise results. Therefore we have opted 
for a solution procedure developed by Laffargue (1990), Boucekkine (1995) and Juillard (1996) to  
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solve the dynamic non-linear forward looking model by Newton-Raphson. The simulation horizon 
must, however, be chosen long enough such that the solution is close to the steady state at the final 
date. We set the simulation horizon to 500 years. Roeger and In’t Veld (1999) provide a more 
detailed technical discussion of this solution method as well as some sensitivity analysis in the 
context of permanent shocks.  
 
 
2. Model  Calibration 
 
We select parameters such that the model fits some basic economic ratios both within and across 
regions. The objective of this exercise is to limit the international variation of structural parameters 
as much as possible and to explain divergences of economic development by the exogenous 
shocks and institutional differences. To select parameter values we largely follow standard 
procedures,  i.e. we base these values on evidence from growth observations and some 
microeconometric evidence.  
 
Demographics: We calibrate the model such that it can closely replicate the most recent 
EUROSTAT projections until 2050
9. Because we make some simplifying assumptions on the 
evolution of the birth rate and life expectancy and because we do not consider migration our 
demographic projections in the model are not identical to the EUROSTAT projection. However, as 
can be seen from Table 1, using the old age dependency ratio as a summary measure of the 
demographic trend, the model projections follow the fundamental trends of the EUROSTAT 
projection. The survival probabilities in the three age groups are chosen such that the mean 
duration in each group is consistent with the age classification (0-14), (15-64) and (65-life 
expectancy). The demographic trend is fundamentally determined by two features, namely a 
decline in the fertility rate from 2.4 in 1970 to 1.6 in 1990. Since 1990 the decline has slowed 
down and has reached a value of 1.3 in 2004. The projections assume that it will slightly increase 
to 1.6 in 2050. More important for the dependency ratio is the development of life expectancy, 




Table 1:   Old Age Dependency Ratio 
  2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
EUROSTAT      24.5 26.2 31.9 39.7 47.4 51.4 
Model 25.5 27.3 31.4 38.1 45.7 52.0 
        
 
Preferences: Consumption and savings behaviour is characterised by three parameters, the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the rate of time preference and the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign assets. Most studies using household survey data (see e.g. Attanasio 
and Weber (1993), Attanasio and Browning (1995)) tend to find estimates for sigma which are 
below one. We choose a value of .5 which is compromise between a value of one which is often 
used in the business cycle literature and smaller values often used in micro simulation studies. For 
the rate of time preference we choose a value of 1% per year. This is at the lower end compared to 
existing studies. This value is necessary for the model to generate a realistic level of the real 
interest rate. As discussed above, the effective rate of time preference is higher since it is a 
function of financial wealth. In selecting values for the rate of time preference we also take into 
                                                 
9 We use United Nations (2000) and US Census (2001) data for the other regions.  
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account household savings rates across regions. An outstanding feature is the relatively low US 
household savings rate. To better capture this phenomenon we set the US rate of time preference to 
1.5%.  
 
Production: The output elasticity of labour is set equal to an average wage share across OECD 
countries. An annual depreciation rate for capital of 6% is assumed. The adjustment cost parameter 
is difficult to pin down on the basis of first moments of the data. It has been shown in the business 
cycle literature, however, that this parameter is crucial for determining the relative volatility of 
investment (see, for example, Mendoza (1991)). It is therefore set in such a way as to make 
investment about 3 times as volatile as GDP. 
 
Labour market: Wage setting is characterised by three parameters, the level of the 
unemployment replacement rate, the parameter χ  which determines “bargaining strength” of 
workers and the elasticity of wages w. r. t. unemployment. Since our starting point is 1970 where 
we observe low unemployment rates across the world we assume identical parameters for wage 
setting for all regions. Unemployment benefits are set such that they amount to roughly 30% of 
gross wages, which is around the order of magnitude found for a weighted average of EU countries 
and the US. The elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment is set to .5 which again 
corresponds to a weighted average of elasticity estimates found for the EU and the US. The 
bargaining strength is set to .5. The indexation of unemployment  benefits to gross wages is chosen 
such that an increase in labour taxes or social security contributions by 1% leads to an increase of 
the unemployment rate of around .3% in the long run. This is about the average value reported by 
various empirical studies with values ranging from practically zero (Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2001)) to a value of .5 obtained by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for example.   
 
International financial markets: Little is known about the degree of international capital 
mobility. Earlier simulation exercises have, however, shown that full capital mobility between 
EU15, US and Japan on the one hand and the ROW would have led to net foreign asset positions 
which would by far exceed the observed international imbalances. It is assumed that international 
financial markets are incomplete by introducing a risk premium which depends on the net foreign 
asset position of the respective region. We impose a small risk premium. Previous research 
(Roeger 2003) has shown that higher risk premia for the non OECD regions are necessary such 
that the model approximately fits the observed net foreign asset position of the fast and slow 
ageing RoW. For example, without risk premia, the fast and slow ageing RoW economies would 
exhibit net foreign debt ratios in the order of magnitude of about 120%, which is nearly ten times 






3.  Standard Policy Experiments 
 
The pension reform scenarios analysed below will be combinations of changes in government debt 
combined with changes in social security contributions (combined with changes in the generosity 
of the pension system). In order to better understand the total effect it is useful to look at the 
individual effects separately by conducting two standard simulation experiments. This also allows 
us to see how the effects in this model relate to results in the literature. We analyse two 
experiments, a permanent increase in government debt and a reduction in pensions. 
  
81 
3.1. An increase in government debt 
Because of finitely lived households Ricardian equivalence does not hold in this model. In this 
experiment we show the degree in which Ricardian equivalence is violated by showing the real 
interest rate response of an increase in the debt to GDP ratio in Europe of 10% points. Enders and 
Hubbard (2004) provide a summary of recent research (in the US case). Their reported estimates 
for a 1% point increase range from zero to 24 basis points. Their preferred estimate lies between 2 
and 3 basis points. Our model is more Ricardian than the results obtained  by Engen and Hubbard. 
A 1% increase in the debt to GDP ratio increases the long run real interest rate by slightly less than 
1 basis point. Notice this result is obtained by increasing government debt in Europe only. The 
results obtained in standard regression analysis are probably biased upwards because the debt 
dynamics are positively correlated internationally over the sample period used for the regression 
analysis.  
 











































After 50 years the real interest rate increases by about 7 BP and the capital stock declines by about 
1% and GDP by around .3%. The effects on the intergenerational wealth distribution are minor. 
This compares to Gertler’s closed economy case where a 10% increase in government debt leads 
to an increase in interest rates of about 25 BP and  reduces the capital stock by roughly 2.5% 
  
 
3.2. A reduction in pensions 
In 2005, the share of pensions in total GDP is roughly 11%. What would happen if the pension 
system would become less generous? In this experiment it is assumed that the share of pensions in 
total GDP would be reduced by 2.5% points (gradually phased in over a period of 10 years). This 
corresponds to the pension experiment conducted by Gertler for the US. The most important 
question is, how such a reform would increase financial wealth and in particular capital 
accumulation.  A less generous pension system in the EU would increase savings and reduce  
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interest rates by about 60 BP in the long run and lead to an increase in the capital stock of about 
7%. Notice, however, a significant part of the additional savings would flow abroad. Foreign 
wealth as a per cent of GDP would increase by about 10% points, while domestic capital as a per 
cent of GDP would only increase by 7% points. Associated with the reform is a redistribution of 
financial wealth from pensioners to worker households. These results compare to a reduction of 
the real interest rate of 275 BP in the closed economy model of Gertler, accompanied by an 
increase in the capital stock of 20%.   
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One striking feature of this comparison is the relatively small crowding out effect of both 
government debt and the PAYG social security system. Two features of the model are probably 
crucial for this result. First unlike Gertler who models the US as a closed economy, we model the 
EU economy as having access to international capital markets. Second, we assume a higher 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ ), namely .5 vs. .25 in Gertler’s paper. Both features tend 
to reduce the crowding out effect. The openness assumption implies that interest rates are 
essentially determined by world savings and investment. A higher σ  induces a stronger response 





4.  EU Pension Scenarios 
 
We conduct three policy experiments. The first (baseline) experiment leaves the generosity of 
PAYG system in place and explores its economic and budgetary consequences. The second 
scenario looks what happens if EU governments resort to debt financing of additional age related 
expenditure and the last scenario analyses a partial transition to a funded system, with deficit 
financing of transition costs. All three alternatives face certain trade offs between fiscal 
sustainability and macroeconomic efficiency. The PAYG system does not pose a particular fiscal 
sustainability problem. However ever increasing social security contributions are likely to generate 
negative labour supply incentives. Along with it goes an erosion of the tax base. The debt solution 
could reduce the macroeconomic costs especially in environments characterised by near Ricardian 
equivalence. However, sustainability of the government budget will certainly become an issue in 
this scenario. The third option is likely to yield the best long term economic and budgetary 
outcome, however transition costs are potentially large, leading to high permanent but sustainable 
debt burden as well.  
 
4.1. The Baseline Scenario: Letting the PAYG System in Place 
Without reforms, the share of pensions financed via the PAYG system will nearly double until 
2050 from currently 9.7% to more than 17%. This is accompanied by an increase in pension 
contributions in the EU from 16 to 27%. The demographic trend is leading to permanently lower 
GDP (per capita) growth rates in the EU over the coming decades. Reduced labour supply is likely 
to cut GDP per capita growth by one third in 2050. Notice, rising social security contributions will 
reinforce the labour supply pressure. With the significant increase in social security contributions, 
a further rise in structural unemployment by nearly 5% points seems possible. Though higher 
savings and increased capital formation will somewhat alleviate the demographic pressure, the 
current pension system does not provide sufficient investment incentives to compensate the 
decline in labour input by increased productivity generated via higher capital intensity.   
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Table 2:   Baseline Scenario: Keeping Generosity of PAYG  
  
  2004  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
         
GDP  per  capita  1.7  1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 
Private  Investment/GDP  15.5  16.5 18.1 19.3 19.3 19.0 
Unemployment  Rate  8.1  8.3 9.0 10.0  11.3  12.8 
Real  Interest  Rate  4.9  4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.9 
Retiree  Cons./Worker  Cons.  1.8  1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Pension/GDP  9.7  10.3 11.6 13.3 15.4 17.3 
Social  Security  Contributions  14.9  15.8 17.8 20.4 23.5 26.5 
         
GDP per capita: % deviation from baseline levels. The remaining figures are percentage point deviations 
from baseline levels.   
 
 
4.2. Scenario 1: Debt financing of additional pension spending after 2005 
The government guarantees the 2005 pension replacement rate and at the same time freezes the 
pension contribution to the current level. The difference between contributions and actual pension 
expenditure is financed via an increase in government debt. With a constant contribution rate (of 
currently 16%) the share of pensions covered by the PAYG contribution would decline from 100% 
to about 66% in 2050. In other words the pension contributions of workers would only finance a 
replacement rate of about 50% in 2050. After 2050 debt accumulation is stopped via an increase in 
lump sum taxes. As shown in figure 3, debt is on an explosive and clearly unsustainable path.  
 
Figure 3  Debt Financing of additional Pensions 
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In 2050 the debt to GDP ratio would reach about  250%. However, debt financing is less 
distortionary than financing via social security contributions. Thus relative to the baseline 
scenario, employment increases, leading to an increase in GDP. Since households perceive 
government debt partly as net wealth, consumption rises as well. Initially, debt accumulation 
would be relatively slow because of the positive employment effects resulting from keeping 
pension contributions constant. However, the macroeconomic gains would be small. The 
employment gains would largely be compensated by a crowding out of the domestic capital stock, 
due to the increase in real interest rates.  
 
 
4.3. Scenario 2: A partial move to a funded system 
In this scenario the government makes an effort to reduce current pension contributions and the 
generosity of the PAYG system such that the ageing induced increases in pension contributions 
will lead to a rate in 2050 equal to the current pre reform rate. This essentially means a reduction 
of the generosity of the current first pillar by about 50%. In terms of rates, the replacement rate is 
reduced from 75% to 37.5% and social security contributions are reduced from 16% to 8% and 
will gradually rise to 16% in 2050. The government respects the entitlements of current pensioners 
fully but only partially the entitlements of workers older than 40 years in 2005 by providing 
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where  is the pension paid under the pre-reform rule while   is the pension consistent 
with the new contribution rate. Workers below 40 years of age at the year when the reform is 
introduced only receive .  The pension subsidies for those cohorts fulfilling the eligibility 
criteria are financed via issuing new debt. Notice, this transition is not actuarially fair for current 
workers, since the government only partially compensates current workers for their pension 
contributions and does not compensate at all workers younger than 40 in 2005. Nevertheless the 
government provides old age income support in such a way that a change in savings allows 
individual age cohorts to adjust smoothly to the new institutional environment. Also taking into 
account the life expectancy this policy implies increased government transfers for more than 40 





Even under this restrictive compensation scheme, the transition burden would be large. As can be 
seen from figure 4, government debt would increase by 80% of GDP over the next 40 years and 
would only decline afterwards. Government deficits would increase by about 4% points initially 
and decline gradually until the subsidies to older age cohorts are terminated after about 40 years. 
 
These simulation results show that a transition to a funded system is most likely not self financing 
via increased economic activity. Because of the transition burden, the question can  be raised when 
to expect positive economic effects from such a reform. There are at least two arguments in favour 
of a positive effect. First, because of a reduction in social security contributions positive 
employment effects should emerge and second there should be increased savings and higher 
capital formation to build up a second pillar.  However, the build up of government debt 
accompanying the transition could dampen or even offset the positive savings effect.  
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As can be seen from the following figures, there is indeed a level increase of GDP, however this is 
mostly explained by the increase in employment. Additional effects from increased capital 
accumulation only arrive gradually. Over the first 15 to 20 years, the transition does not lead to 
additional savings. 
 
Figure 4:   Partial Move to a Funded System 
 












2004 2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044 2049
Debt to GDP ratio Deficit to GDP ratio








2004 2013 2022 2031 2040 2049 2058 2067 2076 2085 2094











2004 2013 2022 2031 2040 2049 2058 2067 2076 2085 2094
















5.   Conclusions 
 
This paper has provided a projection on the likely macroeconomic impact of leaving the current 
PAYG system in place and has analysed a number of alternative strategies of avoiding an increase 
in non-wage labour costs. Special emphasis was laid on the question whether a partial move to a 
funded system could be a feasible option from a budgetary perspective under the constraint that 
age cohorts older than 40 must be subsidized by the general public over a transition period. At 
least for the transition as outlined in this paper, the fiscal costs appear to be rather large and hardly 
feasible from a budgetary perspective.  
 
Apart from the generosity in which older worker cohorts are compensated, the crucial question is, 
what are the real growth effects of such a reform and what is happening to growth of the tax base. 
In this paper it is found that the macroeconomic benefits from a transition to a funded system are 
limited, initially because the build up of government debt is crowding out private investment 
activities. Higher savings occur in the longer term. However, in an ageing open economy it is 
likely that a substantial fraction of savings will be invested abroad. The question arises whether it 
will be possible to tax the returns from foreign assets. 
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Thus all the options discussed in this paper will have to be supplemented by other measures in 
order to keep the budgetary and macroeconomic costs within some limits. At the end it appears 
unavoidable to also consider other measures such as an increase in the retirement age as a means to 
cushion demographic pressure.  
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The short-term budgetary implications of structural reforms.  








The EU fiscal framework has been criticized for neglecting a possible trade-off between short-term 
budgetary objectives and the implementation of reforms that could improve public finances in the 
long term This concern was reflected in the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
acknowledges that under certain conditions structural reforms can be taken into account both in the 
preventive and in the corrective arm of the Pact.  
 
The aim of the paper is that of making a step forward on the understanding of the empirical 
relevance of the trade-off between structural reforms in EU countries. The analysis will focus on 
product and labour market reforms and pension reforms. The main issue investigated is as follow: 
which impact do reforms have on budgets in the short term?  
 
Results show that, in the aftermath of reforms, budgets do not worsen significantly compared with 
cases where no reforms occur. However, when the short-term budgetary impact of reforms is 
evaluated controlling for the response of fiscal authorities to the cycle and debt developments via 
the estimation of “fiscal reaction functions”, there is evidence that product and market reforms and 
pension reforms are associated with a deterioration in budgets. The impact appears rather weak (a 
primary CAB reduced by few decimal GDP points depending on the specific reform considered) 
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1. Introduction 
Structural reforms are at the centre of the EU agenda. Reforms in the functioning of markets and 
the government sector are perceived as a necessary ingredient for re-launching the growth 
potential for the union, in accordance with priorities set in the Lisbon agenda. In addition, growing 
focus is placed on the link between structural reforms and public finances in implementing the EU 
framework for fiscal policy. It is often claimed (e.g., Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998)) that the 
Stability and Growth Pact neglects a possible trade-off between short-term budgetary objectives 
and the implementation of reforms that could improve public finances durably in a medium-to-
long term perspective. The idea of a possible trade-off between the implementation of structural 
reforms and the pursuit of budgetary objectives was reflected in the 2005 reform of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, which permits, under certain conditions, to take into account structural reforms 
in the implementation of both the preventive arm and the corrective arm of the EU fiscal 
framework. In future years, the evaluation of budgetary impact of reforms is likely to acquire 
greater relevance in the implementation of the SGP. Better knowledge on the implication of 
structural reforms for public finances will be required in EU fiscal surveillance. 
A first reason for why there could be a trade-off between reforms and budgetary objectives is that 
reforms may have a temporary negative effect on budget balances. There can be direct budgetary 
costs associated with reforms. This is for instance the case of pension reforms introducing a 
funded pillar classified outside the government sector. In the case of this particular type of 
reforms, budgets would normally undergo a temporary deterioration (due to lost social security 
contributions by the government) offset by long-term improvements (associated with saved 
pension payments by the government). Alternatively, higher deficits could be the result of policy 
action aimed at overcoming resistance to reforms in the political arena via tax cuts or targeted 
government expenditure programmes. Moreover, to the extent that fiscal expansions are expected 
to produce a positive short-run impact on economic activity and employment, keeping an 
accommodating fiscal stance could help to ease to the political cost of reforms. Finally, the 
budgetary deterioration could also be associated with short-term output losses stemming from 
corporate restructuring and temporary increases in unemployment due to higher job destruction.  
Some papers have analysed the trade-off between budgetary objectives and structural reforms 
mainly from a theoretical perspective (e.g., Razin and and Sadka (2002), Beetsma and Debrun  
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(2003, 2005)). Relatively few work exist instead attempting to estimate empirically whether fiscal 
consolidation has a negative impact on the probability of carrying out economic reforms.  
The aim of the paper is that of making a step forward on the understanding of the empirical 
relevance of the trade-off between structural reforms in EU countries. The analysis will focus on 
product market, labour market and pension reforms. The main issue investigated will be the 
following: which impact do reforms have on budgets in the short term? Due to lack of systematic 
data on the direct budgetary impact of the type of reforms considered, the analysis will not 
disentangle the direct budgetary impact of reforms from the impact arising via the payment of 
“compensation packages” to ease resistance to reforms. There is instead an attempt to: (i) perform 
a disaggregated analysis in the change in relevant government revenue and expenditure items (e.g., 
social security contributions, social transfers,…) in reform and non-reform years; (ii) control for 
other factors that may have contributed to short-term budgetary developments (e.g., output and 
debt stabilization objective by fiscal authorities) via the estimation of “fiscal reaction functions” 
(see, e.g., Gali and Perotti (2003)).  
Indicators of structural reforms are constructed starting from indexes on regulatory restrictions 
used in IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2004. Indicators of pension reforms are based on the 
information provided in the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti database. While indicators on 
labour market and product market reforms represent sufficiently large reductions in regulatory 
restrictions, indicators of pension reforms refer to enacted legislative changes concerning pension 
systems. The dataset used in the analysis comprises observations on EU-14 for the 1970s (in the 
case of labour market and product market reforms), the 1980s and the 1990s. In spite of limitations 
related to small sample size and quality of reform indicators, a number of results of interest 
emerge.  
On average, the evolution of the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is not significantly 
different in the aftermath of reforms compared with years not following reforms. Product market 
reforms are associated with slower growth in government revenues – accompanied, however, by 
correspondingly slower growth in expenditure. After pension reforms, social benefits paid by the 
government grow at a significantly slower rate, but the overall impact on the budget is 
compensated by government revenues also growing at a slower rate. There is also evidence 
suggesting that the impact of reforms can be quite different depending on the characteristics of the 
reform, notably whether it mainly introduces parametric changes or also allows for systemic 
changes in the national pensions framework. Estimating the budgetary impact of reforms after 
controlling for the response of fiscal authorities to the cycle and debt developments, there is  
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evidence of a slight deterioration in budgets (in the order of few decimal of percentage points of 
GDP) which is however not always statistically different from zero.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section illustrates the main 
arguments for the emergence of a possible trade off between budgetary discipline in the short-term 
versus the long-term related with numerical fiscal rules preventing the implementation of 
structural reforms. It also outlines the provisions concerning structural reforms that have been 
included in the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. 
The concluding remarks follow. 
 
2. Structural reforms, numerical deficit rules, and the trade-off between short and long-term 
fiscal discipline.  
 
2.1. Structural reforms: definitions, main features, and their long-term impact on public 
finances 
The term reform is used with reference to rather different types of policy interventions: trade 
reforms, labour market reforms, tax reforms, pension reforms, health sector reforms, etc. In 
general, compared with other types of policies, reforms (i) have a long-lasting impact and (ii) 
concern the general functioning of economic (market or state) institutions rather than specific 
elements. The adjective “structural” often accompanies the word reform, to remark the fact that the 
policy concerned are aimed at affecting the economy in its structure.  
Sometimes by reform it is meant a policy aimed at modifying the institutional setting shaping the 
interplay among private economic agents. This is typically the case of reforms changing the 
functioning of markets (product or factor markets). In other instances, reforms may be aimed at 
modifying the working of government. This is the case for instance of reforms affecting the 
working of the welfare state (e.g., pension or health care reforms) or the set-up of policy 
institutions (e.g., reforms concerning the institutional set-up of monetary authorities, or the status 
of authorities enforcing competition policy or regulating public utilities).  
Another relevant distinction is between reforms that modify the features of existing policies and 
institutions (e.g., pension reforms modifying social security rates) from those that replace or 
complement existing policies and institutions with new ones (e.g., pension reforms introducing 
new pension pillars). The former are often refer to as parametric reforms, the latter as systemic. A  
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further distinction is that between reforms that concern all agents in a given sector or only 
particular groups. An example is that of labour market reforms extending to all labour market 
participants as opposed to reforms addressed only to individuals entering the labour market for the 
first time.  
Reforms can be as seen as the outcome of a continuous effort to adapt market and government 
institutions to changing fundamentals: technological progress, evolving needs of individuals and 
the society, demography, etc. In spite of such a constant need of adapting institutions to 
fundamental changes, the process of reform of a given sector of the economy is not always smooth 
and gradual. Indeed, the reform process seems quite often characterized by jumps and 
discontinuities: substantial policy changes are concentrated in few periods of time.
10 Moreover, 
when evaluated over sufficiently long periods of time, there is evidence that reforms in one 
particular sector of the economy are quite often accompanied by reforms in other sectors. In 
several advanced countries labour market, product market and tax reforms occurred broadly at the 
same time (IMF, 2004).
11 Finally, the international dimension seems to matter: reforms in a given 
country are more likely if other countries have already carried out reforms in the same sector or are 
in the process of doing it.
12
One of the most salient features of economic reforms, which has attracted increasing attention by 
academic and applied economists, is the considerable resistance that reforms could encounter in 
the policy-making process. Several political economy arguments have been offered in the literature 
 
10    For instance, in most advanced countries reforms in the banking sector were concentrated in the early 
eighties, while the deregulation of air transportation was mostly achieved between the mid eighties and the early 
nineties. A common thesis is that reforms tend to follow periods of crisis. See, e.g., Drazen (2000) for a discussion of 
this thesis and for a survey on empirical evidence. The point here is not so much that reforms follows periods of 
unsatisfactory economic performance (“the reform should follow crisis…is no more surprising than smoke following 
fire” (Rodrik (1996, p. 27)). The thesis is rather that reforms are triggered only by periods of exceptionally bad 
economic performance. 
11 The fact that reforms in different sectors of the economy tend to occur together could be explained by 
complementarity relations that often characterises reforms. For instance, a labour market reform aimed at increasing 
the employment rate would be more effective if not acting exclusively on one aspect of the labour market legislation 
(e.g., only on legislation concerning firing practices) but rather when considering several aspects at the same time 
interrelated among them (e.g., both hiring and firing practices, unemployment benefits). Complementarities could 
also concern reforms in different sectors of the economy. For instance, product market reforms that increase the 
degree of contestability of sectors may trigger reforms in labour markets. The reduction in the extra-profits 
associated with entry-barriers and anti-competitive practices could reduce the incentives by organized labour to 
capture part of these rents, thereby leading to a higher probability of success for reforms aimed better aligning wages 
to productivity. This argument has been put forward, for instance, by Blanchard and Giavazzi (1993). 
12 The relevance of the international dimension for economic reforms could be due to several reasons, including 
international agreements on reforming sectors for which cross-border spillovers are relevant (e.g., trade and trade-
related reforms as a result of WTO agreements) peer pressure within the context of regional arrangements (e.g., 
labour market reforms within the context of the EU open method of co-ordination), pressure to reform associated 
with the direct spillovers from other countries’ reforms (e.g., as in the case of tax competition or deregulation of 
particular industries) or learning spillovers occurring across the border.  
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to explain why even when there is quite widespread perception that carrying out reforms in a given 
sector would be in the general interest, action could be delayed or blocked altogether.
13 A common 
explanation for why potentially beneficial reforms could be blocked for long times there is the role 
of lobbying in the policy-making process. Such arguments have been first put forward in Olson 
(1971). According to this explanation, reforms, even when they can potentially benefit a majority 
of citizens, often produce losses to particular groups in the society. These groups, even if 
comprising a minority, could be highly motivated to organize resistance to reforms and may face 
lower costs to structure themselves into organized pressure groups, thus prevailing in the political 
arena over large, dispersed groups in favour of reforms. Lobbies can explain quite successfully 
why reforms aimed at reducing protection to given sectors of the economy (e.g., trade protection, 
regulation of industries,…) are blocked.
14 However, arguments based on lobbying are probably 
less suited to explain resistance to reforms with effects on all sectors of the economy (e.g., labour 
market reforms, tax reforms). 
An alternative political economy explanation for why reforms could be blocked relies on uncertain 
reform payoffs at the individual level (Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)). When individuals are 
uncertain about whether they will benefit from a given reform, there could be ex-ante a majority of 
individuals in favour of blocking the reform even when ex-post the reform benefits a majority of 
citizens. Although it is quite difficult to assess the empirical relevance of this argument, it provides 
an explanation for the observed case of reforms that, after being blocked for long times, find 
gradual support among the public once, for some reason, the reform process is put in place.   
An explanation for reform deadlocks that has received large attention by both academic 
economists and policy makers is based on uneven distribution of reform payoffs over time coupled 
with short-sightedness of governments.
15 In the presence of short-run costs from reforms and 
reforms gains materialising only in the long run, politicians that base their decisions on a short 
time horizon (because, for instance, uncertain about being re-elected), may opt not to carry out 
welfare-enhancing reforms. The fact that the reform gains could be delayed in time could in turn 
 
13    However, as stressed by several academicians and policy-makers, stalemates in the implementation of 
reforms could simply be related to technical uncertainty. Politicians may disagree on the need for reforms and on 
which type of measures are better suited to tackle the problem at stake. Such disagreement may result into 
substantial delays. Rodrik (1994) quotes the health care reform proposed by the Clinton presidency as an illustrative 
example of reform on which disagreement was related, among other things, to uncertainty on whether the proposed 
one was technically the best solution. See also Sachs (1994) for anecdotal evidence on the frequent disagreement 
within governments on how to proceed with economic reforms in countries facing macroeconomic crises. 
14   See Grossman and Helpman (2002) for theory and empirical evidence on the idea that lobbies can explain the 
presence and persistence of protection.  
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be related either to the way reforms are designed (e.g., pension reforms that modify only gradually 
the retirement age) or to the fact that the economic effects of reforms need time to materialize.
16 
Short-run costs from structural reforms could be associated to several factors: a temporary 
reduction in economic activity (due, e.g., to resources shifting across sectors and firm 
restructuring); direct negative budgetary impact from reforms (e.g., tax reforms); indirect 
budgetary costs associated with the compensation of reform losers.  
 
European countries are currently focused on reforms aimed at increasing growth and employment 
in line with the goals of the Lisbon strategy and at making public finances sustainable.
  17 The 
objective of improving the growth potential is mainly pursued through reforms strengthening the 
incentives for the supply of labour and human and physical capital (e.g., via reforms in product 
and factor markets), innovation, and the contribution of the public sector to growth (e.g., tax 
reforms, reforms in the educations sector, R&D,…). These reforms permit indirectly to improve 
public finances in the medium-to-long run via a more favourable dynamics of government 
revenues and increased resources to pay back the outstanding stock of public debt. Concerning the 
goal of improving the sustainability of public finances in EU countries, there is agreement among 
experts and policy-makers on reforms aimed at limiting the upward tendency in age-related 
expenditures, increasing employment rates, and favouring a reduction in public debt.
18 Among the 
reforms having a major role in containing the dynamics of age-related expenditures, pension 
reforms have a prominent role in the debate.
19  
 
15 In this vein, Alesina and Drazen (1991) show theoretically how governments may be induced to delay reforms 
aimed at stabilizing public finances. See also Tabellni and Alesina (1990) for a model explaining the origin of a 
deficit bias by governments on the basis of short-sighted politicians. 
16 Available evidence shows that the timing of economic reforms on growth depends quite crucially on the specific 
type of reform considered. Simulations based on a small scale econometric model contained in IMF (2004) show 
that while product and labour market reforms take time to produce positive effects on output, financial market and 
tax reforms have effects on output already in the short term. Kim (2003) calibrates a model of corporate sector 
restructuring on Japanese data an shows that product market reforms boost output in the long-term but has short-term 
costs. Econometric estimates in Salgado (2002) point to a U-shaped impact of labour and product market reforms on 
productivity growth. Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997)) report that tax cuts can have significant positive 
effects on output already in the short term. 
17 See Economic Policy Committee,  2005, ‘Annual Report on Structural Reforms’ and European Commission, 
2005, ‘Working together for growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon Strategy’, Commission Communication to 
the European Council.  
18 The Stockholm European Council of March 2001 agreed on a three-pronged strategy for ensuring public finance 
sustainability: increasing employment rates, reducing public debts, reforming pension and health care systems. 
19 See, e.g., Economic Policy Committee (2002) for an assessment of the impact of alternative hypothetical 
parametric pension reforms in EU countries (concerning the calculation of pension benefits and the effective 
retirement age) using simulations based on the national non-behavioural models used in EU countries’ national 
administrations. Results indicate that a reduction in the indexation of pensions by 1/2 percentage point would 
contribute to reduce pension expenditures projected for 2050 by a range between 0.5 and 2 % of GDP in systems  
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2.2.   Do numerical rules for deficits discourage structural reforms?  
In the policy debate, it is sometimes claimed that carrying out economic reforms could go at the 
expense of the respect of budgetary objectives, and criticisms have been moved to the Stability and 
Growth Pact for not taking properly in consideration this trade-off (e.g., Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
(1998)). In particular, it has been argued that an excessive focus on short-term budgetary discipline 
could act as a constraint on the pursuit of reforms that could improve public finances in the long 
term. This could occur if reforms worsen the budgetary position in the short to medium-term while 
gains appear mainly after some time, so that a choice has to be made in the short-term between 
implementing the reform and keeping deficits unchanged.  
There are several arguments that could provide a justification for the claim that structural reforms 
could worsen the budget in the short-run in spite of an improvement in the medium/long-term in 
public finances. 
The first argument is that reforms may temporarily worsen budget balances. This may be due to 
the presence of direct budgetary costs associated with the reform. A notable example is that of 
systemic pension reforms implying that the social contributions previously collected by the 
government are diverted to a new pillar, which may be privately run or classified outside the 
government. This type of reforms help to contain the impact of ageing on the dynamics of 
government expenditure related to the payment of pensions. However, they will also normally 
entail a reduction of government revenues not immediately compensated by reduced pension 
payments.  
The above argument has been formalized in several recent theoretical papers. Razin and and Sadka 
(2002) develop a political economy model providing a rationalisation of the trade-off between the 
budgetary objectives of the Stability Pact and the implementation of social security reforms. In this 
model, an ageing population has a double effect on the political balance of interests for what 
concerns the implementation of pension system reforms from PAYG to funding. On the one hand, 
it reduces the expected returns from PAYG schemes, thus raising the incentive to reform the 
 
where pension benefits are earnings-related, and by a 0.6-3 GDP points in systems where pensions are paid on a flat 
rate. Moreover, increasing by one year the effective retirement rate would lead to a reduction of pension 
expenditures in 2050 in the order of 0.6 to 1 % of GDP. Estimates of the long-term budgetary impact of various 
types of pension reforms have also been provided by EU countries in their updated stability and convergence 
programmes submitted to the European Commission. All programmes report long-term budgetary improvements 
associated with the reforms, which range between 0.6 to almost 2 % of GDP (stability and convergence programmes 
are available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/scplist_en.htm).  
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system for the young cohorts. On the other hand, since the size of old cohorts increases, this tends 
to reduce the likelihood of pension reforms. In such a framework, feasible reforms worsen the 
budget because the income of alive retired workers need to be maintained. Beetsma and Debrun 
(2004) analyse the trade-off between short-term budgetary discipline and growth-friendly reforms 
with up-front budgetary costs in a model comprising inefficiencies related to deficit bias in 
governments’ behaviour which justify the need for deficit rules. The authors show that in such a 
context there may be a case for designing numerical deficit rules in such a way to account for the 
budgetary impact of growth-enhancing structural reforms. 
In the present context of European policy-making, the argument related to systemic pension 
reforms introducing funded schemes recorded outside the government sector are of particular 
relevance. Following a Eurostat decision of March 2004, all mandatory, fully-funded, defined-
contribution pension schemes need to be classified outside the government sector, even if the 
pension fund is organized and managed by the government. This implies the reclassification of 
pension schemes in countries that implemented reforms creating funded pillars in recent years 
(Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) or that plan to carry out such 
type of reforms in the future.
20 The negative impact on budgets of systemic pension reforms 
implying the classification outside the government of funded schemes can be quite substantial, 
amounting up to more than one percentage point of GDP in some cases.
21 Moreover, although 
being transitory, the negative budgetary impact could be quite long-lasting. Simulations for the 
EU-15 aggregate based on the QUEST ageing model of the European Commission show that the 
budgetary deterioration associated with a partial replacement of a government-run PAYG scheme 
with a funded scheme classified outside government would cause an increase in the debt/GDP 
 
 
20 The decision by Eurostat of 2 March 2004 on the classification of pension schemes implies that funded defined 
contribution pension schemes should be classified outside the government sector. The rationale underlying the 
decision is that these schemes, even when run by the government, should be considered as owned by the pension 
beneficiaries, who are those bearing most of the risk of the scheme. EU countries are required to implement the 
Eurostat decision, by classifying funded, defined-benefits schemes outside the government sector, by March 2007 at 
the latest. See Eurostat News Release 30/2004, 2.3.2004, available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-02032004-BP/EN/2-02032004-BP-EN.HTML
 
21 In the case of Sweden, the re-classification of the funded DC pension scheme introduced with the reform of 1998 
will result in a reduction of the general government budget balance estimated in the order of 1% of GDP per year. 
An overview of the Swedish pension system is provided in “The Swedish National Pension System”, Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs and National Social Insurance Board, September 2003 and can be found at 
http://regeringen.se/content/1/c4/05/07/aa589a7c.pdf. Hungary has reported in its March 2004 Excessive Deficit 
Procedure fiscal notifications a negative budgetary impact from the reclassification of its funded scheme of 0.9% of 
GDP in 2003 and 2004. Poland in it fiscal notifications reported a negative impact of, respectively, 1.7 and 2% of 
GDP in 2003 and 2004 (European Commission (2005)). 
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ratio lasting about 25 years, followed by a substantial reduction afterwards (European Commission 
(2005)).
22
A further reason for why reforms that could be beneficial in the long run may imply budgetary 
deteriorations at least in the short term is that the resistance to reforms coming from reform-losers 
can be overcome by means of compensation packages having a cost on the budget. This could 
either mainly take the form of increased expenditures (government transfers and subsidies) or that 
of reduced revenues. A significant example of increase government transfers related to the 
implementation of structural reforms is that of several Eastern European countries during the 
transition process. The liberalization and privatisation of economic activities was often followed 
by the temporary provision of government subsidies to permit the restructuring of firms. On the 
revenue side, economic reforms were quite often implemented together with tax cuts; this seems 
especially the case for product and labour market reforms (IMF, 2004). A related, but some how 
different argument is based on a trade-off between budgetary adjustment and economic reforms 
associated with the political costs of a restrictive macroeconomic stance. Fiscal consolidations 
could in fact be politically costly due to possible losses of output and jobs in the short term. Given 
that governments dispose of “political capital” in limited supply, whenever part of this political 
capital is allocated in carrying out economic reforms, few could be left for adjusting budgets. By 
the same token, expanding budgets could compensate for using up political capital in carrying out 
reforms.  
Finally, short-term budgetary losses associated with reforms could be the result of a deteriorating 
output gap (and a consequent reduction in the cyclical component of the budget balance) resulting 
in some cases from structural reforms. Some reforms permit to improve potential output but actual 
output could react slowly, and this will result into a rising output gap.
  23 Alternatively some 
reforms could even have temporary effect on actual output which is negative, due for instance to 
firm restructuring or increased job destruction due to the sectroal relocation of workers.  
 
22 The ‘QUEST ageing model’ is a variant of the European Commission macro model, allowing for an overlapping 
generations structure (see McMorrow and Roeger (2004) for a description). Demographic parameters are calibrated 
to the main features of the Eurostat projections until 2050. The model distinguished between various tax and 
expenditure categories and the government is constrained by an intertemporal budget constraint. The simulation 
considers a pension reform that: i) shifts pension contributions into a non-government funded scheme so that the 
amount of contributions received by government fall from 16% to 11% of the net wage; ii) reduces the pension 
benefits paid by the government, guaranteeing accrued rights to PAYG pensions. Workers retiring at the time of the 
reform are assumed to receive pension benefits from the government equal to 75% of the gross wage, as before the 
reform. The cohorts in between receive pension benefits from the government between 50% and 75% of their gross 
wage in proportion to their age, i.e., to the length of the period during which they have been contributing to the 
PAYG system. 
23 Hughes Hallet, Hougaard Jensen and Richter (2004) analyse the budgetary implications of a rising temporary 
output gap associated with labour market reforms in the Oxford Economic Forecasting model.  
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Although there could be some foundation for the above arguments under given circumstances, 
generalizations are difficult. In fact, there is also a series of reasons that point rather to a positive 
relation between economic reforms and short-term government budgets. 
First, there are reforms with a direct positive impact on budgets. This is for instance the case of 
many parametric pension reforms or of labour market reforms (e.g., labour market reforms 
reducing the generosity of unemployment subsidies). Moreover, compensation packages to ease 
resistance to reforms, if appropriately designed, are not necessarily costly to the budget. Schemes 
could be found such that the groups that lose for reforms are compensated via transfers paid by the 
groups benefiting from reforms. There are anecdotal cases which seem consistent with this 
possibility. The Dutch labour market reform started in 1982 and aimed at supporting wage 
moderation was accompanied by cuts in labour taxes and social security contributions paid by 
employees. This permitted to reduce labour costs to businesses without losses in net wages. 
Employment growth followed from 1984 onward. At the same time, government expenditure was 
cut substantially, so that, in spite of the tax cut, the government budget balance improved.  
Second, a credible commitment by the government towards medium-term budgetary discipline 
could help to win the resistance of groups opposing reforms. Once governments are credibly 
committed to sound public finances, the adoption of reforms that permit structural improvements 
in public finances in the medium/long term may become easier. Since voters and interest groups 
anticipate that know that governments will not loosen budgetary policy to ease the resistance to 
reforms, there will be less resistance to reforms in the first place. would be weaker in the first 
place. The credibility of government commitment to budgetary discipline is enhanced when there 
is a wide perception of the need to take action to reverse unsustainable trends in public finances. 
The credibility of government commitment is also strengthened when taken at the international 
level. The experience with the pension reforms in several EU countries in the run up to EMU 
(Spain, Italy, Portugal) seems consistent with this argument. 
Overall, whether a trade-off exists between budgetary discipline in the short run and the adoption 
of reforms is mainly an empirical question.  
 
2.3. Structural reforms in the 2005 SGP reform package 
On 22 March 2005 the EU head of states and governments endorsed a 20 March ECOFIN Council 
report reporting agreed lines for reforming the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The ECOFIN  
102 
                                                
Council adopted regulations amending the original SGP on 27 June 2005.
 24 The 2005 SGP reform 
is the outcome of several months of discussions within the Eurogroup, the Council and the 
Commission with a view of improving the EU rules-based framework for fiscal discipline.
25 The 
main objectives of the 2005 SGP reform package are as follows: (i) strengthening the preventive 
part of the Stability and Growth Pact, mainly via country-specific medium-term objectives 
(MTOs) and the definition of minimum annual budgetary adjustment for countries not having 
reached yet their MTO; (ii) enriching the economic rationale of the corrective arm of the Pact 
through a more comprehensive assessment of the case for launching the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) and the possibility of extending deadlines for correcting the deficits and 
repeating steps in the EDP; (iii) complementing the EU rules with improved fiscal governance 
both at the EU and national level, notably strengthened statistical institutions.  
The amended Stability and Growth Pact includes provisions reflecting the view that numerical 
targets and ceilings for deficits may clash with the implementation of structural reforms. Such 
provisions are found both in the new text of the regulations disciplining the preventive arm (CR 
1055/2005) and the corrective arm of the SGP (CR 1056/2005). In particular, regarding the 
preventive arm of the SGP,  
•  “major structural reforms” will be a possible reason for revising countries’ medium-term 
budgetary objectives (Art. 1.1 CR 1055/2005); 
•  “…major structural reforms which have a direct long-term cost saving effects, including by 
raising potential growth, and therefore a quantifiable impact on the sustainability of public 
finances…” could justify temporary deviations from the medium-term objective and the 
adjustment path towards. Structural reforms will be taken into considerations provided 
“…an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value is preserved…” 
and that “…the budgetary position is expected to return to the MTO within the [stability or 
convergence] programme period…” (Art. 1.3 CR 1055/2005). 
 
•  Special attention should be given to pension reforms introducing “a multi-pillar system that 
includes a mandatory fully funded pillar” (Art. 1.5 CR 1055/2005). 
•   
 
24 Council Regulations 1055/2005 and 1056/2005, Official Journal of the European Union L 174, Volume 48. 
25    For an assessment by the European Commission of the performance of the EU fiscal framework see 
European Commission (2004). For an illustration of the approach of the European Commission to the reform of the  
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•  For what concerns the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact, i.e., the implementation 
of the Excessive Deficit Procedure,  
•  structural reforms enter the broad definition of “policies in the context of the Lisbon 
agenda” and are therefore among the elements considered in the evaluation of “all relevant 
factors” in the implementation of the EDP (Art. 1.1.3 CR 1056/2005);
26 
•  pension reforms introducing “a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory fully funded 
pillar” shall be considered by the Commission and the Council in the application of the 
EDP (Art. 1.1.5 and Art. 1.1.7 CR 1055/2005); 
•  for countries with excessive deficits close to the reference value reflecting the 
implementation of pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system, the “cost of the 
reform to the publicly managed pillar” will be considered when assessing developments in 
EDP deficit figures and (Art. 1.1.7 CR 1055/2005). 
 
The new SGP also recognizes the need of adequate information concerning the implementation of 
structural reforms to implement the EU fiscal framework, and consistently states that “a detailed 
cost-benefit analysis of major structural reforms which have direct long-term cost-saving effects, 
including by raising potential growth” should be included in Member States’ stability and 
convergence programmes (Art. 1.2. and 1.4. CR 1055/2005). 
 
Overall, the reformed SGP comprises provisions that in principle would allow help to avoid a 
possible clash between budgetary discipline and the implementation of structural reforms. The 
extent to which such provisions could lead to an effective improvement in the conduct of 
budgetary policy in Europe will depend to a large extent on the actual implementation of the 
framework. Although the amended SGP regulations define criteria that need to be satisfied for the 
consideration of structural reforms in the implementation of the SGP, some implementation issues 
are left open.
27 Which reforms could be considered for the definition of the adjustment path and 
 
SGP, see, e.g., Deroose and Langedijk (2005). For a description of the contents of the March 2005 ECOFIN report 
see European Commission (2005). 
26 In addition, Art 1.1.3. CR 1056/2005 mentions that the Commission analysis shall reflect “…developments in the 
medium-term budgetary position (in particular, fiscal consolidation efforts in “good times”, debt sustainability, 
public investment, and the overall quality of public finances).” 
27 For instance, deviations from the medium-term objective could only concerns “…major structural reforms with direct long-term cost saving 
effects…”. Moreover, deviations from the medium-term budgetary objective are conditional on the respect of a safety margin against the breach 
of the 3% deficit ceiling under representative weak cyclical conditions. Concerning the consideration of structural reforms among the “other  
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the granting of temporary deviations from countries’ medium-term objectives? How to define the 
size of the granted deviation from the MTO? How to assess the adjustment path towards the MTO 
in light of implemented reforms? A better understanding of the short-term link between structural 
reforms and budget balances is key for addressing the above questions. 
 
 




A first necessary step for the analysis is the measurement of economic reforms. Such measurement 
involves the major difficulty of having to quantify the degree of intensity of policies of very 
different types. Several attempts have been made in recent times by the academia and policy 
institutions to collect data on economic reforms and to develop indicators for the measurement of 
the effectiveness of such reforms.  
A first approach to measure reforms consists of constructing indicators based on information on 
actual policies that have been implemented in given sectors, periods, and countries. Information is 
generally provided on the number of policy measures of certain types, possibly accompanied by an 
evaluation of such policies according to pre-defined criteria. This approach permits to obtain 
information on the action taken by governments with the purpose of reforming the functioning of 
markets or state institutions.
28 A second approach consists of constructing indicators measuring 
the extent of existing distortions associated with government policies, for instance, the distortions 
associated with taxation or with the presence regulations in particular markets.
29 The impact of 
reforms is measured in this case by the change in the level of the indicator measuring the degree of 
distortions. This second approach does not account directly for government reform initiatives, but 
permits to gauge the impact of such initiatives on the structural conditions of the different sectors 
considered. This approach also permits to assess the extent to which reforms are needed. 
 
relevant factors” which needs to be taken in the corrective arm of the SGP, this is subject to the overarching principle that the deficit in excess of 
the Maastricht reference value remains close to this value and that such excess is deemed to be temporary.  
28 Databases on policy measures of different types are constructed an maintained by national and international policy 
institutions and by independent research centres (e.g., Rodolfo de Benedetti Foundation (FRDB) for what concerns 
labour market policies). 
29 Abundant work in this area has been done by the OECD. See, for instance, Nicoletti and Prior (2001) and Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta (2003). For international data on various types of government regulations in the economic field see 
also Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report, Vancouver, various issues.  
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Whenever the indicator reveals a high degree of distortions in particular sectors (as compared with 
other countries or periods) there is indication of a stronger need to carry out reforms.
30  
In the following analysis, indicators for labour and product market reforms are constructed on the 
basis of structural indexes measuring the degree of policy-induced distortions used in IMF (2004), 
while pension reform indicators are built on information collected and processed by the Rodolfo 
de Benedetti Foundation (FRDB) reporting the year of adoption and the main characteristics of 
reforms. 
Table 1 describes the sources of the original data and the methodology followed for constructing 
the reform indicators used in the analysis that follows. The indicators take value 1 in countries and 
years in which reforms took place and zero otherwise. Indicators constructed in this way permit to 
better compare results across different types of reforms starting from data representing different 
type of information (indexes summarizing the degree of distortions in the economy for labour and 
product market and tax reforms, and dicotomic variables reporting when and where reforms took 
place, and with which characteristics, for pension reforms).
31 These indicators also account for the 
discrete character of reforms, i.e., the fact that reforms are generally not evenly spread across time 
and space.
32 The indicators constructed cover EU-14 countries (except Greece for what concerns 
labour and product market reforms). Data are available starting from the ‘70s and up to late ‘90s or 
early 2000 for product and labour market reforms and for the 1985-2001 period for pension 
reforms. 
Table 2 reports the frequency across the sample of the type of reforms considered distinguishing 
between different decades. It shows that labour and product market reforms have been more 
frequent in the ‘90s than they were in the ‘80s and especially in the ‘70s. As for pension reforms, 
they were considerably more frequent in the ‘90s than in the ‘80s (information on the ‘70s is not 
 
30 A further method for measuring reforms is the use of structural indicators providing information on the 
functioning of the economy. For instance, in the case of the measurement of the functioning of the labour market, 
this approach would imply using a number of indicators concerning the magnitude and the characteristics of 
unemployment, job creation and job destruction flows, etc. This approach has been followed at the EU level to 
measure the progress towards the goals of the Lisbon strategy. Progress is benchmarked against indicators measuring 
outcomes achieved in specific sectors of the economy in EU Member States. 
31 Reforms in labour and product markets correspond to changes in the structural indexes indicating a sufficiently big 
reduction in the degree of policy distortions. A similar approach is followed, for instance, in Heinemann (2004). By 
convention, it is assumed that reforms need to induce a reduction in the degree of distortion greater than the median 
reduction observed across the sample. The choice of the median value as a benchmark allows an easy interpretation 
(reforms are events leading to a reduction in the degree of distortion belonging to the top 50%) and implies a 
frequency of events classified as reforms in the order of 20-to-30% of the total, which permits using statistical 
inference in the analysis of the links between reforms and fiscal variables across the sample.  
 
32 However, the use of discrete reform indicators has the drawback of not permitting to take into account the 
different intensity of the impact of policies in different countries and periods, while this can be captured by using 
directly indexes summarizing the extent of policy-induced distortions.   
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included in the dataset used). Table 3 reports the rank correlation coefficients among the reform 
indicators across the sample. The coefficients indicate that while the correlation appears very low 
among labour market reforms and product market reforms and among labour market reform and 
pension reforms, the correlation is quite high (0.14) between product market reforms and pension 
reforms, denoting a greater tendency for these two type of reforms to occur at the same time, in the 
same country. 
 
Prima-facie evidence on whether the adoption of reforms were negatively associated with fiscal 
consolidations can be obtained by comparing across the EU countries included in the sample the 
frequency of reforms in years during which there was an improvement in primary cyclically-
adjusted budgets (primary CAB) with that in years in which primary CABs deteriorated. Graph 1 
reports such information. The difference is negligible in case of labour market reforms, it is 
slightly higher in consolidation years for product market reforms, while in the case of pension 
reforms there is a quite substantially higher frequency of reforms in years in which primary CABs 
improved (31% of the cases as compared with 22% when a reduction in the primary CAB was 
recorded). Overall, prima-facie evidence does not support the view that reforms were less frequent 
in year were fiscal consolidations took place. Additional useful prima-facie information on the 
link fiscal consolidation and the implementation of reforms is obtained by comparing the 
frequency of reforms across the sample before and after the introduction of the EU fiscal 
framework. This permits to have a first check on the presumption that the EU framework for fiscal 
discipline acts as a constraint on the implementation of reforms. Graph 2 reports data on the 
frequency of reforms in the 1990s, separately for the period before and after the start of phase II of 
EMU (i.e., 1994). The data suggest that while labour market reforms became less frequent in the 
EU countries covered by the sample, after the introduction of the EU fiscal framework, the 
opposite holds for product market and pension reforms. 
Looking simply at the difference between reform frequencies in years with and without budgetary 
consolidation does not permit to take into account the impact that factors different from budgetary 
policy had on the timing of the adoption of economic reforms. There are very few attempts to 
estimate empirically whether fiscal consolidation has a negative impact on the probability of 
carrying out economic reforms controlling for other factors. In IMF (2004), regression analysis on 
a panel of advanced countries is performed to assess the impact of alternative determinants of  
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various reforms, including budget balances.
33 Results indicate that fiscal consolidation could be 
negatively associated with tax reforms and labour and product market reforms, while there is no 
significant relation with financial market reforms and trade reforms. Conversely, the level of the 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance is generally significantly and positively related to structural 
reform indicators.
34 Analogous results are found in Duval and Elmeskov (2005). This paper 
investigates the determinants of the probability of undertaking structural reforms increasing the 
flexibility of labour and product markets in a sample of OECD countries. The findings indicate 
that while the probability of reforms is positively related with the level of the budget balance, a 
negative but not statistically significant relation is found with the cyclically-adjusted balance.
35
The strategy of the present paper is that of focusing the analysis on a particular reason for why 
there could be a trade-off between budgetary discipline and reforms, namely the presence of short-
term costs to the budget associated with the implementation of reforms. The next section analyses 
whether the changes that occurred in different categories of government expenditures and revenues 
in the aftermath of reforms were significantly different compared with those when reforms were 
not implemented. In section 3.3. there is an attempt to measure the impact of reforms on budgets 
controlling for the response of fiscal authorities to the cycle and debt levels. 
 
3.2. Developments in budgetary items in the aftermath of reforms  
The purpose of this section is to provide evidence on the short-term budgetary impact of structural 
reforms by tracking the developments occurred in various budgetary items after reforms took place 
 
33 The analysis concerns several types of reforms: labour product and financial market reforms, tax reforms and trade 
reforms. The dependent variable employed is the time change in structural indicators inversely measuring the extent 
of policy-induced market distortions. The explanatory factors considered are as follows:: initial structural conditions, 
variables relating to international factors and openness, macroeconomic variables, and factors affecting the policy-
making process. The initial structural conditions are captured by lagged variables of the structural indicators used as 
dependent variables and by demographic variables. International factors are captured by the share of trade on GDP 
(trade openness) and by a dummy variable for EU membership. The macroeconomic variables used include 
cyclically-adjusted primary budget balances, both levels and year-to-year changes and dummy variables denoting 
years with very low growth (bad years) and how many of the previous 3 years were bad years. Factors affecting the 
policy-making process were captures by a list of dummies capturing political variables (e.g., whether in the year 
were there elections, electoral rule followed,…).  
34 Analogous analysis to that contained in IMF (2004) has been carried out in Debrun and Annett (2004) separately 
on a sample of EU countries only. It is shown that when the analysis is restricted to EU countries, the impact of 
fiscal consolidation on the implementation of reforms becomes significantly weaker. 
35 The dependent variable used in this analysis is dycotomic: it takes value 1 if reforms are carried out and 0 
otherwise. A reform is defined as a change in indexes measuring inversely the degree of policy-induced market 
distortions that exceeds the sample average by two standard deviations. Probit regressions are performed on 
dependent variables measuring the conditions of the labour market, macroeconomic conditions, the state of public 
finances and the political context. In addition regressions include dummies capturing whether countries are small or 
large and whether monetary policy is independent or tied by exchange rate agreements or currency unions.  
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and comparing such developments with what happened instead when no reforms where 
implemented. A negative budgetary impact of reforms could be due either to direct effects 
associated with the reform (e.g., losses of pension contributions in case of systemic pension 
reforms) or to costs associated with the need to win resistance to reforms out via increased budgets 
(e.g., via subsidies or tax cuts). Due to the absence of systematic evidence on the budgetary impact 
of reforms that can be attributed exclusively to direct effects, in the following analysis no 
distinction will be made between the direct component and the component associated with the 
implementation of compensation schemes. 
There is no obvious way in which labour market and product market reforms could impact directly 
budgets in the short term. Depending on the particular reforms considered, the effect could be 
either negative or positive. For instance, labour market reforms could either contribute to contain 
government expenditure if including reductions in unemployment subsidies or raise expenditure if 
comprising active labour market policies to promote employability (e.g., training programmes). As 
for product market reforms, they can for instance have a direct effect on budgets by altering the 
size of government subsidies and transfers to the corporate sector. Although the direct budgetary 
impact of labour and product market reforms is likely to be quite limited in the short-run, one 
needs to take into account the impact on public budgets that could be associated with the 
implementation of compensation schemes. 
A first approach to assess the short-term budgetary impact of reforms is to look at the change in 
various budgetary items in years immediately following reforms and to compare them with that in 
years where no reforms took place. Table 4 reports average changes in primary cyclically-adjusted 
primary budgets (primary CABs) and selected components distinguishing between years 
immediately following the adoption of reforms and remaining years. T tests are performed to 
check whether differences in reform and “non-reform” years are statistically significant. 
Results indicate that neither in the case of labour market reforms nor in that of product market 
reforms the variation in primary CABs is significantly different in reforms or non-reform years. In 
the case of labour market reforms it is observed a weaker reduction in government investment on 
average. In the case of product market reforms, the growth in cyclically-adjusted revenues is 




                                                
Turning to pension reforms, their short-term direct budgetary impact depends crucially on the 
elements touched upon by the reform and on how the reform is designed. Parametric reforms in 
government pension schemes that reduce the generosity of the system are likely to exert a direct 
positive impact on budgets. This is generally the case of reforms increasing pension contributions, 
revising the criteria for the determination of pension benefits (e.g., modifying the indexation 
criterion of pensions), tightening the entitlement criteria for pensions, or increasing the statutory 
retirement age. As illustrated previously, systemic reforms may have instead a temporary negative 
impact on budgets even when having a possible long-term impact on public finances if they imply 
the shifting of social contributions into pension schemes privately run or classified outside the 
government. It should also be taken into account that the short-term budgetary impact of pension 
reforms could be affected to a relevant extent by the fact that reforms are quite often designed in 
such a way to take effect gradually. Table 5 compares average changes in primary CABs and 
selected budgetary items in periods with and without reforms. Results show that, in spite of a non-
significant difference in the changes in the primary CAB between periods with and without 
reforms, there is a statistically significant difference in the short term dynamics of social benefits, 
which on average rise in periods without reforms, while falling immediately after the 
implementation of reforms.
36 The difference in the change in social contributions in reform and 
“non-reform” years appears instead negligible. 
Since the short-term budgetary impact of pension reforms could be quite different depending on 
the specific reforms considered, it could be helpful a close look at budgetary variables of interest 
in the years before during and after each one of selected structural pension reforms. Of course, 
such an analysis would not be very informative on the impact of reforms on budgets (since there is 
no counterfactual for judge what would have been the evolution of budgetary variables without the 
reform) but could help to shed light on whether there are systematic differences in the evolution of 
reforms depending upon the type of reforms considered. The reforms included in the analysis are 
all those reducing overall the generosity of the system and classified as structural in the FRDB 
database, i.e., reforms applying to the whole population and not only to particular categories. 
Table 6 reports the value (as a percent of GDP) of the primary CAB, social security contribution 
and social benefits other than in kind in the year before, during and in the two years after each 
reform. Almost all the reforms considered were mainly of the parametric type, aimed at modifying 
 
36 The ESA95 item social benefits other than in kind (D.62), comprises 4 sub-items: social security benefits in cash 
(D.621), private funded social benefits (D.622), unfunded employee social benefits (D.623), social assistance 
benefits in cash (D.624). Pension reforms are likely to affect especially the first two categories, that on average 
constitute about 2/3 of the aggregate social benefits other than in kind in the EU-15 in the past 10 years.  
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the functioning of PAYG government pension schemes. The only exceptions are the 1996 reform 
in the Netherlands, the 1998 reform in Sweden, and the 1987 reform in the UK.  
The 1996 Dutch reform consisted in the privatization of the pension fun for civil servants. The 
reform carried out in Sweden in 1998 was a broad reform, that implied, inter-alia, revising the 
functioning of the government PAYG pension scheme (from defined benefit to notional defined 
contribution) and the gradual introduction of gradually an additional funded, defined-contribution 
pillar. The 1987 UK reform introduced the possibility of opting out from the government PAYG 
for joining individual private funded schemes.
37 In almost all the parametric reforms considered in 
table 6, elements aimed at reducing pension benefits and increasing pension contributions were 
present, together with revisions in the statutory retirement age.
38 The following points emerge 
from the data reported in table 6. First, the evolution of the primary CAB in correspondence with 
reform years were to a considerable extent driven by changes in cyclically adjusted revenues and 
primary expenditures not directly related to changes in pension contributions and social benefits. 
Second, the pension contributions as a share of GDP moved quite little after the reform in almost 
all cases (never more than 1 GDP point between the year of the reform and the two consecutive 
years). There is some indication that the evolution of social contributions differed depending on 
whether reforms were mainly parametric or systemic. After all parametric reforms (except Italy 
1992), social contributions increased, while in the case of the Dutch, and UK reform there was a 
slight reduction in pension contributions. Third, social benefits changed quite substantially after 
reforms. They fell after systemic reforms. The case of parametric reforms is instead mixed: an 
increase is observed after the German reform, the two Italian reforms and the Portuguese reform, 
while after the Spanish and the Finnish reform a reduction in benefits is observed. Overall, the 
evidence broadly supports the expectation that the impact of reforms is likely to be quite different 
depending on the specificities of the reforms considered, in particular whether they are mainly 





38 FRDB reports as uncertain the impact of the German reform of 1992 on pension benefits, while in all other cases 
reforms are indicated as reducing benefits and increasing contributions. As for revisions in the retirement age, all 
reforms include an increase in the statutory retirement age, generally introduced gradually, except for the 1995 
Italian reform where the retirement age was made more flexible compared with the regime introduced in 1992. 
Moreover, the Italian reforms of 1992 and 1995 were not purely parametric in that they also introduced fiscal 
incentives for the accumulation of individual private pension schemes  
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3.3. Estimating the impact of reforms on budgets through the estimation of fiscal reaction 
functions 
From the prima-facie evidence reported in the previous section there is not strong support to the 
view that labour market, product market, or pension reforms were associated with short-term 
budgetary costs. However, the analysis so far did not control for other factors that may have 
affected government budgets.  
A common way to perform such control is to estimate “fiscal rules”, describing the reaction of 
fiscal authorities (in terms of chosen levels of budget balances) to key macroeconomic 
developments, such as those related to the cycle and the level of debt.
39 The strategy followed in 
the following analysis is therefore that of augmenting fiscal rules with variables relating to the 
implementation of reforms.
40 The budgetary impact of reforms can be gauged by looking at the 
regression coefficient of the reform variables.  
Table 7 reports the results for panel data estimation of fiscal rules. The dependent variable is the 
primary CAB, the explanatory variables are the output gap, the debt/GDP ratio and a dummy 
variable taking value 1 if reforms were implemented in the current or previous year. Estimates 
have been performed separately for the case of labour and product market reforms. In accordance 
with existing estimates of fiscal rules for EU countries, results indicate a non-significant response 
of fiscal authorities to output gaps and a significant positive response to debt.
41 The coefficient of 
reform dummies is negative but barely significant in both the case of labour and product market 
reforms.  
The size of the coefficients is also similar, indicating that in correspondence with both labour and 
product market reforms budgets are loosened by about 0.3 GDP points. The analysis does not 
permit to distinguish whether this budgetary effect is a direct one or whether it is related to the 
objective of policy authorities of winning resistance to reforms by relaxing the budget. It should be 
 
39 The basic idea is that fiscal authorities are motivated by an objective of output stabilization (so that chosen budget 
balances should respond positively to expected output gaps) and by a debt stabilization motive (so that a positive 
response of budget balances to the existing stock of debt is expected). For the estimation of fiscal rules for EU 
countries see, e.g., Von Hagen, Hugues-Hallet and Strauch (2001), Gali and Perotti (2003), European Commission 
(2004), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2004). 
40 An alternative analytical strategy is followed in Pirttila (2001) in analysing the impact of reforms in transition 
countries (privatisation, price liberalization, trade liberalization) on fiscal adjustment. In that analysis, the change in 
the budget balance is regressed against reform variables and on measures of growth, unemployment, private firms’ 
entry and initial conditions (number of transition years). Results indicate that while privatisation has a significantly 
negative impact on the fiscal balance, the impact of price liberalization was significant and positive. 
41 However, it has been shown that the coefficients of output gaps and debt of fiscal rules have not been constant 
over time (e.g., Gali and Perotti (2003), European Commission (2004), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2004)).   
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stressed that these results must be interpreted with care. In particular, they are likely to be affected 
significantly by the chosen method for measuring structural reforms. 
An issue of robustness arises: to what extent are the results concerning the budgetary impact of 
labour and product market reforms driven by the specific way chosen to construct the reform 
indicators? Results do not seem to crucially depend upon the chosen benchmark for the change in 
structural indexes to define when structural reforms occur, i.e., the median value of positive 
changes. In fact, by using the mean value instead, one obtains reform indicators that are still 
correlated with those based on the median (with rank correlations equal to 0.85 in the case of 
labour market reforms and 0.88 for product market reforms). The estimation of fiscal reaction 
functions using reform indicators based on the mean of positive changes in the structural index 
yields results similar to those presented in table 7 (see table 8). We have also performed a further 
robustness check on the labour market reform indicator used in our analysis. We have constructed 
two alternative indicators based on policies actually implemented. Using the FRDB database on 
reforms concerning employment protection legislation and unemployment subsidies, two 
indicators have been constructed. One indicator takes value 1 in years/countries where reforms in 
employment legislation which overall reduce firing costs have been introduced. The other 
indicator takes value 1 in case of reforms in unemployment subsidies that improve incentives to 
labour market participation. In spite of the fact that the correlation of these new labour market 
indicators with the one used in our analysis is rather low, the employment protection reform 
indicator so obtained performs in a quite similar way in the estimation of fiscal reaction functions 
as compared with our benchmark indicator for labour market reforms (see table 9).
42
 
Table 10 presents the results from the estimations of fiscal reaction functions in the case of 
pension reforms. This time, fiscal reaction functions are augmented by a pension reform dummy 
that takes value 1 if a pension reform was implemented in the current or previous year. The 
analysis in this case refers separately to the determinants of the primary CAB, cyclically-adjusted 
revenues and primary expenditures. Results show that the pension reform dummy has a negative 
but non-significant impact on primary CABs. The coefficient indicates that a reform implemented 
in the current or previous year reduced the value of the primary CAB by about 0.2 GDP points. 
However, given the high uncertainty surrounding this estimate (a high standard error of the 
 
42 The rank correlation between the labour market indicator used in our analysis and that based on reforms in 
employment protection is 0.02, while the correlation with that with the indicator based on reforms in unemployment 
benefits is -0.01.   
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regression coefficient) it cannot be judged to be significantly different from zero. By carrying out 
the same analysis using a dependent variable the cyclically-adjusted government revenues and 
primary expenditures one notices that most of the deterioration of the primary CAB in the 
aftermath of pension reforms is associated with a reduction in revenues rather than with increased 
expenditures. Again, the impact on revenues is however not statistically significant. It is to notice 
that, although the analysis does not permit to distinguish whether the budgetary impact of pension 
reforms is a director an indirect one, interpreting the impact of pension reforms on government 
revenues as being mostly direct does not seem consistent with the evidence illustrated in table 5: 
on average, social security contributions do not change significantly in the aftermath of pension 
reforms. 
 
Finally, alternative specifications of fiscal reaction functions have been estimated with the purpose 
of analysing the impact on budget deficits arising from the interaction between different types of 
reforms. In table 11, specifications (1) – (3) include each one of the reform dummies in isolation 
but impose a sample size such that there are no missing observations for any of the reform 
dummies. This permits to compare these results with those in specification (4), which include all 
reform dummies simultaneously, and with those in specifications (5) – (8) which instead include 
dummies taking value 1 when, respectively, are carried out: labour market and product market 
reforms; labour market and pension reforms; product market and pension reforms; all three type of 
reforms. Results show that when the sample is restricted to year/country combinations for which 
there are no missing observations for any reform dummy the impact of labour market and product 
market reforms taken in isolation appears less negative (and less statistically significant) while that 
of pension reforms more negative and statistically different from zero (compare table 11 with 
tables 7 and 10). By including all reform dummies in the specification, the dummy for product 
market reforms turns slightly positive, becoming largely statistically insignificant, whereas the 
coefficient for labour market reforms and pension reforms becomes more negative compared with 
the case in which they are included separately in the regressions (specifications (1) and (3) in table 
11). The lack of robustness of reform regression coefficients signals a possible problem of 
multicollinearity which affects especially the coefficient of the product market reform dummy. 
This seems consistent with the evidence from correlation analysis, which reveal a quite significant 
correlation across the sample between product market reforms and pension reforms. Does it matter 
if different types of reforms occur at the same time? Comparing results from specifications (5) – 
(8) with those in specification (4) in table 11 could help answering this question. In all cases, the  
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coefficient of the dummy for the simultaneous presence of different types of reforms is negative 
(and significant only when pension reforms are concerned) but lower in absolute value compared 
with the sum of the coefficients for the corresponding type of reforms in specification (4). This 
suggests that, on average, the simultaneous implementation of different types of reforms is 
associated with a budgetary deterioration that is lower compared with the cumulated budgetary 
deterioration that would result by implementing the same reforms sequentially.  
 
4. Concluding remarks  
The main messages from the previous analysis can be summarised in the following way. Looking 
at average changes in budget balances in years with and without reforms, no significant differences 
emerge for what concern the evolution of the primary CAB in the short-term, irrespective of the 
type of reform considered. Product market reforms are associated with slower growth in 
government revenues accompanied by corresponding slower growth in expenditure. In the 
aftermath of pension reforms, social benefits paid by the government grow at a significantly 
slower rate, but the overall impact on the budget is compensated by government revenues also 
growing at a slower rate. The analysis of the evolution of budgetary variables during the 
implementation of selected structural pension reforms suggests that the impact of reforms can be 
quite different depending on the characteristics of the reform, mainly on whether the reforms 
mainly introduce parametric changes or also allow for systemic changes in the national framework 
for pensions. When the short-term budgetary impact of reforms is evaluated after controlling for 
the response of fiscal authorities to the cycle and debt developments, there is evidence that product 
and market reforms and pension reforms are associated with a deterioration in budgets (due either 
to a direct budgetary impact of reforms or to other reasons, like tax cuts or expenditure increases 
aimed at easing resistance to reforms). The impact appears rather weak (a primary CAB reduced 
by few decimal GDP points depending on the specific reform considered) and not always 
statistically significant. Moreover, the simultaneous implementation of different type of reforms 
seems to imply a slighter budgetary deterioration compared with the cumulated budgetary 
deterioration arising from the sequential implementation of the same types of reforms. 
It is important to stress that the results from the empirical analysis suffer from the fact that the 
dataset is of limited size and because any measurement of reforms involve to a certain degree 
arbitrary choices which may however matter for results. Caution is needed also in comparing 
results across different type of reforms, given that the reform indicators used in the analysis 
represent somehow different phenomena, (improvements in indexes of labour market and product  
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market restrictions, data on pension reforms implemented). Finally, our empirical analysis of 
structural reforms suffers from an inevitable problem of self-selection bias. The reforms observed 
are only those that have not been blocked in the political process. However, many reforms project 
may have been blocked exactly because of their budgetary impact, but the analysis does not take 
into account of that.  
Overall, there is a strong indication that generalizations are not easy to make for what concerns the 
link between structural reforms and budgets in the short-run. Results differ depending on the 
specific type of reforms considered. Also within a given type of reforms (e.g., pension reforms) the 
fiscal implications are likely to differ considerably depending on the main elements of the reform 
and on how reforms are designed. Furthermore, the weak statistical significance of results reveals 
in general a high degree of dispersion in results across the sample, i.e., each reform case cannot be 
easily assimilated to the average. 
These results point to some lessons for policy. In the implementation of the EU fiscal framework 
there are reasons for taking better into account the role of economic reforms, especially when there 
is a strong ex-ante expectations that reforms may have a positive impact on public finances in the 
long run coupled with budgetary costs in the short term. However, a mechanistic, one-size-fits-all 
approach whereby all reforms or all reforms belonging to some broad categories are judged the 
same way should be avoided. Judgement should be used on a case-by-case basis, on the ground of 
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  Source Description of data from which reform 









IMF  Labour market index consisting of the 
unweighted average of indicators of 
employment restriction, unemployment benefit 
replacement rate and benefit duration. The 
index is normalized in such a way to be 
between 0 and 1 and to increase as labour 
market restrictions are reduced. Original data 
source: Nickell and Nunziata (2001), Labour 








change in the 
labour market 
index is positive 





IMF  Index measuring entry barriers, public 
ownership, market structure, vertical 
integration and price controls in public utilities 
and transport services. The index is normalized 
in such a way to be between 0 and 1 and to 
increase as product market restrictions are 








change in the 
product market 
index is positive 
and bigger than 
the median 
positive change 
          
Pension 
reforms 
FRDB  Data reporting the years in which reforms in 
the pension systems were approved by the 






the system less 
generous took 
place in the year 
Notes: *Except AT (1973-1998), PT (1975-1998) and FI (1971-1998).  
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Table 2:  Frequency of different types of reforms in different time periods  


















0 0.16  0.62 
Pension 
reforms 
n.a. 0.16  0.31 
 
Figures represent the ratio between the total number of cases in which reforms occurred over the total number of years for which 










Table 3:  Rank correlation between indicators of labour market, product market  and pension reforms across 





















-0.01 1  .. 
Pension 
reforms 
0.02 0.14  1 
 





Graph 1: Frequency of reforms during years of consolidations and years where primary cyclically-adjusted 
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Table 4: Average changes in budgetary variables during reform periods and periods where no reform took 




  Labour market reforms  Product market reforms 
Year-to-year change in 
fiscal variables (% 




A reform took 









A reform took 




t test for 
(1)≠(2) 
Primary CAB  0.06  0.08  -0.14  0.15  0.15  -0.0 
Cyclically-adjusted 
revenues 
0.43 0.3 0.65  0.54  0.01  2.89*** 
Social security 
contributions 
0.17 0.08  1.3  0.12  0.017 1.7* 
Primary expenditure  0.38  0.19  0.93  0.36  -0.11  2.44** 
Social benefits other 
than in kind 
0.2 0.05 1.6  0.17  -0.005  1.97** 
Government subsidies  -0.003  -0.048  0.85  -0.033  -0.072  0.79 
N. obs.  238  114    153  141   
 






Table 5: Average changes in budgetary variables during reform periods and periods where no reform took 







  Pension reforms  
Year-to-year change in fiscal variables (% 




A reform took place in the 
current or previous year 
(2) 
t test for 
(1)≠(2) 
Primary CAB  0.012  0.18  -0.87 
Cyclically-adjusted revenues  0.16  -0.04  1.06 
Social security contributions  0.02  -0.015  0.6 
Primary expenditure  0.11  -0.23  1.54 
Social benefits other than in kind  0.06  -0.11  1.85* 
Government subsidies  -0.08  -0.09  0.11 
N. obs.  123  101   
 














between t+2 and 
t (% GDP) 
 
Change in social 
contributions 
between t+2 and t 
(% GDP) 
 
Change in social 
benefits between 
t+2 and t (% GDP) 
 
Germany 1992  1.7  1  1.4 
Spain 1997  -0.1  0  -0.9 
Italy 1992  1.1  -0.1  0.8 
Italy 1995  3.1  0.5  0.6 
Netherlands 
1996 
-1.4 -0.2  -1.8 
Portugal 1993  1.3  0.3  0.6 
Finland 1997  0.8  -0.2  -1.7 
Sweden 1998  -0.5  0.6  -1.2 
UK 1987  0.4  -0.4  -1.8 
 
Note: Including only structural reforms decreasing the generosity of the pension system as reported in the FRDB 
database. Social benefit figures refer to the “social benefits other than in kind” category in the ESA95 government 
accounts. 













































N. obs.  342  293 
R sq.   0.73  0.76 
Chi sq  1121  1171 
Notes: Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables 
regression. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag and the US 
lagged output gap. All fiscal variables are expressed as shares on 
potential output. 
Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, 
respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. 
Coefficients for country fixed effects are not reported. 








Table 8: Budget balances, labour and product market reforms (reform 
dummies defined as changes in reform indicators greater than the average 





































N. obs.  330  291 
R sq.   0.72  0.76 
Chi sq  1005  1163 
Notes: Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables 
regression. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag and the US 
lagged output gap. All fiscal variables are expressed as shares on 
potential output. 
Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, 
respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. 
Coefficients for country fixed effects are not reported. 





Table 9: Budget balances, labour market reforms (reform dummies defined as policies reducing the 




























Dummy for labour 






Dummy for labour 
market reforms based on 





N. obs.  238  238 
R sq.   0.70  0.70 
Chi sq  1174  1164 
Notes: Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables 
regression. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag and the US 
lagged output gap. All fiscal variables are expressed as shares on 
potential output. 
Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, 
respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. 
Coefficients for country fixed effects are not reported. 





































































N. obs.  224  224  224 
R sq.   0.69  0.79  0.73 
Chi sq  1128  405731  255782 
 
Notes: Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables regression. The 
output gap is instrumented with its own lag and the US lagged output gap. All 
fiscal variables are expressed as shares on potential output. 
 
Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. Coefficients for country fixed 
effects are not reported. 
The pension reform dummy is constructed as an indicator taking value 1 if a 
pension reform was carried out in the current or previous year and zero 
otherwise. 





Table 11: Budget balances and structural reforms: results from the estimation of fiscal rules (sample defined 



















































































   -0.34 
(-1.55) 
    






    
Dummy pension 
reforms 








     - 0 . 2 4  
(-1.1) 
    
Interaction labour 
market/pension reforms 












        -0.65** 
(-2.38) 
N.  obs.  188   188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
R sq.   0.65  0.65  0.65  0.66 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 
Chi  sq  853 848 875 878 853 941 908 879 
 
Notes: Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables regression. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag and 
the US lagged output gap.  All fiscal variables are expressed as shares on potential output. 
 
Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
per cent level. Coefficients for country fixed effects are not reported. 
The pension reform dummy is constructed as an indicator taking value 1 if a pension reform was carried out in the current or 
previous year and zero otherwise. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In a number of EU countries, governments are facing a double economic-policy challenge: Not 
only that many features of labour markets, social security and tax systems are in need of an 
overhaul given the constraints of an ageing population and increasing global competition. In 
addition, significant consolidation steps are necessary in order to guarantee long-run sustainability 
of budgetary policies. 
Defining an adequate strategy which successfully copes with these twin tasks requires a thorough 
understanding of possible conflicts or complementarities between both fields. If budgetary 
consolidation and structural reforms are of an instantaneously mutually reinforcing nature there 
would be a strong case of a “big bang” approach combining measures on both policy fields. If, 
however, there are - at least in the short-run - conflicts it can become necessary to define reform 
and consolidation sequences carefully. 
For the EU, the possible conflicts between budgetary objectives and required structural reforms 
have a specific framing represented by the fiscal constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) on the one and the Lisbon strategy’s growth objective on the other hand. If there is a 
conflict between budgetary prudence and measures to increase the flexibility of markets and the 
viability of social security systems, it may be hard to reconcile “Lisbon” with “Maastricht”. The 
recent reform of the SGP (European Commission, 2005) reflects this potential problem as it has 
allowed taking account of major structural reforms in the so called “preventive part” of the Pact. 
Specifically, reforms may now justify a temporary deviation from the given medium term fiscal 
objectives. Obviously, the Pact’s reformers are convinced that fiscal consolidation and structural 
reforms are not always complementary undertakings.  
The SGP’s contentious reform underlines the need for a more thorough understanding of the link 
between fiscal prudence and structural reforms. The SGP’s guardian, the Commission, has to 
decide in future which reform episodes may have an exculpating character for a temporary 
deterioration of the fiscal position. 
Given these policy challenges, this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the link 
between fiscal prudence and structural reforms. It adds to the limited literature which is surveyed 
in the next section. This study explicitly does not treat the long-run link between structural 
reforms and budgetary performance. In regard to the long-run, it is hardly controversial that 
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certain types of structural reforms are able to boost productivity, potential growth and, therefore, 
alleviate fiscal pressures (see, for example, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003).  
This paper contributes new insights to the existing literature in the following respects: First, it 
clarifies conceptual issues how to disentangle typical fiscal features of reform periods on their 
outset on the one hand and over the course of the reform cycle on the other hand. Second, it 
analyzes the mutual link between budgetary policy and structural reforms by looking not only at 
the budgetary balance but also at specific developments on both sides of the budget. This 
refinement is important to make a better empirical distinction between different possible 
mechanisms ranging from compensating reform losers up to demand management considerations. 
Third, it also studies expectation effects of structural reforms which so far have largely been 
neglected although they can be of major importance for government budgets. The empirical basis 
is given by reform indicators depicting structural change of tax system and product, financial and 
labour market for 20 OECD countries between 1975 and 1998/2002 depending on the policy field. 
Overall, the results do not point towards a general short-run trade-off between Maastricht and 
Lisbon since the link between budgetary phenomena and structural reforms is not very close. 
However, the results show that the reform-budget-link differs significantly among reform fields. 
While Maastricht and Lisbon tend to be mutually reinforcing for the liberalization of financial and 
product markets, there may be some short-term conflicts for tax and labour market reforms. The 
challenge of tax reforms is the inherent deterioration of the budgetary balance, which, fortunately, 
is dampened by significant positive growth effects. Labour market reforms appear to suffer from 
negative expectation effects. For all reform fields, the results indicate that expectation effects may 
be a more important part of the link between reforms and the budget compared to other often 
debated dimensions such as compensation issues. 
The next section combines a conceptual clarification of the reform cycle with a survey on the 
existing literature on the short-run mutual link between reforms and budgetary development. 
Section 3 presents a detailed analysis of the situation on the eve of reforms and the evolution of 
fiscal and economic variables over the reform cycle. Section 4 presents estimation results for a 
model of reform processes based on lagged adjustments towards a given target level. Section 5 
presents some insights on direct expectation effects of reforms. Section 6 concludes.  
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2 THE ARGUMENTS AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
There is a small but growing literature aiming at identifying the drivers of structural reforms. With 
a focus on financial deregulation, Abiad and Mody (2005)43 have developed a model describing 
deregulation processes as a lagging adjustment characterized by status quo preferences towards 
some target level. Helbling et al. (2004), Annett et al. (2004) and Heinemann (2005) have applied 
this deregulation model to a larger spectre of reform issues including labour markets, product 
markets, tax and trade reforms. Approaches abstracting from deregulation dynamics but 
concentrating on explaining the likelihood of reforms under given economic and political 
circumstances with the help of probit estimations are Pitlik (2003), Heinemann (2004), Duval and 
Elmeskov (2005), Belke et al. (2005) and Deroose and Turrini (2005). Different reform indicators 
and different potential drivers of reforms are being tested in this literature including proxies for 
the state of the economy, the degree of globalization, political-economic factors or the exchange 
rate system. A number of these studies also discuss the role of the budgetary situation and include 
fiscal variables among the factors relevant for a country’s ability to achieve structural change.  
 
2.1 The  arguments 
For summarizing and supplementing the main arguments of the literature and as a conceptual 
framework for the empirical testing it is helpful to work with the following stylized time scheme 
of a reform cycle. 44
 
Table 1: Stylized scheme of a reform cycle 









period of reform  period after 
reform - 
“short-term” 
full realization of 
reform; period after 
reform - “long-term” 




It can be assumed that the link between the reform event in period R and the resulting long-term 
fiscal situation (period long-term after reform: LA) is favourable. Basically, this positive link is of 
                                                 
43 The earlier IMF Working Paper version dates back to 2003. 
44 It is stylized since it is implicitly assuming a reform process to be a one shot event and not a possibly continuous process as it will be modelled in 
section 4.  
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a tautological nature since the long-run growth and budgetary consequences should be the guiding 
criterion for choosing and deciding a reform in the first place. There is much less agreement on 
the other three time dimensions: the typical fiscal situation prior (period before reforms: BR), 




The transition from a period of a stable institutional equilibrium to a pre-reform period occurs 
through a shock or event which changes the balance of interests of decisive actors (Abiad and 
Mody, 2005). This transition may occur, for instance, through learning processes, changes in the 
ideologies of governments or changing structural factors like international competition or 
demographic developments. With regard to the role of the fiscal situation there are counteracting 
arguments whether a favourable fiscal situation is required to enter a BR period. 
One of the strongest results of the above cited literature on the drivers of reforms is that the 
perception of crisis is conducive for reforms (for further references see also Drazen, 2000). Bad 
fiscal data may contribute to a general sense of crisis and as such prepare the ground for the 
acceptance of reforms. If this aspect dominates, period BR should typically be characterized by 
especially bad fiscal data which constitute one type of crisis symptoms (compared to normal 
periods S with a stable institutional equilibrium). 
The frequently cited compensation argument hints to the contrary expectations that the fiscal 
situation at the eve of reforms should typically be positive. If politically influential interest groups 
lose from the reform, compensation packages may be necessary to buy their consent (European 
Commission, 2005; Grüner, 2002). If this is relevant, there needs to be budgetary room for 
manoeuvre before a reform can occur. The same requirement applies if accommodating aggregate 
demand policies can be helpful for a quick realization of benefits from structural reforms (as 
argued, e.g., by Bean (1998) in the context of labour market reforms). In this case, too, a 
comfortable budgetary starting point should make it politically more acceptable to initiate 
structural change. As a consequence of the compensation and aggregate demand arguments, 
reform periods should be typically preceded by relatively favourable fiscal situations. 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 134  
 
Period R: 
The latter arguments immediately carry over to period R when the fiscal compensation measures 
and/or the accommodating demand-policies have to materialize once the reforms are 
implemented. The resulting deterioration in the budget can be classified as indirect (European 
Commission, 2005; Annett et al., 2004) since it is a politically necessary and not a technically 
inherent part of the reforms. 
A further type of indirect consequences can occur through the impact of reforms on the business 
cycle. Expectation considerations suggest that there may be immediate expansionary 
consequences as early as a government credibly commits itself to reforms. Duval and Elmeskov 
(2005) correctly argue that positive long-run supply side effects can lead to an instantaneous 
demand reaction. Investors and consumers forming rational expectations may at once increase 
spending due to the perception of increasing expected returns and/or life time income. This kind 
of expectation effects have been extensively analysed in the context of the so called “non-
Keynesian” effects of fiscal consolidation following the contributions by McDermott and Wescott 
(1996) and Alesina and Perotti (1997). The analogy in the context of structural reforms is obvious. 
However, depending on the specific type of institutional change and its public perception, 
negative demand effects can neither be excluded if the general public is (mistakenly) pessimistic 
about the reform consequences45 or if, for example, a decrease of social protection leads to an 
increase in precautionary savings (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005).  
In addition, the fiscal position in period R is affected by possible direct implications of reforms 
(European Commission, 2005). Structural reforms can have immediate budgetary consequences 
that may be negative (the mostly cited example are second pillar pension reforms) or positive (e.g. 
reforms, which decrease the generosity of existing transfer systems). 
It should be stressed that the issue of public perception and immediate expectation effects is of 
high policy relevance to the whole reform debate and has so far not attracted sufficient attention in 
the empirical literature. To the extent that positive immediate demand effects materialize all 
problems related to J-curves and short-run costs would be alleviated.  
                                                 
45 For the US, there is evidence that beliefs of the general public diverge significantly from professional economists’ beliefs on the economic 
situation and the relevant drivers of economic performance (Caplan, 2002a). 
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A further argument in the literature (Annett et al. 2004, European Commission, 2005, dating back 
to Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998) refers to a possibly limited political capital which prevents 
governments following different politically sensitive projects at the same time. Translated in our 
stylized setting this is no particularly compelling argument to expect increasing deficits in a 
reform period but it simply suggests that periods of structural reforms are unlikely to be periods of 
budgetary consolidation either. The validity of this particular argument, of course, depends on the 
answer to this paper’s overall question whether there is a short-run conflict between consolidation 
and reform at all.  
 
Period SA: 
Finally, the fiscal situation in the immediate aftermath of reforms is characterized by the 
continuous transcendence from the immediate reform period towards the long-run (positive) 
outcomes. The question how quick the long-run is reached is important for the acceptance of 
reforms from the start.46 There are different reasons why the future is heavily discounted in 
political processes. A classical political argument refers to election cycles and the short-
sightedness of political actors maximizing re-election chances. A behavioural economics 
argument hints to short-term impatience characterizing human behaviour. Standard assumptions 
that people maximize the sum of exponentially discounted expected utilities are not supported by 
experimental research. Instead, a preference bias towards the presence exists in the sense that the 
discount rate between today and tomorrow is significantly larger than between two periods 
somewhere in the future (Frederick et al., 2002).  
 
Period S 
In the stylized setting, the periods BR, R, and SA are framed by periods of stable institutional 
setting, S. In S, existing structures correspond to something like a stable equilibrium and 
transitory effects from former reforms have tapered off.47
 
                                                 
46 In this sense, any attempt to study the economic consequences of observable reform events necessarily suffers from a selection bias. Reforms 
associated with pronounced J-curve effects are less likely to occur compared to the ones resulting in a quick transcendence to the beneficial 
“long-run”. 
47 In reality, things are more complicated as one reform step may breed the next one if, for example, the effects hoped for do not materialize fully, 
see the model in section 4. 
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Classification of fiscal effects 
In the context of a macroeconomic analysis based on a country panel it is hardly possible to 
precisely differentiate between the different “stories” being told about the evolution of budgetary 
policy over a reform cycle (as summarized in figure 1). However, the following properties of 
reform cycles may offer insights: 
While a deterioration of the cyclically adjusted deficit in the course of reforms may be related to 
either the direct reform consequences, to demand management considerations or to the 
compensation aspect, a more detailed look at specific categories of the budget may be helpful to 
differentiate: If, for example, an increase in social spending were behind the deficit deterioration 
this could be regarded to back the compensation story. Conversely, a largely unspecific increase 
in the deficit during reform processes tends to support rather the demand management view. 
Furthermore, if reforms touch the budget mainly via business cycle effects this should be 
detectable from cyclical variables such as growth, output gap or - more directly and scrutinized 
explicitly in the following empirical steps - from sentiment indicators.  
 
Figure 1: Classification of budgetary effects of structural reforms 
 
 




consequence of reform 
indirect impact: 
not inherent in reform but 
due to reactions of 
government/economy 
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2.2  The findings in the literature 
In their time series cross section analysis for the reform experience of OECD countries, Helbling 
et al. (2004) identify the level of a cyclically adjusted primary balance as a significantly positive 
determinant of trade deregulation and labour and product market reforms. The change in the 
balance is significantly negatively related to reforms of labour market and the tax system. 
Annett et al. (2004) replicate this finding for labour market reforms in the sense that reform 
processes tend to be characterized by increasing deficits. For product market, on the contrary, 
reforms are accompanied by improving government finances.  
In its descriptive part of the analysis for EU countries, Deroose and Turrini (2005) have a closer 
look into different components of the budgets and compare reform with no-reform periods. No 
significant differences in the overall balance for pension, labour market and product market 
reforms are found. Some significant differences are detected for single budgetary components: as 
expected pension reforms tend to reduce social spending and for product market reforms 
decreasing revenues are matched by decreasing expenditures. 
The authors also estimate fiscal reaction functions linking the cyclically adjusted budgetary 
balance to the output gap, the debt level and reform dummies where the labour market reform 
dummy has a significantly negative impact on the balance while this is not the case for product 
market and pension reforms. A probit analysis indicates that higher debt levels increase the 
likelihood of labour and product market reforms and that a favourable budgetary balance tends to 
simplify product market reforms. Again, labour market reforms are associated with increasing 
deficits, at least after 1993. 
In their probit estimation for OECD countries 1985-2003, Duval and Elmeskov (2005) include the 
by now standard fiscal variables (level and change in the cyclically adjusted surplus) and - for a 
pool of labour and product market reform events - support the view that a sound fiscal situation is 
helpful for reforms while the change in the surplus is insignificant throughout. 
Looking at the literature as a whole it appears by now a well established fact that a good 
budgetary situation measured by the budgetary balance is typical for the eve of reform while there 
is some indication that - mostly for labour market reforms - increasing deficits accompany the 
reform period. 
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2.3 Unresolved  questions 
The existing studies leave a number of questions open. Most of the literature merely looks at 
fiscal policy in a highly aggregated way, restricting empirical tests largely to the budgetary 
balance and ignoring specific developments on both sides of the budget. Furthermore, a precise 
analysis of the time profiles of reform related fiscal effects is missing. 
A weakness of dominating descriptive approaches is that they do not distinguish between changes 
within the course of reform cycles on the one hand and differences between stable periods and 
reform cycles on the other hand. In terms of the stylized setting above a comparison between 
typical characteristics of R periods with all other periods is not very informative. Instead it is 
desirable to understand, firstly, which features are typical for the transition from S to PR and, 
secondly, how economic and fiscal variables evolve from PR to SA. Straightforward comparisons 
between reform and no-reform periods mix these very different issues up and, hence may lead to 
misunderstandings.  
A further shortcoming is the unclear explanation for the frequent finding of increasing deficits 
with certain types of reforms. Although the compensation argument is regularly cited in view of 
this correlation none of these studies is really able to make an empirical distinction between the 
different possible explanations which, besides compensation, could also be related to direct fiscal 
implication of reforms or to expectations effects.  
Generally, expectation and immediate demand effects are a completely neglected aspect of this 
empirical literature so far and require further attention. 
 
3 TIME PROFILES AND PROPERTIES OF REFORM PERIODS 
3.1  Data and approach 
Reforms are measured as changes in the restrictiveness of government regulation of product, 
labour and financial markets and a measure for the degree of distortions associated with the 
country’s tax system. Data on regulatory rigidity originate from the data collection used in the 
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World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2004 (Helbling et al., 2004, Appendix 3.1. for details on 
sources and construction). The 20 OECD countries covered are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The time 
series start in 1975 and extend to 1998 for labour and product markets, to 2000 for the tax system 
and to 2002 for financial markets. 
All indicators are normalized to range from 0 to 1 where an increasing value signals a declining 
degree of restriction. They are calculated as an unweighted average of sector-specific indicators 
depicting different dimension of regulatory intervention. 
The regulation indicator for the financial sector takes account of the existence of credit controls, 
interest rate controls and restrictions on international financial transactions. Thus, this indicator 
does not include regulatory issues linked to reporting and financial stability oriented monitoring 
of the financial sector which, certainly, would show very different time trends.  
The labour market indicator is constructed on the basis of the Labour Market Institutions Database 
developed by Nickel and Nunziata (2001) and is the aggregate of sub-indicators on employment 
protection, benefit replacement rates and benefit duration. It excludes information on wage 
centralization since for numerous countries there is no time variance for related variables. 
The product market indicator was constructed by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and combines 
indicators on barriers to entry, public ownership, market structure, vertical integration of networks 
and final consumer services, and price controls for the following non-manufacturing sectors: gas, 
electricity, post, telecommunications, passenger air transport, railways and road freights. It thus 
covers the sectors which used to be characterised by heavy government involvement and 
protected monopolies/oligopolies in the past. 
The tax system indicator is based on the following variables: top marginal income tax rate, the 
total tax revenue share of indirect taxes, the labour and capital income tax ratio and the absolute 
difference between labour and capital income tax ratios. The authors argue that these indicators 
are good summary proxies for the growth and employment reducing distortions associated with 
the tax system (Helbling et. al, 2004, p. 133/134). Note that the design of the tax variable implies 
that it is largely driven by the structure of the tax system and less by the overall size of tax 
revenues (and hence the size of the public sector). 
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Definition of reform event 
Any classification of significant reform events is necessarily arbitrary. The selection approach 
followed here is to choose the critical level of change to qualify as significant reform in such a 
way that at least ten per cent of all country year combinations are included.48 Hence, this analysis 
implies a focus on relatively substantial reform events. See table A-2 in the appendix for the 
resulting list of reform periods. 
The following variables representing budgetary and business cycle developments and the 
economic expectations of private households and business are included in the testing, where fiscal 
and business cycle data originate from the OECD Economic Outlook database whereas sentiment 
indicators are calculated as annual averages of monthly data from the European Commission for 
EU countries and from national sources elsewhere. Sentiment indicators are employed after 
standardization: 
Fiscal variables (notation following OECD Economic Outlook database): 
 
Deficits and debt: 
 
-  general government net primary lending as % GDP (NLGXQ), 
-  general government net primary lending cyclically adjusted as % trend GDP 
(NLGXQA), 
-  debt-GDP-level in % (DEBT) 
Government expenditures: 
 
-  general government total primary expenditure as % GDP (YPGXQ) 
-  general government total primary expenditure cyclically adjusted as % trend GDP 
(YPGXQA) 
-  social security benefits paid by government as % GDP (SSPGQ) 
Government revenues: 
 
-  general government total revenue as % GDP (YRGTQ) 
-  general government total revenues cyclically adjusted as % trend GDP (YRGQA) 
                                                 
48 The algorithm results in classifying a larger share than 10 per cent of observations as reforms due to value clusters for the change in the 
regulatory indicators. 
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-  total taxes as % GDP (TYQ)
49 
-  total taxes cyclically adjusted as % trend GDP (TYQA) 
Business cycle variables: 
 
-  growth real GDP in % (GROWTH) 
-  growth domestic demand in % (GROWTHFDDV) 
-  output gap in % (OUTPUTGAP) 
-  unemployment rate in % (UNEMP) 
-  change in unemployment rate in percentage points (DUNEMP) 
Consumer confidence/spending: 
 
-  consumer confidence yearly average standardized (CCONFST) 
-  savings ratio in % (SRATIO) 
-  growth private consumption in % (GROWTHCPV) 
-  growth private residential investment in % (GROWTHIHV) 
Business confidence/investment: 
 
-  business confidence yearly average standardized (BUSCONFST) 
-  growth business investment in % (GROWTHIBV). 
This analytical section is to make a clear distinction between the following two questions: First, to 
which extent are the economic and fiscal features of reform periods different from periods with 
relatively stable institutions? And, second, how do these features evolve from the pre-reform 
situation over the reform period itself up to the years immediately after a reform? So far, these 
questions have not been precisely distinguished in existing descriptive approaches.50
In this section, the results of two tests are presented to shed lights on typical budgetary features of 
reform processes according to those two distinct questions.  
The first test’s focus is on the typical properties of budget and the economic environment prior to 
a reform (period BR in the terminology of the stylized reform phasing of the last section). 
                                                 
49 Further differentiations between household and business taxation was included in the testing but did not result in any further insights and, hence, 
are not reported. 
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The second test concentrates on the evolution of the budget and the business cycle in the course of 
reforms (from period BR to period SA). 
 
3.2  Features of pre-reform periods 
 
In order to detect typical features of pre-reform periods the following equation is estimated
51: 
 
(1)  Y = X β + γ Reform + ε 
 
Here, Y is the scrutinized fiscal or economic variable and X is a complete matrix of country and 
year dummies. Reform is a dummy equal to 1 for the two years before a reform event occurs 
unless these periods are at the same time years following a reform event with lag one or two. The 
purpose of this procedure is to limit the test to clear cases of pre-reform years that are not at the 
same time affected by the consequences of recent reforms.52 In terms of the above suggested 
stylized scheme of reform cycles this tests amounts to searching for significant differences 
between period BR and S. Note that the time and country dummies neutralize year specific and 
country specific factors. The impact, for example, of global business cycle trends is thus 
neutralized. 
                                                                                                                                                               
50 European Commission (2005), for example, tests for differences between reform and no-reform periods. This test does not allow whether 
resulting differences are related to changes occurring within a reform cycle or to differences between periods of stable institutions and (multi-
annual) periods of reform cycles.  
51 This test has been suggested in a completely different context by Caplan (2002b). 
52 This refinement is only relevant in the presence of a consecutive sequence of reforms with some reform pauses in between. In these cases, our 
algorithm only treats the years prior to the start of the whole sequence as pre-reform years. 
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Table 2: Specific features of pre-reform periods in equation (1) 
  impact of dummy for reform  
R
2 of regression, coefficient (standard error) 
Dependent variable  labour market  financial sector  tax policy  product market 
 deficit  and  debt 
NLGXQ  0.23, -0.25 (0.51)  0.33, 0.46 (0.40)  0.30, 0.80 (0.45)*  0.22, 0.54 (0.45) 
NLGXQA  0.24, -0.09 (0.44)  0.29, 0.14 (0.36)  0.29,1.33 (0.41)***  0.24, 0.81 (0.39)** 
DEBT  0.56, 3.59 (2.44)  0.48, -1.38 (2.27)  0.65, 3.50 (2.34)  0.56, 3.08 (2.22) 
 expenditures 
YPGXQ  0.38, 0.60 (0.51)  0.34, -0.23 (0.41)  0.38, 0.57 (0.46)  0.39, 0.22 (0.44) 
YPGXQA  0.34, 0.44 (0.41)  0.30, -0.13 (0.34)  0.31, -0.03 (0.37)  0.35, -0.13 (0.36) 
SSPGQ  0.47, 0.46 (0.28)*  0.43, -0.16 (0.22)  0.53,0.48 (0.023)**  0.48, 0.13 (0.23) 
 revenues 
YRGTQ  0.44, 0.35 (0.46)  0.40, -0.02 (0.38)  0.44,1.79 (0.41)***  0.44, 0.33 (0.41) 
YRGQA  0.41, 0.28 (0.45)  0.37, -0.20 (0.38)  0.42,1.74 (0.41)***  0.41, 0.30 (0.39) 
TYQ  0.18, -0.00 (0.27)  0.21, 0.02 (0.22)  0.22,0.86 (0.24)***  0.19, 0.36 (0.23) 
TYQA  0.18, -0.07 (0.26)  0.20, -0.10 (0.21)  0.20,0.84 (0.24)***  0.18, 0.28 (0.22) 
 business  cycle/labour  market 
GROWTH  0.29, 0.00 (0.00)*  0.29, 0.00 (0.00)  0.32, -0.01 (0.00)*  0.28, -0.00 (0.00) 
GROWTHFDDV  0.21, 1.42 (0.47)***  0.20, 0.51 (0.34)  0.23, -0.64 (0.39)  0.19, -0.85 (0.40)** 
OUTPUTGAP  0.31, 0.11 (0.45)  0.34, 0.45 (0.32)  0.35, -0.16 (0.36)  0.32, -0.76 (0.37)** 
UNEMPLOYMENT  0.44, 0.63 (0.36)*  0.41, 0.05 (0.28)  0.50, 0.55 (0.32)*  0.46, 0.27 (0.30) 
Δ 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
0.32, -0.22 (0.17)  0.36, -0.13 (0.13)  0.36,0.42 (0.15)***  0.32, -0.03 (0.14) 
 consumer  confidence/spending 
CCONFST  0.29, 0.56 (0.19)***  0.35, 0.05 (0.16)  0.30, -0.39 (0.19)**  0.27,-0.44(0.16)*** 
SRATIO  0.25, 0.10 (0.57)  0.28, 0.54 (0.48)  0.39, -0.84 (0.47)*  0.20, -0.01 (0.51) 
GROWTHCPV  0.19, 1.16 (0.41)***  0.18, 0.16 (0.31)  0.21, -0.58 (0.35)*  0.18, -0.45 (0.35) 
GROWTHIHV  0.16, 4.98 (1.88)***  0.14, 2.42 (1.43)*  0.12, -1.35 (1.71)  0.12, 0.22 (1.73) 
 business  confidence/investment 
BUSCONFST  0.42, 0.43 (0.21)**  0.40, 0.37 (0.18)**  0.38, -0.42 (0.19)**  0.40, -0.03 (0.17) 
GROWTHIBV  0.26, 2.81 (1.50)*  0.26, 1.02 (1.11)  0.34, -2.08 (1.23)*  0.25, -2.28 (1.25)* 
*, **, ***: significant at 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level respectively 
 
For deficits the testing indicates that there are no significantly different overall budgetary 
conditions on the eve of labour and financial market reforms compared to other periods. Contrary 
to that, deficits tend to be significantly lower in periods preceding product market and tax 
reforms. For example, the cyclically adjusted deficit is 1.3 percent of GDP lower in periods before 
tax reforms are taking place compared to all other periods. The high significance in case of tax 
reforms is hardly surprising: Budgetary leeway is helpful to initiate legislation aiming at reducing 
tax distortions. 
The separate look into both sides of the budgets does only bring about few but revealing 
significant results: social spending is significantly up prior to labour market and tax reform and 
tax revenues are up prior to tax reforms. 
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For labour market reforms, the findings signal different insights with regard to the role of 
economic crisis. Definitely, a bad cyclical situation is not helpful to prepare the ground for 
deregulating labour markets, on the contrary: Reform cycles start in periods with significantly 
above normal growth, strong internal demand and a high level of consumer and business 
confidence. This is an interesting insight: Times of mental depression are obviously no times to 
embark on dismantling labour market protection or cutting unemployment benefits. Interestingly 
the level, not the change in the unemployment rate, is significantly higher prior to reforms. This 
could be cautiously interpreted as a positive impact of structural and not cyclical unemployment 
on the likelihood of reforms. 
The testing for financial market reforms does not hint towards significant characteristics on the 
outset of financial market reforms apart from a higher business confidence and private housing 
investment. The findings for tax and product market reforms are more in line with the crisis 
hypothesis since here a number of significantly worse business cycle indicators indicate a 
relatively poor situation in the two years preceding reforms. The typical situation in the years 
before a tax reform is undertaken is thus one of a combination of a relatively comfortable 
budgetary situation with a poor growth performance. 
The situation prior to reforms thus reveals some insights on the fiscal preconditions for reforms. 
Clearly, a favourable budgetary situation simplifies tax and product market reforms. For a better 
understanding of the fiscal repercussions of reforms it is necessary to follow fiscal and economic 
indicators over the reform cycle which is the next analytical step. 
 
3.3  Developments over the reform cycle 
The second, distinct step of the descriptive scrutiny targets at detecting significant differences in 
the economic and fiscal setting over the reform cycle. After the first step was meant to show to 
which extent the starting position of reforms is different to years of institutional stability, the 
attention shifts now towards the evolution over the reform process. 
Focusing the analysis on years around major reforms drastically limits the number of included 
observations so that the same test as in the first step requiring a large number of observations 
cannot be applied. Instead, an analysis of variance is executed comparing means before, during 
and after a reform event. Before and after a reform year two years are taken account of. Years 
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between reform events are coded as “before” or “after” depending on their closeness to the 
particular reform event.53 The analysis of variance tests for significant differences in the mean of 
economic and fiscal variables before, during, and after the reform event. Where the F-test 
indicates significant overall differences between means, a pair wise test for differences in mean is 
added54 (employing the Bonferoni correction for multiple testing). Translated into the terms of 
the stylized reform cycle above the test algorithm relates to differences between periods BR, R 
and SA in combination (analysis of variance) and, subsequently, for differences between BR and 
R, BR and SA and R and SA (pair wise tests). 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the means in government primary net lending. Table 3 
summarizes the results of the testing, figures A-1 to A-4 in the appendix show the development of 
means of important further fiscal variables over the reform cycle.  
 
                                                 
53 Single years between reform events are dropped; the same applies to the central year of a three year reform pause. 
54 The analysis of variance only allows inferring whether differences in mean among included classes are significant in total without saying which 
pairs of means are significantly different. Simple t-tests would lead to biased results due to the problem of multiple testing. 
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Figure 2: Means government primary net lending, cycl. adjusted in % trend GDP 































Table 3: Analysis of variance and pair wise mean tests 
  Financial market  Labour market  Product market  Tax system 
 F-stat  sign.  pair 
wise 
differences 
F-stat sign.  pair 
wise 
differences 
F-stat sign.  pair 
wise 
differences 
F-stat sign.  pair 
wise 
differences 
 deficit  and  debt 
NLGXQ  0.06  - 0.80  - 1.26  - 1.20  - 
NLGXQA 1.29  - 0.48  - 0.78  - 1.88  - 
DEBT  1.93  - 1.13  - 0.17  - 0.20  - 
 expenditures 
YPGXQ  0.51  - 0.75  - 0.45  - 0.16  - 
YPGXQA 0.36  - 1.03  - 0.15  - 0.11  - 
SSPGQ  1.36  - 0.78  - 0.34  - 0.19  - 
 revenues 
YRGTQ  0.33  - 0.77  - 0.15  - 0.11  - 
YRGQA  0.71  - 0.81  - 0.13  - 0.10  - 
TYQ  0.45  - 0.31  - 0.36  - 0.28  - 
TYQA  0.69  - 0.31  - 0.43  - 0.29  - 
 business  cycle/labour  market 
GROWTH 0.62  - 1.85  - 2.24  - 7.14***  -1<1** 
0<1*** 
GROWTHFDDV  0.95  - 2.26  - 3.77**  -1<1**  5.09***  -1<1** 
0<1** 
OUTPUTGAP 3.31**  1<-1**  0.76  -  1.85  -  1.93  - 
UNEMPLOYMENT  1.68  - 0.48  - 0.22  - 0.61  - 
Δ 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
0.14  - 0.57  - 2.12  - 7.77***  1<-1*** 
1<0*** 
 consumer  confidence/spending 
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CCONFST 1.43  - 2.70*  1<-1*  4.40**  -1<1**  4.59**  -1<1** 
SRATIO  0.57  - 0.35  - 0.49  - 0.11  - 
GROWTHCPV 0.83  -  2.75*  1<-1*  2.19  -  4.69**  -1<1** 
0<1** 
GROWTHIHV  0.12  - 1.24  - 0.42  - 0.11  - 
 business  confidence/investment 
BUSCONFST 5.58***  1<-1*** 
0<-1** 
3.33** 1<-1**  0.55  -  1.48  - 
GROWTHIBV  1.83  - 0.83  - 2.89*  -1<1*  2.96*  0<1* 
*/**/***: 1/5/10 per cent significance; in pair-wise difference tests: -1: period prior to reform, 0: reform period, 1: 
period post-reform 
 
It is a remarkable result that the fiscal variables - neither deficits nor expenditures nor revenues, 
neither unadjusted nor cyclically adjusted - show any significant differences over the evolution of 
the reform process. Only the deterioration of the primary deficit in the course of tax reforms 
reaches a significance level not too distant from usually accepted critical levels (16 per cent). 
Figure 2 suggests that this pattern is tax reform specific. For no other reform field there is an 
increase of structurally adjusted deficits parallel to reforms. On the contrary, the (insignificant) 
differences in means hint towards falling deficits during reform episodes.  
In contrast to these largely insignificant results, the differences in terms of growth and other 
business cycle related indicators are more pronounced. Growth clearly picks up quickly in the 
course of tax and product market reforms. This upturn is supported by a fast increase in optimism 
among consumers feeding into higher growth of private consumption. Obviously, the data point to 
a swiftly materializing growth dividend for tax and product market reforms. In case of tax reforms 
this finding hints to a partially self-financing effect of tax reforms which can also be seen from the 
less pronounced reaction of the non-adjusted compared to the cyclically adjusted primary deficit.  
Although labour market reforms are not associated with a significant decline in growth rates55 
they have nevertheless a clear negative impact on the sentiment of consumers and firms. 
Furthermore, a significant decline in private consumption is noticeable within the labour market 
reform cycle.  
This section’s findings allow some cautious conclusions about the relative important of reforms’ 
budgetary consequences. Demand management or compensation patterns are not strongly 
supported. Neither for labour market, nor for product nor for financial market reforms, can any 
systematic increase in the cyclically adjusted deficit be detected. For tax reforms the results 
                                                 
55 The F-test results in a confidence level of 0.16. 
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suggest an unsurprising direct fiscal implication of tax reforms in forms of a falling primary 
surplus (which is affordable given the initial favourable situation typical prior to tax reform).  
However, there is support for indirect fiscal consequences affecting the budget via short-run 
growth effects. These effects appear to be positive for tax system and product market reforms and 
negative for labour and financial market reforms. 
Overall both test as described in both the last and this section do not show much support for a 
strong fiscal impact even of major reform processes unless they are related to the fiscal system 
itself as it is the case with tax reforms. Structural reforms and fiscal performance appear to be 
quite detached developments. 
An interesting link occurs with regard to the employed expectation indicators. Tax and labour 
market reforms tend to be started when the general economic mood is relatively depressed or 
positive, respectively. This corresponds to the fact that, once a reform process is initiated, the 
confidence is boosted by tax reforms and dwindles with labour market reforms. Clearly, the 
results suggest that expectation effects may constitute an important link between reforms and the 
budgetary situation and deserve more attention. 
4 ESTIMATING A DYNAMIC REFORM MODEL 
So far, reform events have been treated in a somewhat schematic way as one-off events 
characterized as quick and short-run adjustments towards a new environment. This simplification 
has been helpful to improve our understanding of some typical reform patterns, it does, however, 
not capture the full dynamics of reform processes. Even when limiting the perspective to 
relatively big reforms the results show that, sometimes, there are series of events with frequent 
structural adjustments within a number of consecutive years before a new equilibrium is reached 
(see table A-2 in the appendix). Furthermore, the preceding analysis had to abstract from the 
experience of countries implementing strategies of slow but continuous reforms.  
Given these limitations, the perspective is broadened in this section. The idea is to search now for 
the impact of fiscal and general economic variables in the course of reform processes. In addition, 
the testing is to look for a possible impact of reforms on consumer and investor expectation which 
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would be a further proof for the existence of a type of indirect budgetary reform effects that have 
been neglected so far. 
For these purposes, two models are tested. The first one extends the specification of reform 
processes of Abiad and Mody (2005) and includes a number of detailed fiscal variables. The 
second one is a simple model relating consumer and business confidence towards both reforms 
and the fiscal stance while controlling for the general economic environment. 
Starting point is the specification developed by Abiad and Mody (2005) and applied by Helbling 
et al. (2004), Annett (2005) and Heinemann (2005). This model allows for the series of reforms to 
be driven by a steady convergence of regulation to some “optimum” level of regulation REG*i,t . 
In this notation, larger levels of REG are associated with less restrictive regulatory regimes. 
 
(2)    t i t i t i t i REG REG REG , 1 ,
*
, , ) ( ε μ + − = Δ −
 
If the status quo bias is relevant the values of μ  should be below 1. This parameter of institutional 
stickiness is assumed to depend on the strictness of current regulation: 
 
(3)  1 ,   − = t i REG k μ  
 
Thus, this specification allows for learning: Deregulative reforms can be helpful to limit 
uncertainty about the outcomes of deregulation. In this case, reforms can be self-enforcing. 
Furthermore, this basic adjustment process is driven by further determinants including some 
element of international interaction where the distance to the regulatory situation of the 
benchmark group (REGBM) has an impact on the country’s deregulation path.56 The inclusion of 
this element is particularly relevant in the European context, where cross-border learning is 
regarded as an important element of EU policy cooperation – long before the “Open Method of 





k t i k k t i
BM
t i t i t i t i x REG REG REG REG REG , 1 , , 1 , 1 , 3
2
1 , 2 1 , 1 , ) ( ε β α α α + + − + + = Δ ∑ = − − − −  
 
                                                 
56 It is left open which specific cross-border interdependencies may drive the interaction, possible explanations range from mobility of regulatory 
sensitive factors over direct regulatory externalities up to phenomena of yardstick competition where voters judge governments by comparison to 
policies in third countries (see Brueckner, 2003, for an overview of strategic interactions among governments). 
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In (4) the coefficient α3 measures the impact of cross-border regulatory interactions and the β-
coefficients the influence of the further control variables. By construction, α1=k*REG*i,t-1  and 
is expected to be positive, whereas α2= - k would be negative if the status quo bias really loses 
power due to learning from deregulation. From this reduced form, the implicit “optimum” level of 
regulation equals α1/(-α2). 
The two baseline specifications include following control variables among the x: GDP growth, the 
extent of FDI flows as a measure of globalization constraints57 (sum of absolute values of in- and 
outflows in % GDP), an EU dummy, dummies for governments led by centre and left parties 
(compared to governments led by right parties).58 Besides these control variables a second 
baseline specification includes business and consumer confidence indicators, which come at the 
cost of a substantial loss in the number of observations and which, therefore, will not be used in 
the subsequent consecutive inclusion of fiscal variables. The benchmark variable is constructed as 
the difference of the regulatory situation vis-à-vis the EU average for European countries and vis-
à-vis the USA for non-European OECD countries. 
Any dynamic fixed effect estimation faces econometric problems due to the correlation of the 
error term with the “within” transformed regressors and a resulting bias. The frequently applied 
solution with small T is the application of GMM techniques along the lines of Arellano and Bond 
(1991). However, this solution has been shown to come at the costs of imprecise estimates 
(Attanasio et al., 2000). Since the time dimension of the regressions is relatively long (the 
specifications include up to 26 years) the trade-off hints towards the application of standard OLS 
estimates. Endogeneity problems related to a possible impact of reforms on some of the control 
variables such as growth or the confidence indicators are limited by the use of lagged right hand 
variables. 
The baseline regression reveal marked differences in reform dynamics among different policy 
fields. For product and financial market reforms both variants of the baseline robustly point to a 
stable implied optimum level of deregulation being close to unity (which is defined as the fully 
liberalized status). In contrast to that, no stable optimum level emerges for labour and tax reforms. 
The same structure applies to the cross-border interaction term: Whereas for product and financial 
                                                 
57 In Heinemann (2005), the FDI variable appeared to be a more important measure of globalization constraints of regulatory policies compared to 
other frequently used variables such as trade openness. 
58 For data sources, see Table A-1 in the appendix. 
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market reforms the benchmark plays a significant role this is not supported for tax and labour 
market reforms. Conversely, the political orientation has a significant impact in both variants of 
the benchmark only for the labour reform regression. Low growth is speeding up reforms of the 
tax system and financial markets in line with the crisis hypothesis. The insignificance of the EU 
dummy could be due to the fact that the construction of the benchmark variable already covers 
cross-border links related to European integration. The inclusion of business and consumer 
sentiment indicators results only in few significant coefficients: business sentiment affects the 
speed of reforms of labour markets and tax systems in a positive way.59
Overall, this picture is consistent with a view that reform trends have been more stable and 
internationally linked for product and financial market reforms whereas in the realm of labour 
market reforms and tax policies constant and internationally consistent unidirectional trends have 
not materialized in the covered period. 
 
Table 4: Dynamic reform model - baseline specifications 























































































































































BCONFST  (-1)   0.003  0.001  0.002  0.006 
                                                 
59 For labour market this supports the descriptive finding that a favourable economic situation smoothes reforms whereas for taxes he finding 
stands in contrast to the descriptive results that the situation prior to tax reform tends to be relatively depressed.  
 152  




436/20 216/17 498/20 268/18 461/21 231/19 388/18 226/17 
R-squared  0.16 0.25 0.17 0.27 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.14 
 
 
The baseline (without the sentiment indicators) is now consecutively augmented by the detailed 
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Table 5: Coefficients of fiscal variables in consecutive inclusion in baseline 
  
impact in reform regression 
coefficient (standard error) 
determinant  labour market  financial sector  tax policy  product market 
 deficit 
NLGXQA  -0.00052 (0.00031)*  0.00162 (0.00184)  0.00110 (0.00057)*  -0.00053 (0.00061) 
Δ NLGXQA  -0.00081 (0.00046)*  -0.00188 (0.00309)  -0.00225 (0.00084)***  -0.00041 (0.00091) 
NLGXQ  -0.00061 (0.00026)**  0.00175 (0.00148)  0.00092 (0.00046)**  -0.00086 (0.00050)* 
Δ NLGXQ  -0.00084 (0.00043)*  -0.00395 (0.00261)  -0.00134 (0.00081)*  -0.00097 (0.00081) 
 expenditure 
YPGXQA  0.00037 (0.00035)  0.00418 (0.00214)*  -0.00010 (0.00056)*  0.00090 (0.0006) 
Δ YPGXQA  0.00095 (0.00070)  0.00399 (0.00466)  0.00162 (0.00130)  0.00019 (0.00131) 
YPGXQ  0.00041 (0.00028)  0.00204 (0.00165)  -0.00038 (0.00043)  0.00099 (0.00046)** 
Δ YPGXQ  0.00081 (0.00063)  0.00619 (0.00391)  -0.00049 (0.00119)  0.00052 (0.00114) 
SSPGGDP 0.00045  (0.00044) 0.00265 (0.00289)  -0.00013 (0.00068)  0.0024 (0.0008)*** 
Δ SSPGGDP  0.00197 (0.00131)  0.01078 (0.00880)  -0.00322 (0.00232)  0.0032 (0.0025) 
 revenues 
YRGQA  -0.00016 (0.00028)  0.00463 (0.00179)*  0.00043 (0.00055)  0.00011 (0.00056) 
Δ YRGQA  -0.00055 (0.00058)  0.00455 (0.00398)  -0.00174 (0.00106)  0.00016 (0.00118) 
YRGTQ  -0.00017 (0.00029)  0.00438 (0.00163)***  0.00101 (0.00049)**  0.00010 (0.00512) 
Δ YRGTQ  -0.00072 (0.00054)  0.00259 (0.0035)  -0.00191 (0.00096)**  -0.00050 (0.00104) 
TYQA  -0.00096 (0.00051)*  0.00499 (0.00313)  0.00128 (0.00103)  0.00015 (0.00108) 
Δ TYQA  0.00007 (0.00089)  0.00688 (0.00576)  -0.00131 (0.00153)  0.00048 (0.00184) 
TYQ  -0.00102 (0.00048)**  0.00478 (0.00284)*  0.00210 (0.00097)**  -0.00028 (0.00094) 
Δ TYQ  -0.00003 (0.00082)  0.00181 (0.00509)  -0.00140 (0.00150)  -0.00141 (0.00157) 
*, **, ***: significant at 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level respectively 
 
The primary balance has a robustly significant impact only in the labour market reform and the 
tax reform processes. Labour market reforms tend to be accelerated by bad and deteriorating 
budgetary data (both cyclically adjusted and non-adjusted), tax reforms are simplified by high 
budgetary balances which tend to deteriorate. For labour market reforms, the look at both sides of 
the budget does not show a typical compensation pattern with an increase in (social) spending. 
Only the difference of social benefits reaches significance levels close to conventional 
significance levels (0.13) and could be regarded as a weak hint towards compensation. A stronger 
result is that for labour market reforms, relatively low tax receipts tend to be behind the relatively 
poor budgetary balance.  
The comfortable budgetary situation which characterizes periods of tax reforms is related to both 
relatively low (cyclically adjusted) expenditure levels and high (non-adjusted) tax receipts. 
Whereas the overall budgetary balance is largely insignificant in the product market reform 
regression there are interesting findings for single budgetary categories: Product market reforms 
appear to be prepared by higher social spending. 
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Financial reforms are preceded by above normal revenues and expenditures (cyclically adjusted) 
with no specific focus on social benefits.   
 
5 THE DIRECT IMPACT OF REFORMS ON BUSINESS AND CONSUMER CONFIDENCE 
As final step of the analysis now a closer look is taken at the direct impact of reforms on the 
economic sentiment of consumers and companies. Reforms may reach sentiment via an indirect 
and a direct channel. The indirect impact results from reforms’ impact on growth, employment 
and other economic variables which, in turn, bear upon the mood of consumers and companies. 
The tests of section 3.2 can be understood as a test for the existence of any such indirect effect 
(which turned out to be positive for tax and product market reform and negative for labour and 
financial market reform). 
The direct impact is related to expectations about reforms’ effects before these effects have 
materialized. In a sense, the measurement of the direct impact resembles a test on the economic 
agents’ perception about the economic merits of reforms. A positive (negative) sign would 
indicate that agents share the view that liberalizing reform will foster (reduce) economic well-
being. There is no doubt that this perception issue is also of fiscal importance. A significant 
positive expectation effect is a sign that the reform as such stabilizes expectations and, as a 
consequence, strengthens demand and the budgetary situation. 
To test for direct expectation effects the dependent variable - the standardized consumer and 
business sentiment indicators - are regressed on the lagged endogenous variable, the reform 
variable (the change in the regulatory index) and a number of standard business cycle and fiscal 
variables: GDP growth, change in unemployment, the inflation rate, the level and change of the 
(cyclically adjusted) government balance. An instrumental variable specification is estimated in 
order to cope with the clearly present reversed causality problem. 60
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the regression results for business and consumer confidence. Apart 
from the highly significant autoregressive term, sentiment is driven by growth, the inflation rate 
(more pronounced for consumer than for business sentiment), the change in the unemployment 
                                                 
60 Variables mainly related to long-run structural growth potential of an economy are employed as instruments: population share below the age of 
14, the fertility rate, the openness, the labour force participation rate, unlit labour costs, the debt GDP level and a dummy for a general election. 
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rate (more pronounced for business sentiment) and the budgetary situation (only for consumer 
sentiment). Signs are generally as expected.61 The results for the level of the government balance 
in the consumer confidence regressions suggest that a solid fiscal situation stabilizes consumer 
expectations. 
There is no indication that reforms are associated with direct negative expectation effects. On the 
contrary, tax reforms have a highly significant direct effect towards fostering optimism in the 
business sector. Product market reforms miss the 10 per cent significance by a thin margin 
(significance level is 0.107) in the business sentiment regression. The results underline the 
findings from the reform cycle analysis that tax system and product market reforms are 
characterized by a favourable time pattern of quickly materializing reform benefits. Results from 
the inclusion of measures of overall reform intensity by calculating the sum of reform proxies 
across policy fields are not reported: This variable (including a squared variant) was insignificant 
and did not support the view that a big bang approach combining reforms over different fields at 
the same time has a significantly more favourable expectation effect. 
 
                                                 
61 The results for the government balance are also plausible: A high level of the balance supports optimism whereas (not very robustly) an 
improvement in the balance dampens consumer sentiment which could be associated with the negative impact of tax increases or expenditure 
cuts on sentiment. 
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Table 6: Drivers of business confidence (dependent variable: change of standardized 
business confidence, BUSCONFST) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BCONFST (-1)  -0.95 (0.06)***  -0.97 (0.06)***  -0.98 (0.06)***  -0.96 (0.06)*** 
GROWTH  35.70 (4.71)***  31.80 (4.25)***  34.93 (4.37)***  45.08 (4.71)*** 
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT  -0.16 (0.10)  -0.24 (0.09)***  -0.20 (0.09)**  -0.13 (0.09) 
INFLATION  -0.05 (0.03)  -0.05 (0.03)* -0.04  (0.03) -0.05  (0.03)* 
NLGXQA  -0.011 (0.033)  -0.005 (0.03)  -0.002 (0.03)  0.009 (0.03) 
Δ NLGXQA  -0.026 (0.052)  -0.04 (0.05)  -0.04 (0.05)  -0.04 (0.06) 
Δ WEOLABOUR  2.74 (4.06)  -  -  - 
Δ WEOPRODUCT  - 2.95  (1.83) -  - 
Δ WEOFINANCE  - -  0.36  (0.57)  - 
Δ WEOTAX  - - -  9.22  (2.89)*** 
nb. of observations/nb. 
countries 
195/16 209/18 228/17 205/16 
R-squared  0.66 0.66 0.64 0.69 
Fixed effects, instrumental variable regression; instruments: age share below 14, fertility rate, openness, labour force 
participation rate, unit labour costs, debt-GDP-level, election year dummy.  
 
Table 7: Drivers of consumer confidence (dependent variable: change of standardized 
consumer confidence - CCONFST) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CCONFST (-1)  -0.53 (0.05)***  -0.53 (0.04)***  -0.52 (0.04)***  -0.55 (0.05)*** 
GROWTH  22.38 (2.90)***  21.32 (2.76)***  20.84 (2.72)***  22.80 (3.05)*** 
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT  0.02 (0.06)  -0.002 (0.06)  -0.01 (0.05)  -0.02 (0.06) 
INFLATION  -0.05 (0.01)***  -0.04 (0.01)***  -0.04 (0.01)***  -0.04 (0.01)*** 
NLGXQA  0.02 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02)  0.03 (0.02)*  0.06 (0.02)*** 
Δ NLGXQA  -0.02 (0.03)  -0.02 (0.03)  -0.04 (0.03)  -0.08 (0.04)** 
Δ WEOLABOUR  0.78 (3.05)  -  -  - 
Δ WEOPRODUCT  - 1.15  (1.42) -  - 
Δ WEOFINANCE  - -  -0.33  (0.38)  - 
Δ WEOTAX  - - -  0.23  (2.09) 
nb. of observations/nb. 
countries 
276/18         291/19  309/18  300/17 
R-squared  0.46 0.46 0.44 0.46 
Fixed effects, instrumental variable regression; instruments: age share below 14, fertility rate, openness, labour force 
participation rate, unit labour costs, debt-GDP-level, election year dummy.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
Although the different analytical tools applied do not in every case lead to a uniform picture they 
convey a certain message concerning the extent of a possible short-run trade-off between 
budgetary consolidation and structural reforms. 
Overall, this study shows that there are - if at all - only very limited general conflicts between 
fiscal prudence (“Maastricht”) and structural reforms (“Lisbon”). Judging on the experience with 
OECD reform processes since the mid-seventies, any such trade-off does not exist for product 
market reforms. There is no indication that budgets deteriorate over the reform cycle or that 
deficits can smooth reform processes. On the contrary, the immediate positive growth and 
expectation effects hint to short-run benefits which also should swiftly alleviate budgetary 
problems.  
The result of helpful short-run growth and expectation effects also holds for tax reforms where, 
however, a deterioration of the budgetary balance over the reform cycle appears to be an inherent 
part of the reforms. Fortunately, the budgetary challenges of tax reform are alleviated by a 
positive short-run growth effect working through a positive impact on economic sentiment. A 
good budgetary initial situation is necessary (and typical) for countries trying to reduce the 
distorting burden of taxation. Hence, although there is a negative short-run link between tax 
reforms and the deficit tendencies, countries with high deficits will be unlikely to embark on tax 
reforms in the first place.  
The results for financial market deregulation are not particularly pronounced. Positive short-run 
effects cannot be detected. The descriptive analysis even indicates a deterioration of business 
sentiment in times of financial deregulation. Only on the basis of this examination it is hard to tell 
whether, e.g. transitory adjustments of companies towards new capital supply structures may 
possibly be behind that finding. 
The findings for labour market reforms are of high policy relevance since numerous EU countries 
still have a long way to go on this field. Here, a certain contrast exists between different analytical 
tools. The reform cycle analysis has brought no indication of an increasing deficit in the course of 
the implementation of labour market deregulation measures. However, prior to reforms social 
benefits tend to be slightly at an above average level. Furthermore, the estimation of the dynamic 
labour market reform equation show that the level and the change in the deficit tends to be 
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positively linked to the extent of reforms and that a (almost significant) effect of increasing social 
benefit spending is partly behind this budgetary deterioration - lending some credibility to the 
compensation hypothesis.  
Clearly, labour market effects do not foster business and consumer optimism in a direct and short-
run way. This result is consistently found both in the reform cycle analysis (sentiment indicators 
and private consumption decline with reforms) and the test on direct expectation effects: In the 
latter labour market reforms do not result in a direct positive expectation effect contrary to the 
cases of tax and product market reforms. Obviously, economic agents do not typically perceive 
labour market deregulation as an institutional adjustment improving the economic perspective. 
This is consistent with the finding that the situation prior to labour market reforms is often 
characterized by favourable growth and expectation data. A good starting point allows coping 
with short-run negative consequences of reforms.  
Generally, the results stress the fact that expectation effects should be included in any thorough 
exercise on reform economics. The perception of reforms can be a crucial driver of any short-term 
consequences for employment, growth and the budget. The finding of negative expectation effects 
associated with labour market reforms is likely to be one of the explanations that these reforms are 
particularly slow to materialize. 
Finally the results as a whole point to a sometimes neglected aspect in the discussion of structural 
reforms and the Stability and Growth Pact: Even if certain types of reforms lead to a short-run 
increase in deficits, an unfavourable deficit situation makes it very unlikely that certain reforms 
are initiated in the first place. This underlines the necessity of effective deficit rules in the Pact in 
order to safeguard EU countries’ future structural flexibility. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A-1: Data definitions and sources 
time series  description  source 
NLGXQ  general government net primary lending 
cyclically adjusted as % trend GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook database 
NLGXQA  general government net primary lending as % 
GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook database 
DEBT  debt-GDP-level  OECD Economic Outlook database 
YPGXQ  general government primary expenditure as % 
GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook database 
YPGXQA  general government primary expenditure 
cyclically adjusted as % trend GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook database 
SSPGQ  social security benefits paid by government as % 
GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook database 
YRGTQ  general government total revenue as % GDP  OECD Economic Outlook database 
YRGQA  general government total revenue cyclically 
adjusted as % trend GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook database 
TYQ  total taxes as % GDP  OECD Economic Outlook database 
TYQA  total taxes cyclically adjusted ad % trend GDP  OECD Economic Outlook database 
GROWTH  real growth GDP  OECD Economic Outlook database 
GROWTHFDDV  real growth final domestic expenditure  OECD Economic Outlook database 
OUTPUTGAP  output gap  OECD Economic Outlook database 
UNEMPLOYMENT  unemployment rate  OECD Economic Outlook database 
CCONFST consumer  confidence, standardized  EU Commission, national sources 
SRATIO  household saving ratio  OECD Economic Outlook database 
GROWTHCPV  real growth private consumption  OECD Economic Outlook database 
GROWTHIHV  real growth private residential investment  OECD Economic Outlook database 
BUSCONFST  business confidence, standardized  EU Commission, national sources 
GROWTHIBV  real growth business investment  OECD Economic Outlook database 
WEOFINANCIAL  index financial sector regulation from World 
Economic Outlook 2004 
Helbling et al. (2004) 
WEOLABOUR  index labour market regulation from World 
Economic Outlook 2004 
Helbling et al. (2004) 
WEOPRODUCT  index product market regulation from World 
Economic Outlook 2004 
Helbling et al. (2004) 
WEOTAX  index tax system distortions from World 
Economic Outlook 2004 
Helbling et al. (2004) 
INFLATION 
 




gross foreign direct investment in % GDP  World Bank: World Development 
Indicators 
ideology dummy: left  generated from chief executive’s party ideology 
variable 
Beck et al. (2001) 
ideology dummy: centre  generated from chief executive’s party ideology 
variable 
Beck et al. (2001) 
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Table A-2: Reform years 
  financial market  labour market  tax system   product market 
Australien  81, 83-85, 89    78, 83, 91-92  91, 94, 96-97 
Austria  76, 80, 82, 91  91-92  89  89 
Belgium  76, 79, 82, 91  88-94    87, 93 
Canada       88 
Denmark  78, 81, 83, 88  85-86, 93-94  89-91  89, 93, 95, 97 
Finland  84, 87, 91  87-88, 96-97  78, 87, 95, 97  93-95 
France 86-87,  90-91      89 
Germany   93-94    90,  96 
Ireland 85-86,  92  83-84    88 
Italy  84, 85, 90  96  98  93, 95 
Japan  79, 92, 94  76  92, 97-99  85, 87, 90 
Netherlands  76, 82-83  89-92  94, 96, 98  92-93, 96-97 
New Zealand  84, 86    86-87, 90  83, 86, 89, 93 
Norway  84-85, 87, 95      87, 91 
Portugal 89,  91-93      86 
Spain  88, 93-94, 99  83, 91-92  86, 90  97 
Sweden  78, 83-84, 86, 93  88, 91-94  91, 93  92, 95 
Switzerland 90      99 
United 
Kingdom  76, 79  89-90  76-77, 83, 87, 90-92  87, 90, 93 
United States  81, 87  85-86  81-83  80, 96 
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-1: two year period before reform year, 0: reform year, 1: two year period after reform year, */**/*** significance of 
F-tests as reported in table 3. 
 
 































































































Explanations: see Figure A-1. 
 
 
































































































Explanations: see Figure A-1. 
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FISCAL POSITIONS, FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS 




[Paper prepared for the conference on “Budgetary Implications of Structural Reforms” 
organised by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) of 
the Commission of the European Union on 2 December 2005] 
1. Introduction 
  Many European countries, and in particular a number of those that belong to the euro area, 
are usually seen as being in need of structural reform. The symptoms include high unemployment 
and low labour-force participation (Figure 1). Contrary to some assertions, low employment in 
many euro-area countries is not predominantly the result of an idiosyncratic European taste for 
leisure but to a large extent reflects distortions created by policies and institutions.
63 Weak 
employment also strains government budgets which, in a context of population ageing, is not only 
undesirable but also may become unsustainable. 
  In many EU countries, low employment is accompanied by sub-par productivity levels.
64 
There are many causes for weak productivity, but barriers to competition, reallocation and 
innovation created by structural policies in product, labour and financial markets are certainly 
among them. Indeed, in spite of progress over past decades, euro-area countries remain more 
afflicted by anti-competitive regulatory barriers than most English-speaking countries (Figure 2). 
This again underlines the need for structural policy reform. 
 
                                                 
62.  Principal economist at the OECD Economics Department. This paper builds very heavily on another paper by Romain Duval and Jorgen 
Elmeskov on the effects of EMU on structural reforms (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005). Jackie  Gardel, Lyn  Urmston and Martine  Levasseur 
provided secretarial and statistical assistance. The views and results presented in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the OECD or its Member countries. 
63.  About half of the difference between the number of hours worked per capita in the United States and the “old” members of the European Union 
reflects lower participation rates and higher unemployment in Europe and these differences can to a large extent be explained by different policy 
settings (e.g. Duval, 2004; Jaumotte, 2004; and Elmeskov et al., 1998). Moreover, part of the gap in the number of hours worked per employed 
may also reflect policy distortions (Prescott (2004) highlighted the effect of taxes which may affect labour supply along both the intensive and 
the extensive margin) even though market failure (e.g. asymmetric information, inter-personal complementarities in leisure consumption) could 
boost US hours beyond the social optimum (Landers et al., 1996 and Alesina et al., 2005). 
64.  Observed hourly productivity in countries like Belgium and France is as high as or even higher than in the United States but, to a large extent, 
this reflects the exclusion of low-productive workers from the labour force (Bourles and Cette, 2005). 
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Source : OECD.
Figure 1. Unemployment and participation rates across OECD countries, 2004
A. Unemployment rates
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Note :  The indicator of regulation is measured on a scale from 0 (most liberal) to 6 (most restrictive) and is described 
in Conway et al. (2005).
Source : OECD.








































  Recent episodes of conjunctural weakness in the EU, most prominently in the euro area, 
also point to a need for structural reform. Indeed, the euro area has exhibited less resilience than a 
number of non-euro-area countries in the face of a series of common shocks, which since the turn 
of the century have included the bursting of the IT bubble, corporate governance scandals, 
terrorist attacks and higher oil prices. It is obviously difficult to standardise across countries, but, 
nonetheless, it is hard to argue that differences in exposure to shocks or in macroeconomic policy 
stances between, on the one hand, the euro area and, on the other hand, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom can account for the divergence in output gaps across the two 
country groups (Figure 3). These differences in resilience - which are also visible inside the euro 
area - probably reflect both different capacities to adjust to shocks and different responses to 
changes in monetary policy - i.e. differences in the strength of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism.
65 Again, such differences are likely to reflect structural policy settings.
66
                                                 
65.  Recent work suggests that the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the euro area relies more heavily on effects via business investment, 
whereas in the United States effects via private consumption also contribute importantly (e.g. Angeloni et al., 2003). 
66. Catte  et al. (2004) emphasise the role of structural policies affecting housing and mortgage markets in this regard. 
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*  GDP weighted average.
Source : Data and projections from OECD Economic Outlook 76.
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  It could of course be argued that current structural policy settings reflect a collective 
policy choice and that the associated weaknesses in terms of employment, productivity and 
resilience are just the price to be paid for this choice. This argument is often presented with 
reference to a particular European “social model”. In practice, however, there is no such thing as a 
single European model. Indeed, some smaller European countries combine structural policy 
settings that result in much better than average macroeconomic outcomes with social outcomes 
that are as good as or better than in the larger euro-area economies.
67 Hence, the argument that 
weak macroeconomic performance is the price to pay for better social outcomes does not ring 
true. 
 
  That said, structural reforms cannot generally be assumed to be Pareto improving. If they 
were, they would presumably be politically easy to undertake. Rather, structural reforms usually 
involve a reduction in rents and those who see their rent reduced can hardly be expected to be in 
favour. The case for structural reform thus rests on a weighing of the losses for those who see 
their rents reduced against the gains for others. It is a well-known feature of the political economy 
of structural reform that those who see their rent reduced tend to be easy to identify, to be exposed 
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to a significant loss, to feel the pain up-front and to be well organised (e.g. Olson, 1965). By 
contrast, the gains from reform accrue to no clearly identifiable group, are usually widely 
dispersed with limited benefit for each individual and often occur with a considerable delay. As a 
general observation, opportunity cost is not a concept that plays well in politics. 
 
  As a result of those features, structural reform is usually an uphill battle. This paper will 
not address in detail the overall incentives and disincentives to undertake structural reform. 
Rather, and more modestly, it deals with the possible impact of fiscal positions and fiscal 
adjustment on the political economy of structural reform in product and, in particular, labour 
markets. In this regard, two caveats are in order. 
 
  First, putting the main focus on labour markets is justified by some of the main obstacles 
to euro-area growth and employment being related to labour-market policies.
68 At a more 
mundane level, and relevant for the empirical part of the paper, more information is available for a 
wider range of policies over a longer period as concerns labour markets than is the case for most 
policies directly affecting product and financial markets. However, the focus on labour markets 
should not be taken to imply that reforms in other markets are unimportant. Second, despite the 
emphasis on the role of fiscal policy, other general arguments concerning the political economy of 
structural reform are likely to retain a major role in terms of either facilitating or hindering 
structural reform. 
  The paper proceeds by reviewing in Section 2 some of the arguments that have been put 
forward as to how the state of public finances may affect the political economy of structural 
reform. Section 3 then provides some descriptive evidence based on recent OECD work on labour 
and product market reforms. Section 4 proceeds to an econometric investigation of the impact that 
fiscal positions and/or fiscal adjustment may have on the propensity to undertake structural 
reform. Finally, Section 5 sums up the evidence and concludes. 
2.  Arguments linking structural reform intensity to fiscal positions 
2.1  Fiscal position and structural reforms 
  A sound fiscal situation should facilitate the implementation of structural reforms, for at 
least three reasons: 
•  A budgetary cushion provides room for compensation of losers who would otherwise 
block reforms.  
•  A poor state of public finances is likely to force governments to spend their political 
capital on unpopular fiscal adjustment measures, leaving them with less ability and/or 
                                                                                                                                                               
67.  This is the case whether hard indicators, such as poverty rates, or soft indicators, such as surveys of happiness, are considered (OECD, 
2005a). 
68.  OECD (2005b) uses a consistent procedure to derive policy priorities to enhance economic growth across OECD countries and identifies labour 
market reforms as being particularly important in euro-area countries. 
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willingness to undertake structural reforms. By contrast, sound fiscal positions mean less 
need for fiscal adjustment and thus more room for reforms.  
•  The stronger the initial fiscal position, the greater the room is for fiscal policy to crowd in 
resources in the wake of any structural reform that expands potential output but is not 
necessarily accompanied by a corresponding expansion in aggregate demand. The case 
for fiscal accommodation is most compelling for those reforms that change an economy’s 
structural rate of employment, since such reforms would improve the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance corresponding to a given actual budget balance and employment rate.
69 
Put differently, not changing the actual budget balance post-reform and before 
employment has had time to adjust would imply an effective tightening of fiscal policy. 
  This crowding-in argument needs to be qualified in a number of ways, however: 
•  Other mechanisms exist that allow the added supply capacity to be “crowded in”. In a 
single country with an independent monetary policy, lower interest rates and exchange rate 
depreciation could in principle boost demand and thereby allow the added supply capacity 
to be “crowded in”. In a monetary union such as the euro area, the main – but slower – 
mechanism for crowding in added supply is a lower real exchange rate brought about by a 
period of slack and associated weak inflation. Given the nature of this latter mechanism, 
the up-front costs of structural reform in a monetary union should be greater in large, 
relative closed economies than in smaller, more open economies. This hints at possible 
interactions between monetary policy autonomy and the fiscal position in facilitating or 
hindering the reform process. In particular, the greater the ability of monetary policy to 
crowd in resources in the wake of structural reforms, the smaller the need should be for 
fiscal accommodation, and vice versa. 
•  The basic premise of the argument – that demand does not spontaneously expand in 
response to added supply as a result of structural reform – is not straightforward. In 
principle, rational and forward-looking households and firms should respond up-front to 
the increase in, respectively, permanent income and output. The extent to which this 
would happen in practice might depend on features of financial markets - in particular the 
extent to which households enjoy wealth gains from higher share prices and firms are able 
to secure financing on the basis of future production possibilities rather than pre-existing 
collateral. In general, such spontaneous demand effects are likely to be weaker in 
euro-area countries than in the United States, as also suggested by the experience of the 
1990s. 
•  It is also the case that the balance between supply and demand effects of structural reform 
is likely to depend on the nature of the structural reforms. Experience from many 
countries suggests that structural reforms that remove restrictions in financial markets 
may well stimulate demand more than supply in the short run. By contrast, it might be 
thought that reforms in labour markets are susceptible to weaken demand in the short run 
to the extent they may be associated with reduced public transfers and increased 
                                                 
69.  Reforms differ in their impact on budgets. Reforms that boost productivity without raising equilibrium employment will have only limited 
impacts on the cyclically-adjusted budget balance unless transfer recipients and public-sector employees do not share fully in the real income 
gains created by higher productivity. 
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precautionary saving. This is evidently of particular concern since reform within the EU 
needs to be concentrated in labour markets.
70 
•  The argument obviously rests on the assumption that private saving behaviour does not 
fully offset changes in fiscal policy. Recent pooled cross-country time-series estimation 
across OECD countries suggests that the private saving offset to changes in cyclically-
adjusted budget balances could be about half in the first year, rising to some 70% in the 
long run (OECD, 2004b). Tests suggest that the only significant exception to this pattern 
is to be found outside the euro area (the United States). 
2.2  Change in the fiscal position and structural reforms    
 
  By the same token, a positive change in the fiscal balance –i.e. fiscal adjustment– could 
reduce the probability of reform, for the same reasons that the level of the fiscal balance can be 
expected to increase it: implementing reforms may require a temporary deterioration of the 
budgetary situation in order to compensate losers; efforts to improve the fiscal situation often 
entail political costs that may hamper the ability of governments to implement other types of 
unpopular measures such as structural reforms; fiscal adjustment may depress aggregate demand 
at a time when the implementation of structural reforms would on the contrary require additional 
resources to be crowded in (see Section 2.1 above). 
 
3.  Labour and product market reforms over the period 1994-2004
71
 
  This section uses OECD indicators to examine recent structural reform patterns. In 
particular, it aims to shed light on possible links between fiscal positions and the intensity and 
design of the process of structural reform. As background information for the discussion below, 
Figure 4 presents a brief overview of fiscal policy patterns across OECD countries over the period 
1993-2004.
72 Overall, the Figure shows that cyclically-adjusted budget balances have improved in 
most OECD countries during the past decade. No significant differences –in terms of both the 
level of and the change in the fiscal stance– can be observed between EU and other OECD 
countries.   
                                                 
70.  Empirical evidence on the current-account effects of structural reform seems to corroborate these differences across types of structural reform 
(Kennedy and Sløk, 2005). 
71.  In this, as well as the following, section, EU refers to the 15 members before the recent expansion of membership. 
72.  This period is chosen so as to match the period covered by the database on labour market reforms (see below). 
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*: Cyclically-adjusted government net lending, in % of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 77, 2005.
   No cyclical adjustment for Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Luxembourg, Poland and the Slovak Republic.
   The period covered is 1994-2004 for Slovak Republic and 1995-2004 for Czech Republic and Poland.
   The Czech deficit for 1995 includes a large capital transfer from voucher privatisation worth nearly 10% of GDP.























































































                                                
 
3.1  Overall intensity and timing of labour market reforms 
 
  As part of the ongoing reassessment of its recommendations to address issues of high 
unemployment and low labour-force participation, the OECD has recently carried out a thorough 
assessment of recent labour market reforms (Brandt, Burniaux and Duval, 2005), on which this 
section relies heavily. All policy measures implemented by OECD member countries over the 
period 1994-2004 have been evaluated for 44 possible individual categories falling under seven 
broad policy areas:
73
•  active labour market policies (ALMPs) 
•  taxes and social security contributions 
•  employment protection legislation (EPL) 
 
73.  For full details, see Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005). 
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•  unemployment benefit systems 
•  wage formation and industrial relations 
•  working-time flexibility and part-time work 
•  old-age pension systems and early retirement schemes 
  In each of the 44 individual policy categories, scores are assigned to reforms for every 
OECD country and each of the two sub-periods 1994-98 and 1999-2004.
74 They can be either 
positive or negative, depending on whether the measure considered is in line or at odds with the 
general thrust of OECD policy recommendations, as summed up in OECD (1999). The results are 
then aggregated up to the seven broader policy areas above. 
  Whenever possible, the scoring method at the level of individual policy categories relies 
on quantitative indicators, with the score of an individual policy measure depending on the 
associated change in the relevant indicator. For example, changes in the OECD summary measure 
of unemployment benefits are used to assign a score in the sub-category “benefit replacement 
rates” of the broader area “unemployment benefit systems”. However, in certain cases, sources of 
information are qualitative and their interpretation is more subjective (e.g. some aspects of 
ALMPs). More broadly, some degree of uncertainty and judgement is inherent to any effort to 
quantify individual reforms and, perhaps even more so, to aggregate such quantifications across 
different policy instruments.
75
 Bearing  these  caveats in mind, illustrative indicators of reform intensity within each of the 
seven policy areas can be calculated as the ratio of the actual to the maximum possible score, 
where the latter is the score which would be obtained if maximum scores had been reached at the 
level of all individual policy categories belonging to the relevant policy area. In addition, an 
illustrative indicator of the overall intensity of reforms is calculated as the ratio of the total actual 
score across the seven broad policy areas to the maximum possible score.
76
  Aggregate results for the entire period 1994-2004 are presented in Figure 5 (Panel A). On 
average, the propensity to carry out labour market reforms has been greater in EU than in other 
OECD countries, with six EU countries in the top six positions. Still, this progress has to be seen 
in light of the greater scope and need for reform within the EU and, in particular, EMU. Indeed, a 
noticeable feature of recent reform patterns within the euro area is their apparent lack of 
relationship with initial conditions. Based on rankings across all OECD countries of initial 
                                                 
74.  The scores assigned for the period 1999-2004 incorporate all legislated reforms up to mid-2004, even though some of these may not yet have 
been fully implemented (e.g. some aspects of the Agenda 2010 in Germany, or various pension reforms that are phased in slowly). 
75. Problems  include:  i) the degree to which a given reform is actually enforced may differ widely across countries; ii) no account is made for the 
possibility of non-linear policy effects (i.e. the possibility that a given reform may have different impact on labour markets depending on the 
initial policy stance in the area considered) and policy complementarities; and, iii) sets of weights have to be assigned to individual policy 
categories in order to compute aggregate scores in broader policy fields. 
76.  Extensive testing shows that the ranking of countries in terms of overall reform intensity can be sensitive to the choice of weights 
attached to the scores in individual policy categories (see Brandt, Burniaux and Duval, 2005). 
 177  
NAIRUs (in ascending order) and subsequent reform intensities (in descending order), those 
euro-area countries where reforms were arguably most needed have not necessarily acted more 
decisively, and vice versa (Figure 6, Panel A). Comparatively, and in line with the results of van 
Poeck and Borghijs (2001), structural policies in other OECD countries seem to have been more 
responsive to needs for reform (Figure 6, Panel B). Furthermore, reforms have been much more 
modest in the areas of EPL and employment benefits
77 where political resistance is likely to be 
greater, pointing to the role played by political economy considerations in shaping recent reform 
patterns both in the EU and the rest of the OECD (Table 1). 
  In terms of dynamics, it is worth pointing out that the advent of EMU did not coincide 
with an acceleration of labour market reforms, as shown by the lower average reform intensity in 
EMU countries over 1999-2004 compared with 1994-98 (Figure 5, Panel B).
78 No such slowdown 
was observed in non-EMU EU (Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom),
79 and it was less 
pronounced in other OECD countries. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out that the fairly high reform 
intensity observed in EMU countries during the period 1994-98 was itself fostered by 
expectational effects of EMU. The time span covered here is too short to explore this possibility. 
                                                 
77.  Within each of these “difficult” areas, reform profiles also reflected hesitancy to confront insider interests. For example, most of the 
countries that reformed their EPL did so by easing regulations on fixed-term employment contracts, while generally refraining from lowering 
EPL for permanent workers (See Duval and Elmeskov, 2005). Likewise, countries which reformed their unemployment benefit systems often 
tightened eligibility criteria, conditioned benefit receipt on participation in training and/or reduced associated work disincentives, but they 
typically did not move far in terms of reducing benefit replacement rates and duration or enforcing stricter work-availability criteria. Taking the 
two areas together, there is no obvious pattern differentiating EU countries from others when it comes to challenging or avoiding entrenched 
insider positions. 
78.  This finding contrasts with the descriptive results obtained by Bertola and Boeri (2001) for a smaller range of policy fields (cash 
transfers to people of working age –including unemployment benefits– and job protection only) over a shorter period (up to 1999). 
79.  Not too much should be made of this finding, however, since the non-EMU EU group consists of only three countries, among which the 
top reformer (Denmark) has its currency tied to the euro (through the new exchange-rate mechanism, ERMII). 
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Source: Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005).
Source: Author's adaptation based on Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005).
Panel A. Overall intensity of labour market reforms in individual OECD countries, 1994-2004
Panel B. Timing of recent labour market reforms in EU, EMU and OECD countries
Figure 5. Illustrative evaluation of the intensity of recent labour market reforms
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Table 1. Aggregate reform intensity indicator, reform intensity indicators by area: 1994-2004



























Australia 21.0 7 54 25 -7 19 27 0 17
Austria 17.8 8 15 31 13 23 2 17 33
Belgium 21.4 6 40 44 10 15 5 33 17
Canada 15.2 13 38 13 0 23 0 17 17
Czech Republic 6.2 28 17 0 -3 12 -5 -17 33
Denmark 29.3 1 56 13 10 42 27 17 25
Finland 25.0 3 48 13 13 35 0 17 50
France 14.5 16 42 31 -7 0- 5 33 42
Germany 23.9 4 58 13 17 19 9 17 25
Greece 13.8 17 42 13 7 12 5 17 -8
Hungary 12.3 19 31 25 -7 19 -9 0 33
Iceland 3.6 30 19 -38 0 19 0 0 8
Ireland 17.4 9 46 88 -10 15 -14 0 0
Italy 21.7 5 31 56 23 -12 5 33 50
Japan 8.7 25 23 -13 13 40 33 8
Korea 12.3 19 27 0 25 80 17 8
Luxembourg 14.9 15 33 38 0 4- 5 33 33
Mexico 4.3 29 8 0 0 01 417 0
Netherlands 25.7 2 56 25 13 12 14 33 42
New Zealand 12.3 19 42 19 -13 15 -5 0 33
Norway 15.2 13 46 -19 10 27 0 17 8
Poland 11.2 23 29 0 -3 15 5 17 25
Portugal 15.9 12 23 25 17 85 33 17
Slovak Republic 13.0 18 12 25 14 19 0 17 8
Spain 10.5 24 8 19 17 870 8
Sweden 17.4 9 50 13 13 12 5 0 8
Switzerland 8.7 25 23 6 0 15 0 17 0
Turkey 6.5 27 4 0 13 80 33 8
United Kingdom 16.7 11 50 56 -10 12 -9 0 25
United States 11.6 22 19 50 0 12 0 0 0
OECD average 14.9 15.3 33.0 19.0 5.6 14.0 2.6 15.0 19.2
EU-15 average 19.1 9.5 39.9 31.7 8.4 13.6 3.3 18.9 24.4
     EMU-12 average 18.5 10.1 36.9 32.8 9.4 11.5 2.3 22.2 25.7
     non-EMU EU 21.1 7.0 51.9 27.1 4.4 21.8 7.6 5.6 19.4
1: all reform intensity indicators are expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible socre, i.e. the score that would be obtained if all possible reforms were 
    implemented. See main text for details.
Source: Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005).
Reform intensity indicator by area
1
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Figure 6. Initial conditions and intensity of labour market reforms
 Panel A. Ranks of initial NAIRUs
1 and ranks of reform intensities over 1994-2004: EMU countries 
(Spearman's rank) correlation coefficient:  0.19  
 Panel B. Ranks of initial NAIRUs
1 and ranks of reform intensities over 1994-2004: non-EMU, non-transition countries
(Spearman's rank) correlation coefficient:  -0.55 *
1. Nairu estimates for 1993.
   * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level.
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3.2  Strength versus comprehensiveness of reforms 
 
  Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that policy interactions can be important 
and that comprehensive reform packages tend to be more effective than “piece-meal” reforms in 
improving labour market outcomes.
80 Figure 7 classifies OECD countries according to the breadth 
and depth of their reforms, in what may be regarded as a rough decomposition of the overall 
reform intensity indicator along the two dimensions.
81 The breadth of reforms in each country is 
approximated here by the standard deviation of reform intensities across the seven areas 
mentioned previously: the lower the standard deviation, the more uniform are reform intensities 
and the broader is the reform process. Depth is defined as the magnitude of the reform effort in 
the main areas targeted by the country, measured as the average reform intensity across the three 
areas (among the seven covered in the aggregate reform intensity indicator) in which measured 
reform intensity is highest.
82
Figure 7. Depth and breadth of labour market reforms 
1. The breadth of reforms is measured as the normalised standard deviation of reform intensities across areas (the lower the standard deviation, the more uniform reform intensities are across areas).
2. The depth of labour market reforms is measured as the average reform intensity across the three areas in which the country's reform effort has been strongest. 
Source: Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005).

























































































































                                                 
80.  For a theoretical framework stressing the importance of policy interactions, see Coe and Snower (1997). For empirical evidence, see for 
instance Belot and Van Ours (2000) or Elmeskov et al. (1998). As previously mentioned, complementarities may also exist as regards the 
political economy of reform. 
81.  For example, behind the broadly similar value of the overall indicator for Austria and the United Kingdom lie in fact very different compositions 
of reform, as Austria undertook moderate efforts spread over a wide range of areas while the United Kingdom carried out major reforms 
concentrated on two areas (labour taxes and ALMPs). 
82.  Considering the two – rather than three – highest reform intensities would alter only marginally the ranking of countries. 
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  On these criteria, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands stand out for having made deep 
policy reforms in a wide range of areas since the mid-1990s, opening up for possible synergies.
83 
From a broader perspective, it is remarkable that the vast majority of countries located in the 
upper left quadrant of Figure 7 are EU members. At the same time, virtually no EU country - with 
the exception of Greece - is located in the lower right quadrant. This suggests that relative to the 
OECD average a number of EU countries have pursued both far-reaching and comprehensive 
reform strategies, while only few have confined themselves to either minor reforms or reforms 
covering only a small number of areas. 
3.3  Fiscal policy patterns and labour market reforms: preliminary evidence 
  Over and above the usual caveats that apply to simple correlation analysis, any descriptive 
study is likely to be further complicated by the fact that any causal relationship between fiscal 
positions and the propensity to undertake reforms runs in both directions. In order to minimise this 
problem, Panel A of Figure 8 plots the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balances in 1993 –i.e. before the 
period under study– against subsequent reform intensity over the period 1994-2004. While 
positive, the correlation is insignificant at conventional confidence levels (p-value = 0.45). 
Considering reform intensity over the shorter period 1994-1998 yields a larger but still 
insignificant correlation (p-value = 0.16).  
  Still, the correlation becomes statistically significant when only EU countries are 
considered (Figure 8, Panel B). Likewise, it may not be a coincidence that the fiscal positions of 
top reformers (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Germany to a lesser extent, New Zealand if 
the major reforms of the early 1990s had been taken into account) were among the most 
favourable across the OECD back in 1993. 
                                                 
83.  New Zealand would have fallen in the same category if the major reforms undertaken in the early 1990s, in particular within the context 
of the 1991 Employment Contracts Act, had been taken into account. 
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Figure 8. Fiscal positions and intensity of labour market reforms
 Panel A. Ranks of initial fiscal positions
1 and ranks of reform intensities over 1994-2004: OECD countries
(Spearman's rank) correlation coefficient:  0.14  
 Panel B. Ranks of initial fiscal positions
1 and ranks of reform intensities over 1994-2004: EU-15 countries
(Spearman's rank) correlation coefficient:  0.48 *
1. Rankings of cyclically-adjusted fiscal surpluses in 1993 (1995 for Czech Republic and Poland, 1994 for Slovak Republic).














































0 2 4 6 8 1 01 21 41 61 82 02 22 42 62 83 0
Ranks of fiscal balances in 1993
































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Ranks of fiscal balances in 1993
Ranks of reform intensity over 1994-2004
 
 184  
 The  cross-country  correlation  between the change in cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal 
balances over 1993-199784 and reform intensity over 1994-2004 is insignificant across the 
OECD (Figure 9, Panel A), but becomes significant when only EU countries are considered 
(Figure 9, Panel B).85 Furthermore, it is worth noting that most top reformers have gone through 
a smaller fiscal adjustment process than other OECD countries during the first half of the period 
1993-2004 (Denmark, Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Finland and Germany). Likewise, weak 
reform intensity in certain euro-area countries might to some extent reflect the limited political 
capital governments were left with during the period of fiscal adjustment in the run-up to EMU 
(Greece and Spain over the 1993-1997 period; Italy in the late 1990s (not apparent in Figure 9). 
                                                 
84.  The change in the primary balance is used here in order to get a more accurate measure of fiscal adjustment. Also, fiscal adjustment is 
measured over 1993-1997 instead of 1993-2004 in order to minimise endogeneity problems that arise from the gradual, positive feedback effects 
of structural reforms on fiscal positions. 
85.  Other combinations (correlations over various periods, lagged correlations) also yield insignificant correlation coefficients. 
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Figure 9. Change in primary fiscal positions and intensity of labour market reforms
 Panel A. Ranks of changes in primary fiscal positions
1 over 1993-1997 and reform intensities over 1994-2004: OECD 
(Spearman's rank) correlation coefficient:  -0.01  
 Panel B. Ranks of changes in primary fiscal positions
1 over 1993-1997 and reform intensities over 1994-2004: EU-15
(Spearman's rank) correlation coefficient:  -0.61 **
1. Rankings of changes in cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal surpluses between 1993 and 1997 (1995-1997 for Czech 
    Republic and Poland, 1994-1997 for Slovak Republic).
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3.4  Product market reforms during the past decade 
 
  An update of the OECD indicator of product market regulation (PMR)86 for non-
manufacturing industries indicates that the reduction of regulatory impediments to product market 
competition between 1994 and 2004 was somewhat larger in EMU and particularly in euro-area 
than in other OECD countries, to some extent offsetting their stricter initial policy stance 
(Figure 10). There has been some convergence within the EU, with greater deregulation occurring 
in the most regulated countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain).87 
No correlation can be found between these product market reform patterns and the indicators of 
fiscal policy used above. 
 
                                                 
86.  See Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
87.  Much of this move has been driven by the easing or elimination of coercive forms of regulation (such as command-and-control 
measures and price controls) and a reduction of controls on public or private business enterprise. Significant easing in all types of barriers to 
trade and investment has also been recorded. In contrast, progress in removing legal impediments to new entry in sectors sheltered from 
competition has been limited and the extent of privatisation has been modest. 
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*: the indicator of regulation in non-manufacturing industries is scaled from 0 (most liberal) to 6 (most restrictive).
   The broader OECD indicator (not reported here) covering both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries is 
   described in Conway et al. (2005).
   EU-14 denotes EU-15 minus Luxembourg.






































4. Regression  analysis 
 
  The well-known limitations of descriptive analysis such as that undertaken above point to 
the need for more comprehensive work. In this section, multivariate analysis is used to explore the 
driving factors of the structural policy reforms which have been carried out in OECD countries 
over the past two decades. Consistent with the rest of the paper, the analysis focuses on labour and 
- to a lesser extent - product markets. The modelling makes heavy use of OECD indicators of 
institutional arrangements and, in contrast with Section  3, restricts itself to major reforms as 
opposed to small ones. This emphasis facilitates the estimation of (non-linear) models of 
qualitative choice, which in theory should be more suitable than linear econometrics for the 
analysis of the decision to undertake a structural reform. 
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  Few comparable attempts to explain cross-country structural reform patterns have been 
made in the literature, owing mainly to data constraints. One exception is IMF (2004), which 
seeks to explain the policy stance in a large number of structural policy areas across many OECD 
countries between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s. The study explores the impact of a range of 
factors including macroeconomic conditions, political institutions, reform design and variables 
aimed to capture attitudes towards structural reform. As expected, fiscal surpluses are found to 
favour reforms in product and labour markets, while fiscal adjustment –measured as an 
improvement in the fiscal position– hinders them. 
  The remainder of this section proceeds in three steps. Section 4.1 discusses briefly the 
expected effects of the explanatory variables featured in the regressions. Section 4.2 presents the 
annual dataset of major labour and product reforms assembled for 21 OECD countries over the 
period 1985-2003.88 Section 4.3 attempts to explain the probability of carrying out major reforms 
by means of simple Probit estimates, and Section 4.4 presents linear estimates as a robustness 
check. 
4.1  Potential influences on the propensity to undertake reforms 
  The analysis essentially seeks to determine whether fiscal surpluses and/or fiscal 
adjustment facilitate or impede the reform process. As already noted, both variables are captured 
by the cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus and the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, 
respectively. Other potential influences on reform patterns which are controlled for in the 
econometric analysis are the following: 89, 90
−  Macroeconomic situation: 
Strict regulation of labour and – possibly -
 product markets is more likely to be perceived 
as counter-productive when labour market performance is weak. Over and above the 
possible impact of initial conditions on reform intensity, of which some simple bivariate 
evidence was found above for non-EMU countries, economic crises could play a specific 
role in fostering reforms. This is because a crisis situation may enable governments to 
                                                 
88.  The countries covered: are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
89.  Various attempts to capture the effects of the electoral process on reform patterns were also made but proved unsuccessful. Insofar as structural 
reforms have short-term political and/or economic costs, governments may be inclined to postpone them until after general elections have been 
held. Therefore, reforms should occur more frequently right after general elections than just before. In order to test for this assumption, a general 
election year dummy variable was constructed, taking value  1 on parliamentary or presidential election years and 0 otherwise (Source: 
Worldbank, Database on Political Institutions). However, this dummy variable –as well as various lags and leads of it– was always found to be 
insignificant in the Probit regressions below. 
90.  Section 2 also hinted at possible interactions between monetary policy autonomy and the fiscal position in facilitating or hindering the reform 
process. The rationale behind such interactions is that independent monetary policy could more easily crowd in resources in the wake of 
structural reforms, thereby lessening the need for fiscal accommodation, and vice versa. A dummy variable capturing the degree of autonomy of 
national monetary policy was constructed, which took value 1 when the country was not engaged in any kind of fixed exchange-rate arrangement 
(e.g. a peg, a monetary union or the former exchange-rate mechanism  of  the European Monetary System) and zero otherwise (for details, see 
Duval and Elmeskov, 2005). However, interactions between this measure of monetary policy autonomy and the fiscal variables consistently 
turned out to be statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
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overcome the “status quo” bias which in normal times can prevent welfare-enhancing 
reforms from being implemented.
91
−  Trade openness: 
Due to “crowding-in” effects already discussed, it may be politically easier to carry out 
structural reforms in small open economies than in larger ones. Furthermore, high trade 
openness and the resulting high labour demand elasticity in small open economies may 
limit the ability of insiders to set wages above market-clearing levels, resulting in lower 
rents and thus lower public support for existing institutions (Saint-Paul, 2004). 
−  Reforms undertaken in other fields: 
Some of the specifications estimated below also control for the fact that implementing 
reforms in certain fields may pave the way for reforms in others. As argued above, 
reducing rents in one area may undermine the support for structural policies in other 
areas aimed at capturing such rent. Learning effects may also play a role, i.e. public 
support for structural reform may build up as the benefits of past reforms become more 
visible. Moreover, policy packages may be easier to implement than isolated reforms 
because they spread gains and losses more evenly across population groups and/or 
facilitate the compensation of losers. 
4.2 Data  construction 
 
  The econometric analysis is based on an annual database of major structural reforms in 
21  OECD countries over 1985-2003, constructed for the purpose of this paper. Sources and 
methodology are presented in detail in Annex  1. Compared with the descriptive evidence 
presented in Section 3, the focus here is as previously mentioned on major reforms only, and the 
coverage of policies is restricted to those areas that allow for quantitative description over an 
extended period. Hence, only five fields are considered for which available quantitative indicators 
of the policy stance make it possible to spot major reforms: unemployment benefit systems, 
labour taxes, employment protection legislation, product market regulation and retirement 
schemes. 
  In each of the five policy fields, a major reform is assumed to be undertaken when the 
change in the corresponding quantitative policy indicator (e.g. the OECD summary measure of 
replacement rates in the case of unemployment benefit systems) exceeds two standard deviations 
of the indicator’s sample average.92 This approach yields one reform indicator for each policy 
area, which takes the value  1 when observations  – i.e. pairs  (country,  year)  - correspond to a 
major policy reform and 0 otherwise. Cross-country patterns of major reforms thereby identified 
appear to be roughly consistent with those presented in Section 3 for different types of reforms 
                                                 
91.  See for instance Drazen (2000). 
92.  In the field of product market regulation, there has been a strong general trend toward liberalisation. To distinguish particular moves 
toward liberalisation from this general trend the indicator of product market regulation was initially de-trended. Without this procedure, which 
admittedly is somewhat ad hoc, product market reforms would have weighed very heavily in the data sample (see Annex 1). 
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(both minor and major ones, covering a broader range of policy areas) over a shorter period 
(1994-2004 instead of 1985-2003) (Figure 11). 
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*: EU-14: EU-15 minus Luxembourg.
   EMU-11 = EMU-12 minus Luxembourg.
Source: Author's calculations.
Figure 11. Share of countries where at least one major reform has been implemented
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  Many reforms do not occur in a single year but rather are spread over several consecutive 
years, in which case the indicator takes the value 1 throughout the whole period. In principle, this 
implies a risk that major, but gradual, reforms weigh too heavily in the data sample as compared 
with major, one-off reforms. As well, such gradual reforms might be implemented in years and 
under economic conditions that are significantly different from when they were decided, thereby 
possibly making it more difficult to identify the drivers of reform. In practice, however, protracted 
reform processes are rare in the policy areas and for the countries covered here. 
  The key explanatory variables considered in the regressions are the level of and the change 
in the fiscal balance. These and the control variables are defined as follows: 
−  Situation of public finances: cyclically-adjusted general government fiscal balance as a share of 
GDP (Source: OECD, OECD Economic Outlook 76, December 2004).
 93 
−  Change in the situation of public finances: first difference of the cyclically-adjusted general 
government primary fiscal balance as a share of GDP (Source: OECD, OECD Economic 
Outlook 76, December 2004). 
−  Initial labour market performance: unemployment rate of 15-64  year-olds (Source: OECD, 
OECD Employment Outlook, June 2004). 
−  Economic crisis situation: dummy variable which takes value 1 when actual GDP is at least 
4 percentage points below potential and 0 otherwise (Source: OECD, OECD Economic Outlook 
76, December 2004). 
−  Small open economy: dummy variable which takes value 1 for the following countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and 0 otherwise. These are the smallest countries in the sample in terms 
of GDP size.
94 
4.3  Probit regression results 
 
  The five policy reform indicators can be used in two alternative ways. One option is to 
merge them so as to obtain an aggregate policy reform indicator which takes value 1 for those 
pairs (country, year) that correspond to major reform in at least one policy area and 0 otherwise. 
Alternatively, the individual policy reform indicators can be stacked up in order to expand 
dramatically the number of observations available for the econometric estimates. One problem 
with this option is that it rests implicitly on the assumption that structural reforms undertaken in a 
given pair (country, year) in different fields are independent from one another. However, this can 
                                                 
93.  The cyclically-adjusted budget balance is conceptually closer to the political and financial capital available to the government than the 
actual budget balance. The same holds for the change in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, which should in principle be more representative 
of the political capital spent in consolidation of public finances than the change in the actual budget balance. In addition, fiscal variables that are 
calculated in cyclically-adjusted terms are much less likely to be correlated with other explanatory variables such as the unemployment rate or 
the economic crisis dummy. This contributes to minimise multicollinearity risks. One important difference between the regressions below and 
those presented in Duval and Elmeskov (2005) is that both the level of and the change in the fiscal balance are calculated in cyclically-adjusted 
terms here –while actual values were used for the level of the budget balance in Duval and Elmeskov (2005).   
94.  Setting a cut-off point is not straightforward, considering for instance that the economic size of the smallest “large” country, Australia, exceeds 
only slightly that of the largest “small” country, the Netherlands (the gap between the two countries’ GDP in PPPs was about 15% in 2000). 
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be accounted for in the econometric estimates by controlling for the impact of reforms undertaken 
in other fields. Therefore, aggregate and stacked up datasets are used each in turn in the Probit 
regressions below. 
  Probit estimates on aggregate data are presented in column 1 of Table 2.95 In order to 
mitigate potential endogeneity problems and  to account  for the fact that policy  decisions  may 
be reflected  in  the structural policy indicators with lags, most explanatory variables are lagged 
one (crisis, fiscal and independent monetary policy variables) or more (unemployment 
variable96) periods. Both the fiscal and control variables have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. The probability of carrying out a structural reform in at least one of the 
five fields considered is estimated to be higher the poorer the recent macroeconomic conditions, 
the smaller the country size, the higher the level of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal position and the 
smaller the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal balance. Taking into account that the 
scale of the explanatory variables differs, the size of the estimated coefficients –as measured in 
Table 2 by the marginal probabilities under parentheses– seems to imply that the largest impact on 
the propensity to reform would arise from the prevalence of an economic crisis and the size of the 
country, but the estimated effects of the fiscal variables are also far from negligible.  
                                                                                                                                                               
However, while Australia has the third lowest trade openness ratio in the OECD area (after the United States and Japan), the Netherlands has the 
third highest (after Belgium and Ireland). This suggests that Australia should be classified as a large country and the Netherlands as a small one. 
95.  Logit estimates yield (qualitatively) similar results. 
96.  Unemployment being a highly auto-correlated variable, several alternative lags were statistically significant in the regressions. Here we selected 
the number of lags which maximized the t-statistic of the unemployment rate variable (3 periods). 
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Table 2. 
Probit estimates of the determinants of structural reforms over 1985-2003
1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Econometric method: Probit Random-effects probit Probit Random-effects probit
Dataset: Aggregate Aggregate Stacked up Stacked up
Dependent variable: Binary reform index Binary reform index Binary reform index Binary reform index
Unemployment (-3) 0.06   (m.p: 0.02) 0.10 0.03   (m.p: 0.01) 0.08
[2.68]*** [1.97]** [3.01]*** [3.69]***
Crisis (-1) 0.95   (m.p: 0.36) 1.19 0.38   (m.p: 0.09) 0.71
[2.90]*** [3.08]*** [2.74]*** [3.29]***
Small country 0.62   (m.p: 0.23) 0.64 0.38   (m.p: 0.07) 0.26
[3.98]*** [1.97]** [4.08]*** [1.31]
Cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus (-1) 0.12   (m.p: 0.05) 0.15 0.07   (m.p: 0.01) 0.11
[5.32]*** [3.69]*** [5.30]*** [4.97]***
D(Cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus (-1)) -0.11   (m.p: -0.04) -0.13 -0.04   (m.p: -0.01) -0.08
[1.96]** [2.01]** [1.30] [1.95]*
Other reforms (-1) 0.2   (m.p: 0.04) 0.27
[4.02]*** [3.00]***
Observations 333 333 1655 1655
1. m.p: marginal probability. 
Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Source: Author's calculations.  
  Standard probit estimates such as those presented in column 1 of Table 2 purposefully 
ignore the panel structure of the data. As a robustness check, in column 2 the equation is re-
estimated using a panel data, random-effects probit framework in which countries are considered 
as different individuals. The results are virtually unaffected, except the unemployment variable 
and the small country dummy which are now significant only at the 5% (instead of 1%) 
confidence level. 
  Estimates on stacked up data (columns 3 and 4) use the same specifications97 as those on 
aggregate data, except that they also control for the (lagged) effect of reforms made in other fields 
on the propensity to implement a reform in a given field.98 As already mentioned, this additional 
control variable aims to capture positive spillovers between structural reforms in different areas. 
The results are fairly comparable to those obtained on aggregate data, except that the fiscal 
adjustment variable is not statistically significant at conventional levels in the standard probit 
regression (column 3). In line with IMF (2004), reforms made in other fields are found to be 
                                                 
97.  In principle, the use of stacked-up data also makes it possible to undertake the analysis of the determinants of structural reforms at the level of 
each policy area. However, the scarcity of reforms in each field considered individually suggests – and estimates confirmed – that this is likely to 
bring few robust findings. 
98.  For each of the five policy fields considered, this variable takes values comprised between 0 and 4 depending on the number of reforms carried 
out in the other four fields. 
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highly significant, supporting the view that major reforms are typically “bunched” into packages 
and/or that policy changes in certain areas can pave the way for reforms in others. 
4.4  Linear regression results 
 
  Insofar as the reform process is inherently a binary one, the probit approach adopted above 
should be appropriate. However, in practice, distinguishing “reforms” from “small policy changes 
going in the right direction” necessarily involves some degree of subjectivity, which the 
methodology adopted here to identify major reforms could only at best minimise. Moreover, the 
probit approach does not allow studying the dynamics of the reform process, and may even 
unduly reward slow movers as opposed to overnight reformers, even though this problem is 
probably limited in the context of this paper. For instance, an interesting issue which can not 
easily be tackled within the probit framework is whether the propensity to undertake reform is 
greater the stricter the initial policy stance in the field considered.  
  Against this backdrop, the following linear equation is estimated on the aggregate dataset 




it k it it Z X X ε δ β α + + + = Δ ∑ −1 ) ( , 
where   is the overall policy stance in country i in period t, calculated as the sum of normalised 
–so as to allow comparisons of policy stances across fields
it X
99– OECD policy indicators in each of 
the five fields covered (unemployment benefits, taxes, EPL, retirement incentives, PMR). In other 
words,




it Y stdev Y Y X − =∑
, where  is the OECD policy indicator in field j (e.g. the 
measure of unemployment benefits or the strictness of EPL). The term   captures the lagged 
impact of the policy stance on the change in the policy stance, i.e. on the propensity to undertake 
reform. A negative coefficient would indicate that reforms –measured here as a decline in the 
overall policy stance– are likely to be greater the more there is room for reform, i.e. the stricter the 




it X 1 − α
i δ  captures in a crude way possible cross-country 
differences in policy preferences. The ’s denote the set of explanatory variables used 
previously, including the level and the change of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance, but 
excluding the country size dummy which is now captured by the country fixed effects. The crisis 
variable is refined and now denotes the number of crisis years over the past three years.  
k
it Z
                                                 
99.  It acknowledged, however, that there is no straightforward way to normalise the various policy stance indicators. The choice of the normalisation 
method could have some influence on the results. For instance, here, dividing by the standard deviation of policy stances implies that the weight 
of a given policy reform in the estimation is inversely related to the cross-country variation in policy stances in the field considered, ceteris 
paribus. 
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  Estimation results obtained with various econometric methods are presented in Table 3. 
Fixed effect estimates confirm the probit regression analysis, with the exception of the 
unemployment rate variable which is found to be insignificant (column 1).100 In particular, both 
the level of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal position and the change in the cyclically-adjusted 
primary fiscal balance are significant with expected signs. The country fixed effects are also 
found to be significant, pointing to cross-country differences in policy preferences and/or the 
influence of omitted variables on policy stances.101 However, fixed effects estimates can not be 
relied on since, as already noted, many of the explanatory variables –including the fiscal ones– are 
likely to be endogenous and thus to bias the results.102  
  Endogeneity problems are tackled in column 2 by means of system-GMM estimates 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). This method is particularly appropriate for the estimation of dynamic 
panel data equations when the dependent variable is highly persistent and/or certain explanatory 
variables are endogenous (see e.g. Bond, 2002). Here, all explanatory variables are assumed to be 
endogenous, and standard statistical tests suggest that the model is well specified.103 The main 
difference between System-GMM and fixed effect estimates is that the lagged policy stance 
becomes significant, suggesting that reforms are more likely to occur when the initial policy 
stance is strict. However, this effect is quantitatively small, pointing to a high degree of inertia. 
Both the level of the fiscal balance and the fiscal adjustment variable remain significant, although 
only at the 10% as regards the latter. 
                                                 
100.  The lack of significance of the unemployment rate can be explained on two grounds. First, its effect may already be captured – at least 
partly – by the crisis variable. Second, within the fixed-effect framework adopted here, the unemployment rate is likely to work essentially as a 
proxy for the business cycle position.  
101.  A Fisher test rejects the null hypothesis of no fixed effects at the 1% level.  
102.  Another potential concern is the standard downward dependent variable bias (Nickell, 1981). However, the downward lagged dependent 
variable bias falls as the time span of the sample increases. Furthermore, it is less of a concern when the time span is large and of the same order 
of magnitude of the number of countries, as is the case here (Judson and Owen, 1999).  
103.  The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis of valid moment conditions at the 5% (and even the 
10%) level, and the Arellano-Bond test rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the residuals but accepts –as would be 
expected– the null of second-order autocorrelation. However, the power of the Hansen test to detect invalid overidentifying restrictions can 
decline dramatically in small samples if an excessive number of moment conditions is used (Bowsher, 2000). Therefore, the system-GMM 
estimates presented in Table 3 only use instruments (levels of explanatory variables) lagged 2 and 3 periods in difference equations and 
instruments (first differences of explanatory variables) lagged 1 period in level equations. 
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(1) (2)
Econometric method: OLS fixed effects Sys-GMMs
1
Dataset: Aggregate Aggregate
Dependent variable: Change in policy stance Change in policy stance




Crisis years -0.08 -0.04
[2.92]*** [2.29]**
Cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus -0.03 -0.02
[3.05]*** [2.88]***
D(Cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus) 0.04 0.02
[3.03]*** [1.93]*
R squared 0.16
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions Chi2(201) = 16.2
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) -3.26***
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) -0.52
Observations 333 333
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%, *** sign
1: instruments (levels of explanatory variables) lagged 2 and 3 periods are used in difference equa
    and instruments (first differences of explanatory variables) lagged 1 period are used in level equ
Source: Author's calculations.
Table 3. 
Linear estimates of the determinants of structural reforms
over 1985-2003
 
4.5  Interactions between the fiscal adjustment variable and monetary policy autonomy 
 
  As already noted, one theoretical argument for the presence of the fiscal adjustment 
variable in the above regressions is that a temporary relaxation of fiscal policy may help offset 
any short-run economic slack associated with the implementation of structural reforms. However, 
this “crowding-in” argument should be less compelling when the monetary policy reaction to 
reforms can act as a substitute for fiscal accommodation. In a single country with an independent 
monetary policy, structural reforms that create short-run economic slack and lower inflation 
should bring about lower interest rates and exchange rate depreciation, both of which could in 
principle boost demand and thereby allow the added supply capacity to be “crowded in”. But such 
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mechanism is not available in a country that pursues a fixed exchange-rate regime or participates 
in a monetary union such as EMU, and therefore has little or no monetary autonomy.  
  In order to test whether the impact of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal 
balance is greater in those countries that have no monetary policy autonomy, a dummy variable is 
constructed which takes value  1 when the country is not engaged in any kind of fixed 
exchange-rate arrangement (e.g. a peg, a monetary union or the former exchange-rate mechanism 
of the European Monetary System) and zero otherwise. Information on official exchange-rate 
arrangements is drawn from various issues of the annual IMF publication Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions.104 This definition obviously ignores that fixed exchange-rate 
commitments come in different shapes and forms. For example, the ERM contained countries that 
pursued a “hard” peg to the Deutsche Mark (e.g. Netherlands) as well as countries that underwent 
frequent depreciation. The lack of sophistication in the definition of monetary autonomy may 
create a bias in the estimations, probably in the direction of not finding any effects. 105  
  All regressions in Tables 2 and 3 are then re-run including an interaction between the 
fiscal adjustment variable and the dummy variable for monetary policy autonomy.106 The results 
obtained for the variables of interest –namely the interaction term and the fiscal policy variables– 
are reported in Table 4. The interaction term is correctly signed in all equations and statistically 
significant in most of them. Taken at face value, the coefficient estimates imply that monetary 
policy autonomy partially offsets the impact of the change in the (cyclically-adjusted primary) 
fiscal balance on the propensity to undertake reforms. 
                                                 
104. Note  that  de jure exchange-rate regimes are not necessarily applied in practice (Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001), even though this 
issue is generally far more relevant for developing countries than for the developed ones considered here. As a result, some adjustments were 
made. In particular, Austria was classified as having a fixed exchange rate regime over the full sample period even when it was not a formal 
member of the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System. This is because this country maintained de facto a fixed exchange 
rate with the Deutsche Mark. 
105.  Another potential concern could be the asymmetry of the former European Monetary System. Indeed, it has been argued that German 
monetary policy acted as a “Stackelberg leader” under this system, while other central banks had to follow suit in order to maintain fixed 
exchange rates. In order to account for this possibility, the regressions presented in Tables 4 below were re-run assuming that Germany retained 
its monetary policy autonomy under the former EMS. The findings were qualitatively unaffected, with the interaction term even being 
marginally more significant in all equations. 
106.  These estimates also include the monetary policy autonomy dummy variable itself. Following a standard procedure, interactions 
between variables Xit and Yit –here, the autonomous monetary policy dummy and the fiscal adjustment variable, respectively– are specified as 
( )( ) .. .. Y Y X X it it − − , where  
.. X and 
.. Y are the sample averages of Xit and Yit , respectively. With this specification, the 
coefficients of Xit and Yit –and therefore the estimated effect of the fiscal adjustment variable– have a straightforward interpretation, i.e. they 
measure the direct effects of these variables for an average, hypothetical country. This is because the interaction term is equal to zero at the 
sample average. 
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OLS fixed effects Sys-GMMs
2










Change in policy 
stance
Change in policy 
stance
Cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus 0.12 (m.p: 0.05) 0.14 0.07 (m.p: 0.01) 0.12 -0.03 -0.02
[5.36]*** [3.76]*** [5.42]*** [4.49]*** [2.92]*** [2.86]***
D(Cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus) -0.13 (m.p: -0.05) -0.12 -0.04 (m.p: -0.01) -0.06 0.03 0.03
[2.10]** [1.82]* [1.30] [1.41]* [2.73]*** [2.31]**
Interaction (autonomous monetary 0.18  (m.p: 0.07) 0.22 0.11 (m.p: 0.02) 0.19 -0.03 -0.04
policy) * D(Cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus) [1.61] [1.73]* [1.66]* [2.16]** [1.35] [1.85]*
R squared 0.17
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions Chi2(270) = 15.3
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) -3.29***
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) -0.62
Observations 333 333 1655 1655 333 333
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
1: all equations in Table 4 also include the same control variables (not reported) as in Table 2 (for columns 1-4) and Table 3 (for columns 5-6). 
    They also include the dummy variable for monetary policy autonomy described in the main text.
    m.p: marginal probability. 
2: instruments (levels of explanatory variables) lagged 2 and 3 periods are used in difference equations,
    and instruments (first differences of explanatory variables) lagged 1 period are used in level equations
Source: Author's calculations.
Table 4. 
Testing for interactions between the autonomy of monetary policy




5.  Summary and conclusions 
 
  This paper is an empirical attempt to determine whether structural reforms in labour and 
product markets bear some relationship with fiscal positions and fiscal adjustment processes. A 
priori, a sound fiscal position should facilitate the implementation of structural reforms, insofar as 
it provides room for the compensation of losers as well as for crowding in resources if reforms –
e.g. in the labour market– create short-run economic slack. Conversely, fiscal adjustment –defined 
as a positive change in the cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal balance– may hamper the ability of 
governments to later implement other types of unpopular measures such as structural reforms, 
particularly those that would further depress aggregate demand. Against this backdrop, the 
question arises as to whether the persistently poor state of public finances, combined with fiscal 
adjustment during the run-up to EMU, has slowed down the reform process in a number of EU 
countries during the past decade. 
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  The descriptive evidence on recent reform patterns presented in this paper suggests that 
EU (including euro area) countries typically have undertaken more comprehensive and far-
reaching labour market reforms than other OECD countries over the past decade. However, this 
conclusion needs to be qualified in several ways. Different reform intensities between EU and 
non-EU countries need to be seen in the light of greater need for reform in the former. As well, 
EU countries – with the exception of a few small ones – have shown no particular ability to carry 
out needed reforms in areas where political resistance is normally strong (with the exception of 
retirement schemes where impending fiscal pressures are particularly large in EU countries). 
Furthermore, in the more specific case of EMU countries, there appears to have been a slowdown 
in the reform process after the formal advent of the euro – though this could reflect the prior race 
to qualify for EMU.  
  In line with theoretical priors, there is some evidence that top reformers (Denmark, 
Finland or the Netherlands) started their reform programmes with relatively favourable fiscal 
positions and made only limited efforts to improve them during their reform years. Conversely, in 
a number of EU countries where only few reforms have been implemented during the past decade, 
the state of public finances was initially poor and major fiscal adjustment efforts were made, 
especially during the run-up to EMU (Greece, Italy, Spain). 
  Nonetheless, the usual problem with descriptive evidence is that it is difficult to identify 
with any confidence the drivers behind the observed patterns of structural reform. This issue is 
likely to be even more acute here given the existence of feedback effects of structural reforms on 
the fiscal balance. Therefore, multivariate probit and linear analysis is carried out for 21 OECD 
countries over the period 1985-2003 in order to explore the influence of fiscal positions and fiscal 
adjustment processes on structural reforms, controlling for a number of other potential influences 
on the propensity to undertake reforms. The focus is on the major reforms made in labour and –to 
a lesser extent– product markets over the past two decades.  
  The upshot of the analysis is that many of the “usual suspects” indeed do seem to 
determine the pace of structural reform, such as going through an economic crisis and more 
broadly experiencing high unemployment. Small countries are also found to have a greater 
propensity to undertake reforms, possibly reflecting lower risks of short run economic slack 
and/or lower product market rents and thus lower public support for existing institutions aimed at 
capturing them. As expected, there is also robust evidence that a sound fiscal balance helps. 
Conversely, fiscal adjustment is found to hinder the structural reform process. There is also more 
tentative evidence that the latter effect may be greater for countries that pursue fixed exchange-
rate regimes or participate in a monetary union such as EMU, and therefore have little or no 
monetary autonomy. Possible extensions to this work include the incorporation of a number of 
additional control variables into the analysis, such as demographic or political factors. Moreover, 
the relationship between the reform process and the fiscal balance runs in both directions, and 
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should therefore ideally be treated as such –an issue tackled here through system GMM estimates 
but which deserves further attention. 
  Against this backdrop, the SGP might be seen to prevent an optimal inter-temporal 
management of fiscal policy, which in theory should allow for a short-run deterioration of public 
finances followed by a gradual improvement as the structural output gains of reforms materialise. 
However, the recent reorientation of the SGP should in principle have made the use of fiscal 
policy to accommodate structural reform easier.107 Furthermore, accommodation remains of 
course perfectly feasible all along for countries that undertake reform from a position of close to 
budget balance or surplus. 
                                                 
107.  For instance, a recent paper by Beetsma and Ribeiro (2005) develops a political economy model to study the interaction between 
structural reforms and the need to adhere to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In designing a reform package, governments are faced with a 
trade-off between reducing electoral uncertainty via monetary compensation to reform losers and abiding by the deficit limits of the SGP. Within 
this context, the authors show that looser sanctions and/or sanctions that take account of reform efforts or the business cycle should all facilitate 
the implementation of reforms.  
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Discussion Paper No. 1066, March. ANNEX 1: CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLICY REFORM DATABASE 
  In order to construct an annual database of structural reforms to be used in probit 
regressions, it would seem natural to collect information for each country regarding when 
major reforms were voted. However, not only is such an approach difficult - especially for 
reforms that were carried out prior the first publication of the OECD Jobs Study in 1994 - but 
more importantly it suffers from two important limitations: while our focus should be clearly 
on major reforms, there is no straightforward criterion a priori to distinguish them from small 
ones; certain reforms start small before getting big over the years and therefore can not be 
associated with any specific year. One example is the slow but quasi continuous decline in tax 
wedges in Denmark between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s or in Finland since the mid-
1990s. 
  Here these two limitations are dealt with as follows. First, in order to identify major 
reforms, we rely exclusively on a posteriori criteria: a major reform in a given policy area 
(e.g. product markets) is one that is accompanied by a “substantial” change in a corresponding 
quantitative policy indicator (e.g. the OECD indicator of product market regulation). This 
approach was already taken to construct the reform intensity indexes presented in Section 4, 
but only to a limited extent since more qualitative information was also taken into account. 
Second, if the “substantial” change in the policy indicator does not occur in a particular year 
but rather is spread over a longer period, then all the corresponding years are assumed to have 
been reform years. This is implicitly consistent with the view that a country engaged in a 
reform process has the possibility to opt out every year, so that the continuation of a reform 
process can by itself be regarded as a “reform”. 
  We restrict our analysis to five key policy areas for which straightforward 
quantitative indicators can be used to assess the magnitude of policy reforms. These are 
unemployment benefit systems, labour taxes, employment protection legislation, product 
market regulation and retirement schemes, for which the quantitative indicators used are, 
respectively: the OECD summary measure of benefit replacement rates (an average of 
replacement rates across various earnings levels, family situations and durations of 
unemployment); an average of OECD measures of the wedge between labour cost and take-
home pay across two situations (a single worker and a couple with a dependent spouse and 
two children, at average earnings levels in both cases); the OECD summary index of 
employment protection legislation; the OECD summary index of product market regulation in 
seven non-manufacturing industries; an average of OECD measures of implicit tax rates on 
continued work -  which sum up deviations from actuarial neutrality  - in old-age pension 
systems and early retirement schemes across thee situations (at ages 55 and 60 in early 
retirement schemes, and at age 60 in old-age pension schemes, for a single worker with   
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average earnings in all three cases).
108 All these indicators are available for 21  OECD 
countries over the period 1985-2003. 
  The threshold beyond which a change in the policy indicator is assumed to signal a 
major policy reform is set as follows. For each of the five policy areas mentioned above, the 
standard deviation of the annual change in the corresponding quantitative indicator is 
calculated over all available observations (typically 399, corresponding to 21 countries over 
the period 1985-2003). A major reform is then assumed to have been undertaken when the 
overall change in the policy indicator exceeds two standard deviations. In practice, this 
corresponds respectively to: a decline in the benefit replacement rate indicator larger than 
6.5 percentage points; a decline in the tax wedge measure larger than 5 percentage points; a 
decline in the summary index of employment protection legislation larger than 0.5 units (the 
average value of the index over the sample considered is 2.1); a decline in the de-trended 
indicator of product market regulation larger than 0.6 units (the average value of the de-
trended index over the sample considered is 5);
109 a decline in the average implicit tax rate on 
continued work larger than 6.5 percentage points. 
  We obtain one reform indicator for each policy area, which takes value  1 when 
observations - i.e. pairs (country, year) - correspond to a major policy reform and 0 otherwise. 
Two alternative ways can then be envisaged to exploit these five reform variables: 
−  One option is to merge them so as to obtain an aggregate policy reform indicator which 
takes value 1 for those pairs (country, year) that correspond to at least one major policy 
reform and 0 otherwise. 
−  Alternatively, they can be stacked up in order to expand dramatically the amount of 
information available for the econometric estimates. One problem with this option is that it 
rests implicitly on the assumption that structural reforms undertaken in a given pair 
(country, year) in different fields are independent from one another. However, this can be 
accounted for in the econometric estimates by controlling for the impact of reforms 
undertaken in other fields. 
  Therefore, both aggregate and stacked up datasets are used alternatively in the Probit 
regressions presented in Section 4.3 of the main text. 
 
 
108.  The main sources for these indicators are respectively: OECD, Benefits and Wages, various issues ; OECD, Taxing Wages, 
various issues; OECD (2004a), Employment Outlook, Paris; Nicoletti, G. and S. Scarpetta (2003), “Regulation, productivity and growth”, 
Economic Policy, No.  36; Conway P. and G. Nicoletti (2006), “Product market regulation in non-manufacturing sectors in OECD 
countries: measurements and highlights”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, forthcoming, OECD, Paris; Duval, R. (2003), 
“Retirement Behaviour in OECD Countries: Impact of Old-age Pension Schemes and Other Social Transfer Programs” OECD Economic 
Studies No. 37, 2003/2, OECD, Paris. 
109.  The rationale for de-trending the product market regulation indicator is to control for the general decline observed across the 
OECD area over the sample period. In the absence of such a control, our methodology would identify a disproportionately large number of 
reforms compared with other policy fields. Instead, here only declines in product market regulation that have gone substantially beyond the 
general trend towards deregulation are considered as major policy reforms. 